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## Near East/South Asia Report

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30 December 1985

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## 'ARAFAT ON PLO RESOLVE TO FIGHT U.S.-ISRAELI TERRORISM

LD020848 Algiers Domestic Service in Arabic 0600 GMT 2 Dec 85

[Text] PLO Executive Committee Chairman, Yasir 'Arafat, in a statement to Algiers Radio, said that the recent Zionist attack on the PLO General Command headquarters was not the result of what is being alleged by the Zionists [words indistinct] but was basically due to the concentrated fedayeen operations being carried out by Palestinians inside occupied territories and the painful blows they are dealing to the enemy, and his economic and military establishments. He pointed out that the Palestinian resistance is proud of the resolution adopted by the Palestine National Council regarding the escalation of the armed struggle against the Zionist enemy inside the occupied territories.

Regarding the recent Central Palestine Council meeting in Baghdad, Yasir 'Arafat said:

[Begin 'Arafat recording] This meeting, which was held in Baghdad last week, was important. It was attended by a large number of the leaderships and cadres of the Palestinian revolution. In addition to the Central Council's meeting, a meeting of the Palestinian leadership and of the Executive Committee, were also held. Details of the situation in which the Arab region and particularly the Palestinian issue, is passing were discussed at these meetings in light of Arab and Palestinian as well as international moves. The importance of the PLO Central Council and the Palestinian leadership's meetings in Baghdad at this time lies in the fact that they would allow us the opportunity to reply to all these practices and pressures and organized official terrorism against the PLO--which is an American-Israeli terrorism not only against the PLO but also against Tunisia, Egypt, Italy, Yugoslavia, and even against the United Nations. Therefore, the statement which was issued has put matters in their right places and was our reply to all U.S. attempts to intimidate or pressure us. As before, we are a nut which is difficult to crack, or as we say in a proverb: you cannot eat the flesh of every bird. Our struggle is a long one, as that of the Algerian people who sacrificed one and a half million martyrs. Like the Algerians, our backbone is strong. The Palestinian revolution defies every one who tries to terrorize it. [end recording]

Yasir 'Arafat spoke about other issues in this radio interview. He referred to one of his documents which pointed out that the Palestinian resistance mounted 622 fedayeen operations during the first 9 months of this year which resulted in the death of 810 Zionists and the wounding of 151 others.

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CSO: 4500/41

## AFRICAN WEEKLY PRAISES FLN COURSE, POLICIES

LD011739 Algiers APS in English 1140 GMT 1 Dec 85

[Text] Algiers, 01/12/85 (APS)--"The preeminence of the FLN party on the national scene if it bothers the followers of "liberalism" and even "multipartism" has initiated new ethics and customs as was noticed on the occasion of the nationwide debate on the enrichment of the national charter," the weekly REVOLUTION AFRICAINE wrote in its last issue.

It is indisputably the debates on the enrichment of the national charter that were the core of the hectic activity of the party instances. Citizens expressed themselves democratically on topics decisive for the present and the future of the country, they voiced concern mainly over socio-economic development, the defense of the gains of socialism, the unity of the FLN party, the internal and external security of the country and the need to strictly control the private sector.

Those who were expecting the questioning or the were repudiation of the essential options freely decided, by the Algerian people or nothing for their pain. [sentence as received]

Their fear before the fervent pleas for the safeguarding of the gains of socialism made them come out in the open. They tried to undermine the bases of the Algerian revolution through its guide the FLN party but to no avail.

By giving them the floor, the weekly went on, the FLN party showed its proclivity for dialogue and democracy, [word indistinct] proved that it is a progressive party opened toward the masses from which it emanates and who have strongly reasserted their adherence to the FLN ideals and to the course it charted out.

Thus certain trends could express themselves freely and this evidently is an act of political democracy, besides the FLN party assumes the destiny of the country in conformity with the will of the masses and the masses only can decide about their present and future. The recent debates set facts in their true light all the fuss they made about changes to be brought about was wishful thinking they must take it once and for all that the link between the FLN party, and its vanguard is very strong and permanent.



The FLN, the weekly further added is mustering up all the vivid forces of the nation, its care for youth, which was one of the topics of the fifteenth session of the Central Committee, its all-out efforts to provide good training for youth and prepare future to take over are reflective of its will to conceive of and build future on healthy bases.

They are also its best guarantees of success, the weekly concluded.

/9599

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## BRIEFS

COMMUNIQUE WITH BURKINA FASO--Algiers, 11 Nov 85 (APS)--A joint communique was signed here Sunday between the National Union of Algerian Youth and the defence committees of the Burkina Faso revolution after a series of talks between delegations of the two organizations. The document which dealt with questions related to the development of the two countries and the international situation, insisted on the reinforcement of cooperation relations between the Algerian and Burkinabe youth. Dealing with the international situation especially in Africa and in the Arab world, the two sides noticed the intensification of imperialist manoeuvres directed against national liberation movements democratic forces and progressive countries, hindering the development process of new societies. The two delegations reiterated their support for struggle of the South African people under the leadership of ANC and the Saharan people under the leadership of the Polisario Front. [Text] [Algiers APS in English 1035 GMT 11 Nov 85 LD] /9599

CSO: 4500/41



## EGYPT

### FRG FIRMS AID IN DEVELOPING RAILWAY SYSTEM

Hamburg DEUTSCHE VERKEHRSZEITUNG in German 28 Sep p 15

[Text] Firms from the FRG are supporting Egyptian efforts to expand and modernize the railway system. Among those heavily involved in numerous projects are Siemens AG, AEG-Telefunken AG, Thyssen Henschel, Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm and German Railroad Consulting GmbH.

Siemens AG is currently involved in several projects. The ZUB 100 train control system is to be installed on the route from Alexandria through Cairo to Asyut.

The route from Cairo to Sidi Jabir has been monitored with the aid of this system since the spring of 1983. The German firm was also awarded the contract to expand the Cairo-North to Qalyub route at the beginning of last year. This order is expected to be worth DM 77 million. It includes the expansion of several stations.

About 1 year ago AEG-Telefunken received an order for more than DM 12 million. The company is supplying the electrical equipment for 120 air-conditioned second class carriages and 15 complete spare sets of equipment and spare parts to meet a 3-year requirement.

In the past Thyssen Henschel has exported a total of 232 diesel-electric locomotives of the same model to Egypt. The 10th contract, which was concluded just a short time ago, calls for the delivery of 21 of the same type of locomotive, valued at about DM 60 million.

In cooperation with AEG-Telefunken AG, which was responsible for the electrical equipment, Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm (MBB) is supplying 40 generator cars from Donauwoerth to Egypt. These cars are used on non-electrified routes, where they can supply an entire train with electricity by means of a full-length collector rail.

German Railroad Consulting GmbH is acting in an advisory capacity in the rehabilitation of the track bed. The Bundesbahn and the Deutsche Bank are involved in the undertaking.

Egypt is receiving financial assistance in these railway projects from the German government through the Credit Institute for Reconstruction (KfW). In 1984 the KfW made DM 119 million available. Almost DM 70 million of this was for supplying locomotives and spare parts, DM 22 million to build up capital aid for the rehabilitation of the track bed and DM 15 million was approved for workshop installations.

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CSO: 4620/3

## PLANNED PRICE CONTROLS ON PRODUCE DISCUSSED

### Reviving Old Pricing System

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 6 Oct 85 p 14

[Article by 'Ali Shalabi]

[Text] Dr Naji Shatlah, the minister of supply and internal trade, stated that he will submit this week to the Council of Ministers a bill aimed at controlling vegetable and fruit prices and establishing a price balance in the local market.

The bill calls for reviving a currently suspended old law issued in the 1950's which requires wholesalers to keep books and bills showing the purchase price from the producer. It also requires retailers to post two prices for each commodity: the price of purchase from the wholesaler and the sale price for the consumer.

The minister said that a 7 percent margin of profit will be set for the wholesaler and a profit margin of 25-30 percent will be set for the retailer, depending on the kind of commodity offered the consumer. This system is in operation in numerous European countries and its implementation in Egypt will create no supply problems.

### Agriculture's Production for Supply

Dr Shatlah added that his bill includes five other plans which seek to supply fruits and vegetables to consumers at proper prices and to increase the quantities sold at the distribution outlets of the consumer cooperatives controlled by the ministry from 100 tons to 500 tons a day.

An agreement will be concluded between the Ministry of Supply and the agricultural sector to deliver to the ministry 200,000 tons of vegetables and 100,000 tons of fruits to be marketed at the cooperatives.

The minister also pointed out that an agreement has been reached with Dr Yusuf Wali, the deputy prime minister and the minister of agriculture, to cultivate 40,000 feddans with fruits and vegetables for the Ministry of Supply and to set up collection centers at the production sites to receive, prepare, package, and distribute the supply to the various outlets. Agreement has also been reached to deliver the Ministry of Agriculture's entire production of fruits and vegetables to the Ministry of Supply.

The bill prepared by the minister of supply also calls for boosting the role performed by the fruit and vegetable marketing associations in all the governorates in order to develop their work and to provide them with technical equipment and with the necessary cadres so that they may be able to perform their role as a wholesaler instead of continuing to play their current role as conventional associations that do not serve the purpose required of them.

These associations get their financing from the Agricultural Development Bank and then they, in turn, finance the producer instead of forcing him to resort to the wholesaler. This step requires the consolidated efforts of all the governors.

#### Controlling Prices

The minister also announced that the bill further calls on the consuming governorates, such as Cairo and al-Jizah Governorates, to set up producer markets on specific sites in the various quarters and on the fruit and vegetable marketing associations in the other governorates to supply these markets with the quantities they require to meet the consumer needs.

The bill also calls on the Ministry of Supply to set up consumer cooperatives in Greater Cairo to sell fruits and vegetables only. Agreement has already been reached to set up three such cooperatives.

The bill further calls for eliminating Rawd al-Faraj market and for setting up alternative wholesale markets whose task will be to supply fruits and vegetables in quantities that meet consumer needs in the Greater Cairo Governorate.

The minister of supply stressed that the bill he has prepared will eliminate the crisis in a fundamental manner and will make it possible to control prices.

#### Fair Pricing System

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 6 Oct 85 p 14

[Article by Ibrahim 'Aziz]

[Text] It seems that the Ministry of Supply has finally become convinced of the feasibility and importance of establishing compulsory vegetable prices that are fair to both the producer and the consumer. This is why the ministry has announced the revival of this pricing system in light of the failure of the voluntary pricing system which, legally, does not require observation of the posted prices.

With the restoration of the pricing system, a lengthy debate has erupted on how to insure the enforcement and survival of the system and on how to make it fair to both sides: the producer and the consumer.

What are the bases which must be followed in establishing the compulsory price so that it may do neither side an injustice and may not cause the disappearance of goods?

## Producer and Consumer Prices

Dr Sa'd 'Allam, the director of agricultural planning at the National Planning Institute, believes that a distinction must be made between two fundamental pricing levels, namely producer prices and consumer prices.

The ongoing debate focuses mainly on the consumer prices without dealing adequately with the producer prices despite their important impact on the supply of various kinds of goods offered for sale.

It is noticed generally that both producer and consumer prices are inclined to rise year after year. But the rate of increase in the consumer prices is much higher than the rate of increase in the producer prices.

## Middlemen's Greed

While the increase in the producer price is due to increased demand and higher production costs, the big and constant rise in the consumer prices is due fundamentally to the multiplicity of middlemen, to increased demand, and to the lack of set consumer prices. This leads to increasing prices without any controls and without any real reasons for such an increase.

It has been noticed that the difference between the producer price and the consumer price, or the so-called marketing margin, is usually higher in the fruits and vegetables group than in other groups of goods. This indicates a flaw in the marketing apparatus controlling this group, especially since it has become evident that the profit margin is three times the profit margin achieved by the producer. This means that there is a major flaw in the marketing structure and there is the unfairness emanating from this flaw.

Considering that there is a flaw in an a failure on the part of the marketing apparatus, then pricing becomes an urgent requirement in order to prevent a widening of the gap between incomes and prices.

## Encouraging Producers

[Words presumably dropped] and fruits, the producers must be encouraged by being enabled to get fair prices for their production so that they will be motivated to increase their production, improve its quality, reduce family consumption, and, consequently, increase the supply of these varieties.

Producer prices must cover the costs and permit a reasonable profit margin. It is also required to determine the components forming this price. This does not preclude having different prices in different provinces. The starting point is to set the producer price accurately and fairly. Then the profit margins for each of the wholesaler and retailer can be set.

## Effective Control

Dr 'Allam stressed that with the setting of prices, there has to be an effective and constant control over the markets, not just to observe the prices but

also to watch the supply so as to insure that goods do not disappear from the market. The laws concerning price violations and the failure to observe the prices must also be strictly enforced.

#### Associations' Role

Dr 'Allam added: the fruit and vegetable marketing associations and the agricultural cooperative apparatus can perform an extremely important role in marketing these goods and insuring that they are in supply by obtaining the goods from the government and agrarian reform farms and by purchasing them from the farmers directly. This requires the associations to expand their activities and to secure the resources they need, be they financial resources or trained cadres.

The agro-industrial sector can absorb big production at the season peak and process this production in order to supply it throughout the year.

#### Central Pricing Committee

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 6 Oct 85 p 14

[Text] In accordance with President Husni Mubarak's instructions and with Prime Minister Dr 'Ali Lutfi's decisions on the need to control prices and curb their rise, the Ministry of Supply has intervened to establish a fair compulsory price that guarantees that the producer gets his due and that sets a reasonable profit margin amounting to 7 percent for the wholesaler and 25 percent for the retailer.

It has also been decided that the ministry's control agencies will carry out their daily responsibility of insuring implementation of the compulsory price. At the same time, 50 outlets have been set up for the wholesale marketing of fruits and vegetables in the governorates producing them, such as al-Qalyubiyah, al-Buhayrah, al-Sharqiyah, and Ismailia, so that these outlets may gather the produce put out by these governorates and may eliminate the middlemen who reap excessive profits.

#### Central Pricing Committee

On the method of establishing prices, Eng Husayn Khalil, the under secretary at the Ministry of Supply for control and distribution, said: a central committee will meet at the ministry's general office every Monday morning to price vegetables. This committee includes representatives of the Ministry of Supply, specialists in the Ministry of Agriculture and in the supply directorates of Cairo, al-Jizah, al-Qalyubiyah, and Alexandria Governorates, representatives of the supply intelligence, heads of the consumer cooperative companies, and representatives of the Chamber of Commerce, the retailers, and the producers.

After reviewing the opinions and familiarizing itself with the volume of each commodity produced, this committee will set fair prices for fruits and vegetables in the Greater Cairo wholesale and retail markets. These prices will be transmitted to the other governorates on the same day so that they may use them as a guide in setting their prices at a meeting they hold every Tuesday, with the prices going into effect as of every Thursday morning.



As for the wholesale market, the prices will go into effect as of Wednesday noon so that the retailers may apply them as of Thursday morning.

#### Prices in Governorates

Khalil added: the task of this central committee is to coordinate the prices applied in the various governorates, guided by Greater Cairo, which encompasses the largest consumer concentration that attracts such goods to its markets.

The prices set for the producing governorates and the governorates close to them will be lower than Cairo's prices. It is possible, however, that these prices will be higher than Cairo's prices in the remote governorates only because of the higher transportation costs incurred when shipping produce to them from the producing governorates. But these higher prices will not be excessive.

It is well known that the current period falls between two cycles when the vegetable supply drops due to the small volume produced. But when this period passes, compulsory prices will be set for vegetables each week in accordance with certain rules that cover actual costs, the producer's profit, and the profit of wholesalers and retailers.

#### Wholesale Market First

Khalil asserted at the same time that the Ministry of Supply's main objective is to control the wholesale market first and that it will then be possible to control the retailer.

Moreover, consideration has been given to increasing the acreage planted with fruits and vegetables for the Ministry of Supply so that it may be possible to supply 1,500 tons of fruits and vegetables each day.

Khalil also asserted that it has been decided to advance loans to producers to encourage them to deliver their production to the Ministry of Supply directly and without the intervention of middlemen.

#### Compulsory Vegetable Prices

Cairo AL-SIYASI in Arabic 6 Oct 85 p 14

[Text] Dr Naji Shatlah, the minister of supply, stated that compulsory vegetable prices in Cairo will not be achieved in isolation from the other governorates.

The minister added that he will ask the minister of local government to instruct all the governorates to establish compulsory vegetable prices so as to prevent the producers from trying to avoid delivering their goods to Cairo.

The minister also said that he asked the ministry's agencies concerned to expand the efforts to set up new sale outlets controlled by the ministry so that they may compete with the private sector's retailers and may establish a price balance in the markets.

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PREMIER GIVES INTERVIEW DURING VISIT TO AMERICA

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 26 Oct-1 Nov 85 pp 67-70

[Interview with al-Jazuli Daf'allah, Premier of Sudan, by Khalil Matar: "America Is Being Asked To Rebuild the Sudan; We Are Not Responsible for the Debts of Numayri's Regime"; in the United States, date not given]

[Text] They have said that chance made him head of the Doctors' Union. They have said that chance made him prime minister. However, Dr al-Jazuli Daf'allah has proved that he has a distinctive political sense and exceptional power to master the ability rapidly to adapt himself to his new position in the premiership, which he assumed early in April 1985. He has quickly gained the respect of all parties in the Sudan.

This conversation with the Sudanese prime minister, which AL-TADAMUN held with him during the first visit he made to the United States, contains "prescriptions" for most Sudanese and Arab ailments. Dr al-Jazuli's preoccupation, as that of every Sudanese, is the fledgling democracy in the Sudan. Because it is his preoccupation, he mentioned it more than 32 times during his conversation with AL-TADAMUN. The conversation also dealt with the Sudan's problems and concerns, starting with economic problems, passing through efforts to implant the foundations of democracy and ending with the problem of the south. Dr al-Jazuli Daf'allah, through AL-TADAMUN, urged Col John Garang to stop the fighting and prepare for negotiation, and also revealed that Ethiopia has not yet responded to the Sudan's initiative to improve relations. He stressed that his government would not devalue the Sudanese pound and would not yield to the pressures of the International Monetary Fund. Here is the text of the interview:

AL-TADAMUN: You recently made an official visit to Egypt which occurred under circumstances in which Egyptian-American relations had deteriorated because of the incident of the hijacking of the Egyptian civil airplane. Since we have found it customary that what happens in Egypt affects the Sudan, and the converse also is the case, does this have an effect on your current visit and your relations with Washington? Is there a role which you might play in the area of "rectifying" the situation between Cairo and Washington?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: I do not imagine that the recent events which have taken place will have any influence on Sudanese-American relations, but the

events by themselves were unfortunate. I do not believe that they will in effect encourage efforts at peace and detente which many countries in the region are calling for.

AL-TADAMUN: In other words, you say that the Egyptian-American problem is confined to the framework of the Middle East problem and that it will not extend to include other elements.

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: Yes.

AL-TADAMUN: Will you address yourself to this subject with the American administration during your visit to the American capital?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: I will meet Mr George Bush, the American vice president, in Washington. I do not believe that this is one of the basic subjects which will be raised. We in the Sudan have problems which have priority over this transitory incident.

#### Our Demands on America

AL-TADAMUN: Do you have specific demands which you will present to the American administration?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: It is not a process of making demands on our part so much as one of consulting on what is going on in the Sudan and in the framework of the relations between the United States and the Sudan. Perhaps everyone knows that the Sudan was subjected to a drought this year and last year which involved half the Sudanese people. The United States, through bilateral cooperation and humanitarian organizations, played a great role in helping the Sudan with urgent assistance. We are expecting that the United States will play a greater role in reconstruction so that we may overcome the aftereffects of the drought and famine. This is one aspect.

The other aspect is that the economic situation in the Sudan is suffering from numerous difficulties. The debts on the one hand and the balance of payments deficit are two influential factors. Here also we expect the United States to help the Sudan by offering loans and aid in order to help the balance of payments. It also is one of the countries giving grants and loans to the Sudan. It is necessary to hold discussions with it on the Sudan's debts, which come to \$9 billion all in all, especially since the Sudan is not able to pay the interest on these debts or their instalments.

For a period of 16 years the Sudanese people continued to suffer and tighten their belts. However, in the context of the drought and famine, the Sudanese people cannot bear more. The status of these debts must be reviewed in a manner which will allow the fledgling democracy in the Sudan to live and persevere, and also in order that economic growth may be created which will help our people in what they are facing.

#### We Reject the Devaluation of the Pound

AL-TADAMUN: The economic problems you mentioned are making you confront the International Monetary Fund's terms for its continued support of the

Sudanese economy. The most important of these terms is the devaluation of the Sudanese pound, increased government support for certain commodities and the revival of the private sector. What are your programs and plans for confronting these terms?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: We entered into many negotiations with the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank and we met them with the refusal to devalue the Sudanese pound, because in Numayri's era we experimented with the devaluation of the pound, which happened five times, but that did not lead to the revival of the Sudanese economy, although it might be a useful prescription for an advanced economy which has economic flexibility. However, the economy of a developing country does not have any flexibility, especially since the devaluation of currency does not lead to increased exports or even increased production.

For all these reasons, it is necessary to devise another formula, and we told the officials in the World Bank, "From the beginning of the seventies, since you set out conditions and offered Numayri loan after loan, either Numayri committed himself to your diagnosis and the economic prescription you presented, but the Sudanese economy did not advance -- rather, it collapsed, and therefore it is logical to say that this prescription has not been compatible with the Sudanese economy -- or you said that the prescription was proper but Numayri did not commit himself, and we ask why you lent to him time after time, until the debts owed by the Sudan had accumulated." In either case the government of the revolution is not answerable for this, and our government must not be punished and made to face hard terms at a time when we are facing complications.

AL-TADAMUN: From your statement, I understand that you will ask the World Bank to disregard the Sudan's debts. Will you ask it for new help as well?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: Yes, we will ask for further help, because the Sudan needs support and resources to get out of the current crisis. The Sudan has tremendous economic resources but what it lacks is capital. The basis of economy is capital, capable management and a stable political regime.

We hope that the revolution will have provided management and a stable regime and thus it will be capital that we need.

AL-TADAMUN: If the International Monetary Fund resubmits its conditions, what will your government do?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: There are some conditions we cannot respond to even if we want to. Therefore, what cannot be responded to will not be.

We Did Not Differ with Egypt over Anything

AL-TADAMUN: In the light of your recent visit to Cairo, a date was set for a visit the chairman of the Transitional Military Council, 1st Lt Gen 'Abd-al-Rahman Siwar al-Dhahab, will take to the Egyptian capital. What impressions did you draw from your visit to Cairo? What is the future of Egyptian-Sudanese relations?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: My impressions are good. A lengthy meeting took place between me and the Egyptian prime minister, and we discussed all matters which are of concern to the two countries. We did not differ over any of them. The common views were clear, and there were no differences over them.

The Sudanese revolution has created numerous changes which it has been necessary to adapt to. We ourselves in the Sudan are trying to adapt ourselves to these events. In addition, these events require some adaptation on the part of the brothers in Egypt. Perhaps the element of personal contact has put the facts in their framework. There has been a common vision and agreement over this vision.

In addition, my meeting with President Mubarak was friendly and fruitful, and we did not differ over anything. I believe that Egyptian-Sudanese relations are continuing to be as they were, relations of conciliation and mutual understanding.

The only thing we might have discussed with reservations was the issue of integration; we in the Sudan had raised some reservations with regard to its organizational structure. We said that it entailed much pomp and much inefficiency. We all agreed that we would like to preserve integration and make it more effective and more useful for the two peoples, and consequently we would like to review its structures.

AL-TADAMUN: In light of the need for adaptation you referred to, some people might consider it farfetched that Egyptian-Sudanese relations will go back to their former state. Are there practical steps, especially with your visit and that of 1st Lt Gen Siwar al-Dhahab to Cairo, to restore relations to their former state?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: In fact, you are saying that it is not possible for integration to be restored to its former state. Integration consisted of a meeting of two presidents, two People's Assemblies, two secretariats and funds. In substance, integration was much less than that. We want to retain the structures in the framework of the actual state of integration, so that integration, in terms of effectiveness and economic interaction, will have broader horizons, and we want to expand its structures. However, in the past there was a total split between the actual state of integration and its structures. We now want to cause a reduction in the magnitude of the structures so that they will conform to the actual situation.

AL-TADAMUN: Within this clear theoretical framework, are there practical steps that you have drawn up?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: We have specified that a committee consisting of the two parties should meet in the near future in Cairo or in Khartoum to offer practical recommendations to the two governments on the structures of integration.

Government to the Civilians

AL-TADAMUN: After the revolution you again proceeded to form a joint delegation of civilians and military personnel to attend international conferences, while today we see a purely civilian delegation.



Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: The Sudan's revolution has been for the sake of freedom and democracy and for the sake of a civilian regime. Military personnel and civilians concur on this. Therefore in terms of thinking we concur that it is necessary that a civilian government rule the Sudan. We are all agreed that there is no room for military figures to govern. However, due to specific circumstances surrounding the Sudan's revolution, the Sudanese Sovereignty Council was composed of military figures. However, that does not make the Sudanese government a military one. Rather, in reality, it is a civilian government and a civilian democratic situation.

In this context and thinking, no embarrassment exists if a delegation is all military or all civilian, or mixed, because the view is that in the Sudan we have a civilian political system although the Sovereignty Council which stands at the head of this regime consists of military figures.

AL-TADAMUN: It might be correct to say that the military command holds the reins of affairs and has most of the cards in the Sudanese situation today. Will this command, in your view, end up allowing the Sudanese civilian man in the street complete rule, or will it retain a sort of influence over him, especially since it responded to his revolution and did not take the initiative toward it?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: I do not know what you have based your question that the military command is holding most of the cards on. Here I would like to turn you over to the Sudan's constitution for the transitional period in this regard. Perhaps if you read this constitution you will find out that it is based on the separation of powers and is a parliamentary constitution. There is a sovereignty council with specific powers and a government which is responsible for the entire administration of the country. Therefore, the statement that there is a military council which is holding all the cards and not allowing others to act, or the like, does not correspond to the Sudan's actual situation. Perhaps at a later period you may read the constitution which governs the Sudan.

However, talking about the Sudanese man on the street and the Sudanese revolution, and whether he will allow it to continue its course, I believe that we all, whether we are military personnel or civilians, are agreed that we want democracy and civilian rule. The Sudanese people who created the revolution do not need to get permission from anyone, because it is they who create revolutions and they who create events.

#### We Will Not Extend the Transitional Period

AL-TADAMUN: The transitional government is facing many problems. Do you consider that the period specified might be extended if it has not completed the tasks demanded of it?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: There is no inclination to extend the transitional period. Basically, it was not required that all the problems of the Sudan be solved during the transitional period; however, it was assumed that it would take specific steps which would lead to the codification of the Sudanese revolution and the election of a constituent assembly which would elect a

government from among its members to which it would hand over the keys of rule.

The democratic process itself is needed for the sake of further progress. We must not extend the transitional period in order to solve all problems, because the continuation of the democratic process is the only way to create progress. The process of holding elections by which a government will come in that represents the people is only an instalment in our democratic progress and the means for continuing our effort on behalf of progress.

AL-TADAMUN: Let us move over to the Sudanese south, which is now witnessing appeals for secession. If we think deeply about the matter, we will find that the south has only been represented through the army or the Sudanese Communist Party. In other words, we have not seen any of the Sudanese parties from the north managing to infiltrate the bases in the south. Do initiatives exist in the direction of a party or secular solution which could solve the problem of the south?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: I differ with the basis on which your conclusions were founded, that the south has always been represented through the army or the Communist Party. That is not true. There are many traditional parties which have had representatives from the south and roots in the south. Historically, if we go back to the democratic elections in the south of the Sudan, we will find that the traditional parties have established a broader presence in representing the southern forces. This is the fact.

AL-TADAMUN: Are they at the same level today?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: After 16 years of an absence of democracy and the parties' loss of their democratic activity, it is difficult to talk about the magnitude of the representation of the people in the south of the Sudan by nationwide parties. However, southern parties have now arisen. These parties say that they are nationwide parties and are not restricted to the people of the south. However, we must wait awhile before interpreting things, because the picture after the April revolution and during the past few months is not a complete one and party action has not assumed its more extensive scope. Therefore, it is difficult to predict the magnitude of the extension of traditional national parties on the southern stage.

#### The Southerners Do Not Want Secession

AL-TADAMUN: How do you cope with the ideology of secession in the south, especially in the light of the coup attempt declared in Khartoum which, though not of great size, constituted an expression of the extension and spread of this ideology, if one may use the expression?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah (laughing): Let me differ with you once again. There is not a single southerner now who wants secession. In the previous period, there were some brothers in the south who called for secession, and some of them were calling for a regional government or southern federal government. Now, however, and let us speak most frankly and truthfully, I have not met a single Sudanese who advocates the secession of the south from the north.

Rather, they advocate a sort of autonomy or regional government in the south. This is understandable and acceptable, because today we have a regional government even in the north of the Sudan. We have the Southern Region, the Eastern Region and the Western Region, and we have the Region of the South. There is nothing amazing in this statement.

Therefore the notion of regional government or autonomy is acceptable in the Sudan. This is what the brothers in the south are asking for. However, we have not yet reached the stage of entering into a detailed dialogue on the characteristics of this regional government, what its substance will be, what its limits will be, what its responsibilities will be -- this is what must be mutually understood and the object of consultation. I repeat that there is no one in the south who wants secession.

Regarding what happened in Khartoum recently, that was not a coup so much as a revolt with secessionist undertones or undertones based on racist tendencies or tendencies more embodied in divisive things than things that bring people together. However, these groups remain restricted and do not represent a generally accepted view in the north or in the south.

AL-TADAMUN: However, Col John Garang has kept attacking the transitional government for a long time. Has he now been won over to this government?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: The latest information I have is that Col John Garang has said that he will accept dialogue, is in favor of the unity of the Sudan and is prepared to take part in the conference that will be held to solve the problems of the Sudan. But why is he fighting? Let him prove what he is saying in practice. It is necessary to show good intentions in a practical manner.

A Message to Garang through AL-TADAMUN

AL-TADAMUN: What message do you send Col John Garang through AL-TADAMUN?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: Through you, I am telling him, stop the fighting in the south. The regime you were fighting we all were fighting, and we have got rid of it, so what are the reasons for the fighting?

In the Sudan today there is democracy. There are parties which have various political views, from the far right to the far left. If John Garang has an idea he wants to present to the Sudanese people, the Sudanese people are accessible to him, and all the outlets of democracy are accessible to him. What is our need to fight? Let him stop and present his ideas and his viewpoint to the Sudanese people in the north and the south. This is democracy. There also are elections coming up and he can convince whom he wants of what he likes and be the master of his own self through them. All the scope is open to him, and the people are understanding and aware. All the causes of conflict have been eliminated and nothing remains to us but to sit down together to solve the various problems of the Sudan.

Therefore what is required is to stop the fighting and enter into a democratic dialogue.



AL-TADAMUN: What are you offering John Garang to stop the fighting?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: Garang says that he has no demands and that his concern is for the Sudanese people and the Sudanese nation to reach solutions to the various issues of the Sudan, including the issue of the south. We are in favor of that. We have issued a political declaration saying that he should state the basic political issues in whose framework the dialogue to be held must revolve.

AL-TADAMUN: Have you set a date for this conference?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: No, a date has not been set. However, there is a national committee which is working to set a date and hastening steps to hold the conference at the earliest possible opportunity.

AL-TADAMUN: When do you believe this conference will be held?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: In a month or close to it.

AL-TADAMUN: What foreign factors affect the situation in the south? Or, more accurately, are there any initiatives to stop foreign support for John Garang which is affecting his current policy?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: There are obvious objective facts, which are that John Garang has a radio station in Ethiopia from which he broadcasts his political ideas and convictions, and his bases where his men train exist on Ethiopian territory. Therefore, all the aid offered him comes through Ethiopia. These are objective facts about which there is no argument. As to who is supporting John Garang now, and where he gets weapons and support, I would not like to enter into the details on that, but I would like to stress another fact, which is that the Sudanese Liberation Army movement has no innate resources that enable it to finance and arm itself. There must be bodies which are still backing John Garang's movement with materiel and ammunition.

AL-TADAMUN: Will your foreign political contacts and your new alliances stop this support which John Garang is receiving to some extent?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: As I said, we would first like John Garang himself to see the change in events in the Sudan and the new conditions and would like him himself to be the person taking the initiative for a solution. It is certain that we have established or tried to establish good neighborly relations with our neighbors. These relations have been desirable in themselves, regardless of the military unrest in the south. However, they will have a positive outcome in terms of the rebel movement present in the south.

We Want It To Be a National Issue Only

AL-TADAMUN: It is well known that Libya had been supporting John Garang, but recently had reservations, especially after you made alliance with it. Col al-Qadhdhafi said that he was afraid of the secession of the south. Has there been a conciliatory Libyan role, especially with al-Qadhdhafi's recent visit to the Soviet Union, since Ethiopia is a socialist country, in

stopping the support offered Garang and entering into negotiations with the secessionist government?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: What I would like to say is that no request has been made on our part to any body to mediate. We are trying as far as possible to keep the issue of the south of the Sudan in its national context and we do not want to make it a regional one or even an international one. However, we realize that interrelationships exist and that the cause has dimensions which transcend the borders of the Sudan. We will make our efforts within the limits of this understanding so that we can bring this issue under control.

AL-TADAMUN: Your foreign policy recently has concentrated on the Western countries, while there have not been any contacts with the Eastern ones.

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: You are perhaps referring to this trip, which is the first trip outside the Sudan and to the West. Basically, the trip has been to participate in the celebrations of the United Nations' 40th anniversary. We cannot call the United Nations eastern or western. It certainly will give me an opportunity while I am in the United States to meet officials in the American administration in order to reach understanding regarding our two countries' mutual interests.

Therefore one cannot say that our whole effort has been directed toward the Western camp and not the Eastern one. We declared from the beginning of the revolution that we were in favor of the policy of nonalignment.

AL-TADAMUN: Have there been initiatives toward any visit you might make to the Soviet Union?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: I would not rule out such a visit although I have not decided yet. In principle, there is nothing to prevent me from visiting the Soviet Union, but that has not been determined in a practical fashion.

AL-TADAMUN: It has been noted that the transitional government has been anxious, perhaps because of the Sudan's economic situation, to make the United States understand that the new Sudan has no enemies, while the concern to make the Soviet Union understand has not been as intense.

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: I do not agree with this statement, because I have met the Soviet ambassador more than once, clearly described our new foreign policy to him and stated that it is a policy founded on balance and nonalignment, that we want traditional relations of friendship with the Soviet Union, that there are common interests between us and we must stimulate the cultural and commercial areas between ourselves.

However, he asked that all that be presented in the form of a letter, which we wrote; on the other hand the Sudan has reopened many embassies in Eastern Europe which had been closed during the previous era. All these initiatives indicate that the Sudan wants to establish relations of friendship with the Eastern camp.

## Ethiopia Has Not Responded to Us

AL-TADAMUN: Have there been initiatives to improve Sudanese-Ethiopian relations?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: The Sudan has declared from the beginning of its revolution that it is in favor of good neighborly relations and in favor of establishing special relations with neighbors. However, we contacted Ethiopian officials, said that it was necessary to solve problems through dialogue and took steps in that direction for our part. Unfortunately, though, our Ethiopian brothers have not taken the same steps toward us as we have taken. However, our attempts are still underway to establish relations founded on friendship and mutual respect.

AL-TADAMUN: Many people view you as a political leader who was sired by the Sudanese upheaval. What are your plans for the future? What is your opinion regarding the new tendency the man on the Sudanese street is witnessing in terms of a mixture of parties and a departure from the realm of factionalism and tribalism toward secularism and national unity?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: I as a Sudanese citizen consider myself a soldier in the ranks of the Sudanese nation and will continue to fight, whatever position I am in. Differences in positions will not change the nature of the task. Whether I am a doctor, a prime minister or an ordinary citizen, I will continue to pursue my national duties within the limits of my ability on behalf of the Sudanese nation.

In response to your talk about future political action, factionalism and tribalism, I say that the people of the Sudan have created two people's revolutions, and they are a people who have fought against two oppressive domineering regimes. These people cannot reach a stage of submission to factionalism and tribalism. They are an alert people and I do not believe that a people exists in the third world which has recorded what the Sudanese people have recorded in modern times. Therefore our people, with this alertness and this aspiration toward freedom and democracy, cannot submit to factionalism.

The Sudanese people have transcended this stage and their parties and political organizations must respond to them in this regard and measure up to their alertness and awareness, so that we will be able to create a democratic regime which will respond to the Sudanese people's resources and aspirations.

AL-TADAMUN: Do you consider that the parties are proceeding in this direction?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: I hope so.

AL-TADAMUN: Everyone has observed the mass popular reception by which Yasir 'Arafat was greeted in Khartoum. Could we consider that an indication of the possibility that the Palestine Liberation Organization's headquarters will be moved to the Sudan?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: I do not believe that that is an indication that the organization's headquarters will be moved to Khartoum. Rather, the Sudan as an Arab country is interested in the Palestinian cause, has made contributions to the Palestinian cause since 1948 and has fought for the sake of the Palestinian cause. Some Sudanese fighting men are still living in Jerusalem. The Sudan has a history in conjunction with the Palestinian cause, and we would like to play a part on behalf of the Palestinian people and the Palestinian revolution.

AL-TADAMUN: What if you were asked to receive the headquarters of the Liberation Organization?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: It is early to talk about that.

#### Treating the Arab Nation

AL-TADAMUN: You are a doctor. How might you treat the Arab nation today, if they brought it to your clinic?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: I believe in the first place that we must be frank in talking about the Arab nation's problems, and second, we must be realistic and acknowledge the Arab situation, with the problems it entails, because we must proceed from modest convictions which will get us to agree on a minimum which brings us together and does not separate us and take a unified step in this context. Let us refrain from the big ambitions and fantasies of comprehensive unity. Let us start from a modest point which takes into account the Arab situation with all the differences in conditions and political views, alliances of the Arab world and so forth that the situation entails, so that we can establish a minimum of agreement, and then let us move on to a level higher than that, but as realists. If we arrive at the conviction and take a common practical step of course on behalf of this conviction, we will say that this is the first step on the 1,000-mile journey by which we want to proceed. As for general talk and topical and fantastic ambitions, they will not bring about an advance or delay. That is my view.

AL-TADAMUN: You attended the emergency Arab summit conference in Casablanca and you happened to witness a sort of Arab consensus and a sort of Arab division. In the light of this atmosphere, what basis do you recommend as a first step on the 1,000-mile journey?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: The importance of the Casablanca summit is that it broke the rule that there can be no common Arab action except through consensus. We have now emerged from the mode of consensus to the mode of the majority.

AL-TADAMUN: Is this point positive?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: Yes. I consider it a positive point. Perhaps it is the only positive point the Casablanca conference produced, because except for that, everything that happened was an affirmation of what had happened in previous conferences. There is not a single organization in the world based on consensus, because that would make it a paralyzed medium. Accepting the

principle of the majority is a progressive step and we can seek a common minimum by which to start the 1,000-mile journey by means of it.

AL-TADAMUN: What is the first step?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: It is hard to be specific. The Arab nation has many common causes. Let us take the Palestinian cause as an example. We can arrive at a common conviction and talk about that from a common premise. Let us specify what we want. Do we want peace, or do we want something other than peace? If we want peace, what must be done? The discussions so far have continued to proliferate.

If we do not want peace, have we prepared ourselves to face the state of an absence of peace?

Then there is the Iraqi-Iranian war. Let us determine our position on that. What is our view about resolving it? What common effort is there to resolve it, since it is a destructive war which does not serve Iran or Iraq and does not serve the Arab nation or the Islamic nation? These are two of our causes.

AL-TADAMUN: Have you established diplomatic relations with Iran? Is there any initiative you might take with regard to the Iraqi-Iranian war?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: I believe that establishment of such relations will give us an opportunity for this sort of initiative, although we do not yet have any plan for such an initiative. Many initiatives have been made for which the elements of success have not provided. Therefore one cannot risk a new mediation process without having a conviction that the elements of success might exist.

AL-TADAMUN: What is your next step after the transitional period?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: In the direction of a democratic regime which has been codified and is based on the constituent assembly which will set out a permanent constitution and define the form of government in the Sudan in a permanent manner.

AL-TADAMUN: What if you are asked to remain in the premiership after the transitional period?

Al-Jazuli Daf'allah: I am not thinking about that. Everything that happens has a story.

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# DEFENSE MINISTER DISCUSSES RECENT TRIP TO EGYPT

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 26 Oct 85 pp 71, 72

[Interview with Defense Minister 'Uthman 'Abdallah by Hamidah Na'na': "The Parties of the Sudan Must Rise above the Disputes; Otherwise, a Threat Exists"; in Cairo, date not given]

[Text] AL-TADAMUN's first meeting with Maj Gen 'Uthman 'Abdallah, member of the Sudanese Military Council, took place in Khartoum a few days after the upheaval. When we published what came out of the first meeting, which our colleague 'Uthman Mirghani held, we gave him the label of "strong man of the upheaval" and said that it was permissible to assume that he was the "'Abd-al-Nasir of the upheaval." In a second meeting with him, which took place in Cairo on the eve of the conclusion of his mission to Egypt, Maj Gen 'Uthman 'Abdallah started addressing our colleague Hamidah Na'na' with words of reproach concerning the labels AL-TADAMUN had given him. This is a reproach which duty requires that we accept, and we appreciate Maj Gen 'Uthman 'Abdallah for giving AL-TADAMUN the exclusive interview he gave a few hours before he left Cairo, where his visit went on 3 days longer than had been planned -- imparting a special significance to the interview.

Although Maj Gen 'Uthman 'Abdallah, member of the Military Council and Sudanese minister of defense, denied, in his interview with AL-HAWADITH, that he had made any request of the Egyptian authorities, the information made available to AL-TADAMUN confirms that besides being a response to a previous invitation and aimed at participating in the 6 October holidays, the visit had the goal of strengthening relations between the two countries, requesting application of the joint defense agreement, sending arms and training Sudanese army personnel and units in Egypt or under Egyptian experts sent to the Sudan, lest events in the south develop in a manner leading to abandonment of the unity of Sudanese territory.

'Uthman 'Abdallah is considered a strong figure in the Sudanese government. He is 45 years of age, married and the father of five children. He is religious and extremely intelligent. Here is the text of the conversation with him.

AL-TADAMUN: The visit to Egypt must have goals which go beyond the scope of what has been announced. Might we learn about them?

Maj Gen 'Uthman: In the name of God, the all-merciful and most compassionate: the purpose of this visit is to respond to an invitation previously given to me by our brother the Egyptian minister of defense and deputy prime minister, 'Abd-al-Halim Abu Ghazalah, which ought to have been answered early, but in view of my personal health circumstances was postponed to this time. It is taking place at the same time as the recent events which have occurred in the Sudan and has been interpreted as having the objective of requesting military support from Egypt. The truth is not like this. Without a doubt, the Sudan and Egypt are linked by a joint defense agreement and in this context I must state that the security of the two countries is governed by similar factors and circumstances, because if we talk in the language of political geography (geopolitics) we will come up with the conclusion that the leaders of the two countries must meet from time to time to reappraise conditions on the political stage, in the Arab, regional and international contexts.

AL-TADAMUN: This is in theoretical terms, but the facts state that the distinctive relations which existed during the rule of the former president, Ja'far Numayri, have fallen off to a large extent following the upheaval of which you yourself represent one of the prominent figures. Are you here therefore to put an end to this decline?

Maj Gen 'Uthman: I said that the basis in the visit was to respond to the minister of defense's invitation, but I seized the opportunity to talk to many political action leaders. I met with President Husni Mubarak and Dr 'Ali Lutfi, the prime minister. I also met with a further group of ministers, the chairman of the People's and Consultative Assemblies, then the leaders of the political parties, Fu'ad Siraj-al-Din, Khalid Muhyi-al-Din and Ibrahim Shukri. My objective in all these meetings was to eliminate the minor obscurity these relations had succumbed to during the previous period. I found the brothers in Egypt sympathetic regarding the current circumstances the Sudan is going through. In addition to that, I of course seized the opportunity to hold discussions with the minister of defense and the commanders of the military branches, then made a field visit to naval, infantry and air units, and we talked about subjects of joint training between the two countries. Finally, I held a meeting with the representatives of the Sudanese community in the embassy in which we discussed their problems and ways of dealing with them and their goals.

AL-TADAMUN: How do you evaluate the results of your visit as you are on the verge of leaving Egypt?

Maj Gen 'Uthman: My evaluation of the visit from the premise of my specialized field as minister of defense is that it has been excellent. It was necessary to restore bridges of trust between brothers in a very good manner.

AL-TADAMUN: How were your military discussions with the Egyptian party and what did they concentrate on?

Maj Gen 'Uthman: We talked about training subjects, because application of the joint defense agreement requires the unification of training, military



expressions and joint staff command operating procedures, on top of the training of military and technical college instructors.

AL-TADAMUN: Do you have any special interpretation of this agreement which differs from that of the previous regime?

Maj Gen 'Uthman: My interpretation of the agreement is that it is one which lies within the general category of the joint defense agreements the Arab League regulated in 1951. However, from the standpoint of the common threat to the Sudan and Egypt, joint defense agreements have come into being to give a new framework to the agreement requiring the movement of armed forces between the two countries within each other's borders in accordance with a request from the political and military commands in the event organized foreign intervention from a hostile country is proved. Since the Sudan is signatory to the joint defense agreement with all the Arab countries, this agreement in particular does not constitute a threat to any other Arab country. It is true that this agreement provoked great controversy in Sudanese political circles following the elimination of the previous regime, but, in spite of my respect for the political leaders and party leadership in the Sudan, I believe from the purely military point of view that the agreement is aimed at serving Sudanese strategic objectives ahead of serving Egypt, and therefore I consider that abrogating this agreement at any time would entail a loss to the Sudan before it would be a loss to Egypt.

AL-TADAMUN: It is being bruited about in the Egyptian press that you brought President Husni Mubarak a message from Lt Gen Siwar al-Dhahab, the chairman of the Military Council. What is the substance of this message?

Maj Gen 'Uthman: I brought two oral messages, to President Mubarak and to Dr 'Ali Lutfi. The first was from Lt Gen Siwar al-Dhahab and the second was from al-Jazuli Daf'allah. The two messages express the thanks of the Sudanese people and their government for Egypt's position vis-a-vis the recent events. Lt Gen Siwar al-Dhahab thanked President Mubarak in particular because he made telephone contact with him. Dr Lutfi also made contact with al-Jazuli Daf'allah to be reassured of the situation, first of all, and to put Egypt's resources at the service of the Sudan, second of all, should any foreign intervention be proved.

AL-TADAMUN: Could you describe to us the facts and the magnitude of the recent events in the Sudan?

Maj Gen 'Uthman: The recent events in the Sudan are very serious, because they were aimed at the Sudan's national identity, in the sense that some elements of the al-Dinka tribes and others from Mount al-Nubah sought to take power through a bloody military coup which in its initial stages had the goal of creating political chaos and assassinations and then preparing a suitable atmosphere for the arrival of military political leadership from outside the Sudan, with the goal of imposing a new regime founded on the basis of the sovereignty of what they have called the "black bloc" over what they have called the "Arab element." According to the investigations underway, it has been proved to us that this movement was carried out through coordination between someone called Phillip 'Abbas Ghabbush, the head of a

political party called the Sudanese National Party, and the military command of John Garang's group, which is now operating from the Ethiopian borders as a takeoff point. The situation was put under control with the fewest possible losses, but danger will still face the country unless the forces of the Sudanese political man on the street are unified, rise above their peripheral disputes and work seriously to attain the goals for whose sake the revolution burst forth.

AL-TADAMUN: Is the south now in a situation one should feel despair over, or do you have a democratic political plan to restore it in order to preserve the unity of Sudanese territory?

Maj Gen 'Uthman: All political forces, including the Transitional Military Council and the Council of Ministers, have considered the principle of democratic dialogue to be appropriate, rather than the military solution, and, in order to bring that about, the two councils and the political forces have sent delegates and messages to Col John Garang and his political leadership in London, Addis Ababa and Nairobi. Most unfortunately, the response to these messages has been negative.

AL-TADAMUN: President Siwar al-Dhahab got in touch with President Mubarak and asked him to mediate or exert efforts with John Garang to urge him to accept negotiations. What is the significance of this request? Does Egypt have a close relationship with John Garang?

Maj Gen 'Uthman (after performing the twilight prayer): I do not believe that Col John Garang, with his current orientation, which has the Sudan's national identity as its target, will be prepared to accept Arab mediation for the sake of rapprochement with the Sudan's political leadership. Although I do not tend toward pessimism, I stress that no Libyan or Egyptian mediation with John Garang will realize the desired results, because among the conditions he has raised as a basis for starting the dialogue is one which calls for the elimination of the integration agreements with Egypt, the defense agreement and the agreement over Nile water. No one who has this position regarding Egyptian-Sudanese relations will accept mediation. Regarding Libya, one of the conditions he has set out is the elimination of the military protocol signed in Libya last July. On the basis of these facts, I have a personal conviction that Garang will not accept Arab mediation to bring about a rapprochement in views.

AL-TADAMUN: What is the fate of the integration agreement between you and Egypt? Is it still in effect or has it been suspended? Don't you find that there is a contradiction between your options and Egypt's regarding this agreement?

Maj Gen 'Uthman: The integration agreement could have had a successful fate if it had been established at the beginning on the popular level, but unfortunately it was established from above. All the institutions which emanated from it have been characterized by pomp and empty displays. The principle of integration between Egypt and the Sudan should be considered an acceptable one as far as the two peoples are concerned. Therefore, when we asked for a review of the integration agencies we aimed, and still do aim, at guidance,

not at abrogation. I am sure that joint committees between the two countries on the popular level can implant the bases, principles and foundations on which real integration serving the popular interests of both Egypt and the Sudan will be based.

AL-TADAMUN: From the theoretical standpoint it still exists?

Maj Gen 'Uthman: Yes, it still exists.

AL-TADAMUN: You visited Tripoli and met Col al-Qadhdhafi. You then signed the military protocol together. Don't you believe that your relations with Egypt might conflict with your relations with Libya? If the answer is no, how do you reconcile the two countries?

Maj Gen 'Uthman: The subject was not raised with me in Tripoli or in Cairo. The integration agreement was directed toward purposes of agricultural development, light industry, the construction of road networks, the development of transportation and the improvement of fishing techniques in the Red Sea and Lake al-Nubah. These are all things which constitute no threat as far as any Arab country goes, because they are purely economic matters. I imagine that any effort at integration between any two Arab countries is a very good one serving the orientation toward unity.

AL-TADAMUN: Will the transfer of power from the Military Council to an elected government be properly carried out after the transitional period ends in a few months, if conditions in the south continue to escalate, or is there a possibility that the transitional period will be held over and extended?

Maj Gen 'Uthman: Although the security situation in the south of the Sudan should not be considered good, the national conference to be held soon next month to deal with the problem of the government in the Sudan, including the status of the southern region, will be held on schedule even in the event John Garang does not come to Khartoum and join the negotiations. This conference will in effect create relative tranquility in some disturbed areas in the south as much as it will lead to the holding of elections throughout the Sudan. In the event the situation continues as it is after the holding of the conference, there will be a meeting among all the political forces in the Sudan over the holding of partial elections including the north of the Sudan and the stable areas in the south. In this case, a parliament will be established as an alternative to a constituent assembly, and this of necessity will result in the failure to set out a new constitution. At that time, parliament, which represents the true power of the people, will have the right to choose its institutions from the Sovereignty Council and the Council of Ministers. In this case, the Military Council and the Council of Ministers will automatically be dissolved and power will be transferred to a civilian government from the party which wins the majority or as a result of a coalition.

AL-TADAMUN: During the discussions with Egyptian officials, did you request that the former president be handed over?

Maj Gen 'Uthman: I did not address myself to the subject of the handing over of Numayri, because I was not delegated by my government to raise this subject with the Egyptian political leadership.

AL-TADAMUN: Are you satisfied with what is going on on the political stage? Do you imagine that the turbulence the Sudanese man on the street on the one hand and of course the political parties on the other are going through will produce a progressive political program which will be a basis of action for any future civil government?

Maj Gen 'Uthman (brusquely): No.

AL-TADAMUN: Why not?

Maj Gen 'Uthman: The Sudanese political man on the street is not stable now for a number of reasons which unfortunately are now reflected on the armed forces. Perhaps the most conspicuous signs of instability are:

First, some political parties are divided within themselves.

Second, although the points of concurrence among the various parties are more numerous than the points of dispute, unfortunately dispute predominates among the political parties.

Third, the dispute over the definition of the identity of John Garang's movement, and whether it is a genuine Sudanese movement or an imported idea.

However, in spite of all that, I believe in the democratic system. I also believe in the political parties' ability to bear their full responsibility in the stage of transformation to the parliamentary system via the transitional period. If I may be permitted to direct an appeal to the political parties on the Sudanese stage through AL-TADAMUN, I call them to solidarity.

AL-TADAMUN: Is there anything new regarding your foreign policy?

Maj Gen 'Uthman: Our policy is concentrated on the principle of positive neutrality which of necessity requires dynamic balanced movement on all fronts.

AL-TADAMUN: Relations with the Soviet Union: where are they now?

Maj Gen 'Uthman: They are good and getting better.

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CSO: 4504/64



SUDANESE OPPOSITION CALLS FOR REPLY TO LETTER ON PEACE MOVES

EA291914 (Clandestine) Radio of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army in English 1300 GMT 29 Nov 85

[Station commentary: "The SPLA High Command Still Awaits Reply to its Letter to Prime Minister Dr al-Jazuli Daf'allah"]

[Excerpts] When premier Dr al-Jazuli Daf'allah wrote earlier to the SPLA-SPLM [Sudanese People's Liberation Army-Sudanese People's Liberation Movement] leader extending an invitation to negotiate possible cessation of hostilities, he found the SPLA High Command very eager and willing to meet. If the SPLA was really fighting for the pleasure of it, it would not have taken the trouble of replying to Dr al-Jazuli's letter, especially if it is recalled that the movement's High Command had to pass through a tedious, labyrinthine process to force a consensus of opinion as to the content of its reply letter. Far from being a mere courtesy reply, which would have been the case if the SPLA was not genuine about peace, the letter amounted to documentation of concrete proposals for attainment of peace in Sudan.

The SPLA-SPLM laid before the country's political forces, including the TMC [Transitional Military Council] and the Council of Ministers, five [as heard] conditions it feels are essential to any process of national dialogue. In a nutshell, these are:

A commitment by the TMC to an agenda to discuss, not the so-called problem of southern Sudan, but fundamental national questions;

An undertaking by the TMC and the Council of Ministers to dissolve themselves immediately following any national congress;

The lifting of the state of emergency and the scrapping of shariah laws and specific treaties concluded with some foreign powers respectively.

These are the terms the SPLA stipulated for peace and it is on the basis of these terms that it envisages its full and effective participation in national dialogue. These conditions are quite objective and many would tend to agree. It is, therefore, wrong to assume that they are in any way tailored to meet the interests of the SPLA alone and to thwart genuine peace efforts. Although the movement finds it rather unfortunate that certain political quarters and the TMC find the terms unpalatable, its vigor in the quest for peace remains undiminished.



Once having replied to Dr al-Jazuli's letter, the SPLA High Command felt that it had discharged an onerous national obligation that required it to take part alongside the rest of the country's political forces in the search for peace. Accordingly, the SPLA sat back and waited in the hope that some positive response from the other side would emerge. Even when the TMC started to maneuver for military advantage by declaring cease-fire and violating them [as heard] soon thereafter, the SPLA never for a single moment discarded its hopes. Frequent announcements attributed to the TMC have been made, saying that the TMC and the Cabinet would hold a joint session devoted exclusively to discussion of the SPLA's letter. At one point, it was being claimed that means and ways of delivering the government's reply to SPLA's letter were being studied. Regrettably enough, none of all these had occurred. The inescapable conclusion is that these announcements, from the outset, have been interded for nothing more than propaganda.

The TMC, realizing that SPLA's political offensive was gaining momentum, meanwhile its own had begun running out of steam, decided to embark on a campaign of disinformation. According to its ploy, the TMC thought that if it could create the impression that it was making a breakthrough in its attempts to end the war by peaceful means, the SPLA would be seen as the obstacle to peace. As part of this campaign, Radio Omduraman stated recently that the SPLA had agreed to take part in the Madani Conference despite the fact that Radio SPLA had broadcast only a few hours earlier an official statement by the SPLA-SPLM political-military high command in which the movement categorically denied reports that its delegation was going to Khartoum or Madani.

Since the SPLA is fully convinced that the only avenue leading to peace in Sudan is national dialogue, it will continue relentlessly to press for such a dialogue. It is rather baffling that the TMC, the Council of Ministers, the various political forces and some individuals insist on calling upon the SPLA to submit to peace negotiations. The least that could be said about this request is that it is premature. The SPLA has already communicated its views on this vital matter to the political forces and the ball is undeniably right now still in the court of the prime minister, Dr al-Jazuli Daf'allah. The SPLA has made its move in the peace arena and it is now the turn of the TMC, the Cabinet, and the other political forces to make theirs. Till then it would be futile and unrealistic to expect anything new from the SPLA-SPLM.

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CSO: 4500/39

SUDANESE INTERIOR MINISTER DISCUSSES FALASHA ISSUE

GF291722 Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 28 Nov 85 p 3

['baas Nadhim dispatch]

[Excerpt] In a brief interview with AL-QABAS during his visit to Kuwait, General 'Abbas Madani stressed the firm Kuwaiti-Sudanese relations and affirmed that security cooperation between the two countries is the central issue of his talks with Kuwaiti Interior Minister Shaykh Nawwaf al-Ahmad al-Sabah. The Sudanese minister also reviewed the Sudanese internal and security situation.

On the trials currently taking place in the Sudan he said: The trial of Baha'-al-Din Muhammad, Numayri's assistant for private affairs' is over. The trial of another five suspects in the well-known Falasha issue is also over. More people will stand trial in the Sudanese criminal court. The minister refrained from defining the number of the suspects. He said: The trial of every group will be set in the proper time. We do not want to pass judgement before hand.

Responding to a question of the trial sessions and whether they are to be carried by radio, television, and press or distributed as printed matter to information media, he said: The April popular upheaval restored democracy to the Sudan. This is based on a plurality of political parties and on popular sovereignty. It is certain that after the upheaval, all who aborted democracy or exceeded the legal limits of their authority will be brought to account.

A number of investigative committees were formed which come under the category of punishment and criminal law. This is designed to bring to account all against whom evidence can be confirmed. These committees actually acquitted those against whom evidence was not proven. The people against whom charges were confirmed were presented to the courts by the committees. The Sudanese courts are public. They are attended by the public and by those who work in the media. The trials are watched and heard on television and radio. There are no restrictions on what takes place in the court rooms.

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CSO: 4500/39

SUDANESE MINISTER ON VISIT TO KUWAIT, INTERNAL SITUATION

GF291532 Kuwait AL-SIYASAH in Arabic 28 Nov 85 p 3

[Report by Babakr Hasan Makki]

[Excerpts] Police General 'Abbas Madani, Sudanese interior minister, has lauded Kuwait's support for Sudan during the ordeal of drought and desertification which hit Sudan last year. He stated that he had conveyed his country's gratitude to the amir of Kuwait, and to the heir apparent and prime minister, Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Sabah during his meeting with them yesterday [27 November].

In an exclusive interview with AL-SIYASAH, the Sudanese official indicated that he had found the amir of Kuwait, and the heir apparent and prime minister to be greatly interested in events in Sudan, and that they have special regard for Sudan and the Sudanese, in view of the historical ties between the two countries.

Police General 'abbas Madani, added that his visit to Kuwait comes as part of the aims of the council of Arab interior ministers concerning cooperation and coordination among Arab countries in the field of security.

The Sudanese interior minister spoke of the current security situation in his country. He described the political moves currently taking place as a "healthy form of democratic practice". He noted that Sudan now lives in an atmosphere of liberty and democracy following 16 years of repression. He stated that Sudan's democracy is based on a plurality of political parties, and the people's sovereignty. He noted that the increase of political activity is a natural matter in a democratic country.

The Sudanese official stressed that the former "state security organ" was condemned following the April uprising which led to its liquidation and the arrest of all of its officers.

Police General 'abbas Madani revealed that the Sudanese Cabinet has made a decision to open the door into the new security organs for the absorption of some personnel belonging to the former security organ who have been acquitted. He stated that 29 officers have actually been appointed with the rank of second lieutenant who were earlier trained at the police academy. He added that these officers have been absorbed as police officers and not as officers in the security field.

The Sudanese minister indicated that he expects the political parties in his country to respond to the call made by the authorities to hand over the weapons they used to confront the regime of the former president. He noted that some parties have actually handed over their weapons.

The Sudanese interior minister announced that the number of military and civilian detainees in a conspiracy which, it has been reported, was designed to topple the new regime, has totalled more than 200 people. He stated that interrogation of the detainees continues. He added that investigations of political plots usually take a long time.

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CSO: 4500/39

SUDANESE MINISTER ON ARAB SECURITY, SOUTHERN SUDAN

GF291627 Manama WAKH in English 1545 GMT 29 Nov 85

[Text] Doha, 29 Nov (WAKH)--Sudanese Minister of Interior Gen 'Abbas Madani Muhammad praised existing friendly relations between Sudan and Qatar and described them as ever growing in various fields in general and in security domain in particular.

Currently on a visit to Doha, the Sudanese minister told QNA, his visit aims at bolstering cooperation in security fields between their two respective security organs.

In response to a question on pan-Arab cooperation and coordination in security domains, the Sudanese minister pointed that the Arab interior ministers council had worked out an overall Arab security strategy which was endorsed by various Arab countries.

We are all putting this strategy into practice to ensure the security and safe living of Arab nationals through greater cooperation and coordination coupled with upgrading of crime combatting forces and development of security methods, he said.

On the problem of southern Sudan, the minister said a national conference will be held shortly to debate the future system of government in Sudan with the participation of all political powers in Sudan in addition to southern Sudan rebel leader John Garang.

The minister expressed hopes that the expected conference would be a success to strengthen national unity.

The Transitional Military Council and the Cabinet have already endorsed the general election law which will be held next February to hand over power to an elected body on April 26, 1986.

The trial of those involved in the falasha case has already proceeded to a great extent.

The transitional government is giving utmost priority to solving Sudan's economic problems and in this regard great efforts have been exerted to rationalize spending and increase production, he said.

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CSO: 4500/39



LAW MINISTER CHARGES NUMAYRI ALLOWED NUCLEAR DUMPING

NC271259 Paris AFP in English 1223 GMT 27 Nov 85

[Text] Khartoum, Nov 27 (AFP)--Sudanese Attorney General 'Umar 'Abd-al-'Ati has lodged charges here against deposed President Ja'far Numayri for allegedly agreeing to allow nuclear dumping in exchange for payments of four billion dollars, local press reports said today.

The Kharoum daily AL-SAHFAH reported that the charges related to an agreement between Marshal Numayri and an unnamed West German firm for the dumping of nuclear waste in the Wadi Howar Valley region bordering Egypt, Libya and Chad.

Mr 'Abd-al-'Ati's charges against the former leader included undermining the country's constitution, high treason and endangering the Sudanese people.

Meanwhile the Sudan News Agency (SUNA), quoted Mr 'Abd-al-'Ati as saying his office had provided documents concerning the nuclear dumping agreement and other accusations against Marshal Numayri to a delegation of lawyers due to leave next week for Egypt, where the former president has been living in exile since his overthrow last April.

He said the delegation would work with the Egyptian Bar Association to present a legal objection before the Egyptian constitutional court over Cairo's decision granting Marshal Numayri political asylum.

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CSO: 4500/39

SUNA SAYS SPLA IN NAIROBI TRANSPORTS RECRUITS THROUGH KENYA

EA282111 Omdurman Domestic Service in Arabic 1500 GMT 28 Nov 85

[Text] The SUDAN NEWS AGENCY has obtained information from private sources which reveal that the Sudan People's Liberation Army [SPLA] Representative in Nairobi is attempting to transport new recruits for the army to Addis Ababa through Jomo Kenyatta airport and through the overland route from (mobali) town in northern Kenya. The sources states that the SPLA representative in Nairobi first facilitates the arrival of the recruits from southern Sudan into Kenya. Then they leave for Ethiopia.

The sources stated that the SPLA is currently experiencing a critical situation in Kapoeta area and Bahr al-Ghazal Province. They explained that the SPLA soldiers are carrying out hostile acts against the citizens of Kapoeta area, accusing them of cooperation with the People's Armed Forces during battles that took place in the area recently.

They have also killed innocent people and have stolen or burnt their property, besides pressganging some youths into working for them. They are also planting mines in the area to which most [as heard] of the citizens of the area have fallen victim.

The sources added that the SPLA soldiers in Bahr al-Ghazal are divided into separate groups and are not in contact with their command which is led by Colonel (Malko Ilu). A split has occurred in their ranks because some of them have expressed a commitment to protect the citizens of the area. This information has reached the headquarters of the movement and has been reported [as heard].

The sources confirmed that the SPLA has sent a delegation to Nairobi, led by Yusuf Kuwah, to ask for material and moral support. The sources said that some Sudanese have contacted Kuwah, asking him to negotiate with the government [not further specified]

The sources pointed out that the propaganda currently being made by Radio SPLA for Muhammad Harun (Kafi) aims at [word indistinct] him to be [word indistinct] with Kuwah as two representatives of the sons of the Nuba Mountains. The sources said the differences over negotiations with the government have been aggravated inside the SPLA command and people like

Martin Magier (Jash), Joseph Adoho and Dr (Bak), have suffered unknown fates because of their disagreement with the [apla--command on this matter].

There are rumors to the effect that they have been killed because they are demanding negotiations with Anyanya Two in order to reach a unified stand and then negotiate with the government. It has been confirmed that they have been currently taken to an unknown destination. The sources added that Dr Benjamin Paul (Akol) had suffered the same fate for these same reasons.

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CSO: 4500/39

## BRIEFS

SUDAN TO RETAIN FLAG--After a comprehensive and careful study the Transitional Military Council has resolved to keep the republic's emblem and flag as they are now during the transitional period. Some political parties, national alliances and trade union groups had earlier asked for the republic's emblem and flag to be changed since they regard them as symbols of the defunct May regime. Their request is part of the campaign to remove all the symbols and slogans of the toppled May regime. [Text] [Omdurman Domestic Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 23 Nov 85 EA] 12624

TROOPS KILLED IN ULANG--Somali People's Liberation Army forces under the command of Major Dr Yak Major Deng on 19 and 20 November 1985 heavily shelled Ulang in retaliation against the enemy's provocation. According to our correspondent at Ulang, 12 enemy soldiers were killed. [Text] [(Clandestine) Radio of the Sudanese People's Liberation Army in English 1300 GMT 25 Nov 85 EA] 12624

TALKS IN ZAIRE--Khartoum, 25 Nov (SUNA)--Transitional Military Council [TMC] Chairman General 'Abd-al-Rahman Muhammad Hasan Siwar-al-Dhahab held talks with Zairian President Mobutu Sese Seko in Kinshasa on relations between the two countries. He also held similar talks with the Zairian prime minister. During these talks, he explained the situation in Sudan as well as the steps to resume and bolster relations with neighboring countries. He also talked about the Sudanese people's efforts as well as those of the fraternal and friendly countries to contain famine. He touched on the forthcoming national conference, which will deal with the problem of the south as well as the problems of the various areas without ignoring ethnic, cultural, and religious disparities, explaining that Sudan is preparing for general elections early next year. This came as a press statement issued by the TMC chairman's office here this evening on the chairman's visit to Zaire 23-25 November. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in Arabic 1755 GMT 25 Nov 85 JN] 12624

CHARGE D'AFFAIRES APPOINTED--Tehran, Rabi' Al-Awwal 8, Nov 22, JAMAHARIYAH NEWS AGENCY--It was announced in the Iranian capital, Tehran, that an Iranian charge d'affaires was for the first time appointed now in the Sudan after the resumption of their bilateral relations in the wake of the toppling of rump Numayri. The appointment of the Iranian charge d'affaires in the Sudan came after the talks with the Iranian Government held in Iran by the Sudanese official delegations currently in Iran on strengthening and advancing the bilateral relations in all fields. [Text] [Tripoli JANA in English 1433 GMT 22 Nov 85 LD] 12624

NEW LICENSES NOT ISSUED--Khartoum, Nov 30, SUNA--Finance and Economic Planning Minister 'Awad 'Abd-al-Majid said that it was decided not to issue a license to any new foreign bank. He added that HSI ministry is intending to cement the organ responsible for control of the banks. He expressed dissatisfaction over the performance of some foreign banks in Sudan. [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 1758 GMT 30 Nov 85 JN] 12624

ESCAPEES DIPLOMATIC PASSPORTS WITHDRAWN--Khartoum, Nov 30, SUNA--The Committee entrusted to pursue and extradite the escapees elements of the defunct regime has informed the Foreign Ministry to withdraw the diplomatic passports of these escapees and inform the countries to which the escapees have resorted about this decision. On the other hand the committee currently embarking on preparing the black file of deposed President Numayri which contains several criminal charges in different cases. [as received] [Text] [Khartoum SUNA in English 1800 GMT 30 Nov 85 JN] 12624

ARAB DEVELOPMENT FUNDS' LOAN--Khartoum, 2 Dec 85 (OPECNA)--Arab development funds will extend 200 million dollars in loans to Sudan next month, it was announced here Sunday. The aid will be used basically to rehabilitate Sudan's Gezira Project--the largest cotton plantation complex in Africa. Minister of Finance and Economic Planning 'Awad 'Abd-al-Majid said some of the credits would be used to help reactivate the country's ailing sugar plants and to finance the completion of a trunk road in central Sudan. The Arab funds have also indicated their readiness to provide additional loans for other projects in Sudan, provided the country makes available local financing. Suitable projects for financing include railways, rural water supply programs and a ground station for the "Arabsat" Arab telecommunications satellite scheme. [Text] [Vienna OPECNA in English 1710 GMT 2 Dec 85 LD] 12624

CSO: 4500/39



TUNISIA'S MZALI INTERVIEWED BY AL-TADAMUN

PM271550 London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 23-29 Nov 85 pp 8-11

[Interview with Tunisian Prime Minister Mohamed Mzali by Fa'ud Matar in Tunis on 13 November]

[Text] [Matar] To begin with, as an Arab citizen watching from afar what is happening in Tunisia and to Tunisia, I feel a little worried and, at times, frightfully worried.

[Mzali] What is happening to Tunisia? What is happening in it and why the worry?

[Matar] There are forces lying in wait in Tunisia and there are circumstances that make one wonder: Can the Lebanese tragedy be repeated in one way or another, with different methods? Is this anxiety and fear appropriate or is it exaggerated?

[Mzali] It is true that there are numerous sides that care for it. Some of those lying in wait for Tunisia harbor hostility for it, either because some of them want to establish unity with Tunisia in spite of it or because there are conflicts and disagreement in viewpoints in the area. These people want Tunisia to pay the price. There are also some imperialist economic circles that are apprehensive about the country's independent tendency which is a clear tendency compatible with the Tunisia's interest and which does not curry favor with any foreign circles.

[Matar] Does this situation harbor hidden dangers for Tunisia and are you dealing with it from the point of view of someone facing danger or someone observing fears? Is the Destour Party still capable of facing the dangers from a popular position or have the other parties which you have licensed eroded this party's brilliance and role?

[Mzali] The Tunisian regime is strong and is deeply rooted in the masses. Moreover, the Detour Party is still, contrary to the belief of some, trusted by the masses, is the object to which the masses hopes to achieve development are still pinned and is still in a good position organizationally.

[Matar] But the power enjoyed by the UGTT and by its leader, Habib Achour, leaves this matter open to give and take.

[Mzali] The democracy practiced in Tunisia makes a mountain out of a molehill, as the popular proverb goes. This means that any small incident occurring in Tunisia is, thanks to the democratic climate, reported by the news agencies and the opposition parties, also thanks to the democratic climate, spin stores around it.

[Matar] But all is not completely well. I will not conceal from you the fact that I have heard a lot from circles which are not participating in the government about confusion and failures. I have even heard from them or, to be precise, from some of them explanations and details that give the impression that the conditions...

[Mzali] They must have depicted the picture to you as they have depicted it to others, namely that Tunisia is sitting on a volcano.

[Matar] Not exactly. But the picture does seem extremely gloomy and conditions, according to what they say, are not at all good.

[Mzali] I would like to assure you that Tunisia is strong, thanks to President Habib Bourguiba, to his credit, to his instructions, and to his popularity and thanks to our party's organizations. Because the regime is strong, it allows the press to publish whatever it wishes and allows people to say whatever they wish to say. But the truth is one thing and what is written or said in clubs, cafes and salons is something else.

#### Health Body and Germs

[Matar] Can we expect, as a result of this, the imposition of restrictions on what is published and steps against those who step out of bounds in debate? Can we assume that the democratic option will gradually decrease?

[Mzali] Tunisia is like a healthy body which is often threatened by a germ. Our task is to preserve the fitness of this body and to protect it from germs and pests. We have gone through numerous crises and the Tunisian body has been able, because it is healthy, to confront and destroy the germs and pests before they could devastate it. We are prepared for any likely confrontations but we do cling to the democratic option.

[Matar] Within this framework, let us ask the prime minister: As long as this is the situation, then why isn't the problem with the UGTT and with Habib Achour solved within the democratic concept you have indicated your determination to cling to?

[Mzali] There is no problem with the UGTT. There is a problem among the unionists. As to what is said about the presence of a problem with the UGTT, it is a figment of the imagination of some people.

[Matar] Despite all that we hear and see and despite the campaign in the official Tunisian press against Habib Achour, you still tell us that there is no problem and that the talk about the presence of a problem is no more than a figment of the imagination of some people?

[Mzali] Yes, there is no problem with the UGTT. All that there is to the matter is that there is a leader or a "mini-leader" called Habib Achour with whom we have decided not to deal because he has likened the Tunisian system to the system in Israel or in South Africa and because he has reviled some ministers. We have a recording confirming this abuse. We, as a government which believes in the democratic option, have decided not to deal with him. We deal with the UGTT and believe in the importance of the presence of a strong labor union and in maintaining a normal and good relationship with the UGTT. It happens at times that the UGTT submits some demands. We study the demands and do what can be done, as happened 5 years ago, or we say that we do not approve of the demands or are incapable of meeting them.

In such a case, the unionists are either persuaded by the pressure of economic circumstances and tighten their belts on a nationalistic and realistic basis or they try to compel us to raise the wages through a strike. When a strike is decided upon, this indicates expectation of one or two results: Either the strike succeeds and puts pressure on the government so that it accepts the demand or grants a raise or we say "no," as the British Government did with the mine workers union. By the way, the strike staged by the mine workers in Britain went on for a full year and yet it did not move heaven and earth, whereas there are those [here] who upset the world over a strike of several days.

The principles of the democratic system permit strikes, permit self-expression and permit withholding wages from those who do not work. We take all these points into consideration and this is why I say that I do not believe that there is a problem with the UGTT as a union. To repeat, our problem is with the "mini-leader" called Habib Achour. We are democratic and he is not.

#### Strike in Tunisia and Denunciation by Others

[Matar] Therefore, it seems as if the fundamental aspect of Tunisia's crisis is that Tunisia is paying the price of democracy. Does this mean that the price is exorbitant and that there may come a time when you will reconsider the situation?

[Mzali] We are proud to be paying an exorbitant price for democracy and to still cling more firmly to it. I find myself thinking: If some Arab countries and some of the Third World countries generally were to embrace the democratic system and permit strikes, then numerous strikes would be staged and would generate problems and turmoil.

I am not against strikes and strikes will continue to be a right guaranteed by the constitution. Moreover, I personally support the principle of striking, keeping in mind that it is a two-edged weapon. I have told the unions: Just as you have the right to declare a strike, I, as government, have the right to reject the demands. This is why I am surprised by the clamor aroused over the strike in Tunisia.

[Matar] When strikes are a gained or permitted right in a few countries, isn't it normal for the others to denigrate strikes? Tunisia is most advanced in terms of the unionist presence and of the constitutional guarantee of a man's right to express his demands through strike.

[Mzali] I support strikes as a principle and a strike is a democratic means, provided that it is employed on a nationalistic basis and free from foreign influence.

[Matar] But strikes are destructive at times. Here is Lebanon paying its sovereignty, independence, freedom, security and its decision-making ability as the price for strikes, freedom and democracy. Here it is, despite all that has happened in 10 years, hearing the call for strike whenever a catastrophe befalls it, with the strikes taking place but with nothing changing.

[Mzali] There are other factors that have created Lebanon's crisis and have caused Lebanon to suffer from the tragedy it has been experiencing for 10 years. The tragedy of Lebanon is not in democracy and freedom but in the presence of other factors which, thank God, do not exist in Tunisia. Therefore, there is no danger to Tunisia and no fear for it from democracy.

[Matar] I will not hide from you that I am perplexed by your enthusiasm for the principle of the strike.

[Mzali] I am not enthusiastic but rather reassured. We may hear about another strike or strikes in a week. This does not mean, as long as we are in control of the situation and we respect the right to strike, that we should be affected or grieved.

[Matar] There is no doubt that in some of its aspects, a strike is a reasonable outlet at times.

[Mzali] It is not only this. It is a legitimate right and a means to exert pressure that may or may not produce results. The important thing is that we cling to the strike as a principle and a law.

[Matar] Let us move from the tension between you and the UFFT to the tension between you and the Libyan regime. has...

[Mzali] (The prime minister did not let me finish my question, saying:) Do you consider Libya's aggression against us a state of tension?

[Matar] I will rephrase the question: In the wake of the Moroccan prime minister's visit to you and of the development of the crisis between Tunisia and the Libyan Jamahiriya...

[Mzali] (The prime minister did not welcome the new phrasing of the question, saying:) You say that a crisis developed between Tunisia and Libya whereas what must be said is: When Libya embarked on expelling 32,000 Arab Tunisian citizens, including men, women and children, some of whom were not yet 40 days old...)

They have impounded their property and beaten and expelled them. All was well when we went to sleep and suddenly we woke up to a state of tension. What has happened since 5 August is that the Libyan regime -- beg your pardon, the people's committee's have expelled more than 32,000 Tunisians.

[Matar] There is a coincidence that merits further consideration and that is summed up in the following: Algeria has been unable to eliminate the causes of the Tunisian-Libyan tension and you have not been able to eliminate the causes of tension between Algeria and Morocco. This means that the Arab Maghreb countries lack people with good offices.

[Mzali] Scientists say that the definition of a problem constitutes half the solution. Therefore, you should not compare the Sahara issue and the Algerian-Moroccan relations on the one hand and the Libyan attack on Tunisia on the other. There is a difference between the two cases. Morocco has not attacked Algeria nor has Algeria attacked Morocco, whereas Libya has attacked us, has sent mined parcels and terrorists and has violated our airspace.

[Matar] Mzali used the phrase "Libya attacked us" repeatedly. While I was preparing to ask a new question on the recent coordination between Egypt and Tunisia, he said with a vehemence I had not noticed in my four previous interviews with him: What Libya has done constitutes aggression. Algerian aircraft have not violated Morocco's airspace whereas the Libyan aircraft have violated ours. The matter did not end at this. Rather, they summoned the officials of our embassy in Tripoli and told them: We have violated your airspace as a preliminary warning so that the Tunisian press and broadcasting station may hold their tongue. They also sent a number of mined parcels that have claimed innocent lives. Such a thing has not happened between Morocco and Algeria. Instead of saying that it is a crisis or a state of tension, as you have said, why don't you say that it is Libyan aggression against Tunisia? Aggression. It is an aggression...

[Matar] To your way of thinking, how can good relations be restored with the Libyan Jamahiriyah?

[Mzali] There is no problem between us and the Libyan people. Good relations will not be restored unless the Libyan regime compensates the bruised and beaten Tunisian Arab citizens, gives them their funds, properties and entitlements that are impounded in Libyan banks and return to them their television sets, cars and furniture and unless the Libyans pay the price of the goods shipped to them by simple Tunisian merchants and refrain from terrorism. If this happens, matters will be set aright.

[Matar] What, in your viewpoint, are the reasons for the conflict with the Libyan Jamahiriyah?

[Mzali] The problem is not between the Tunisian Government and al-Qadhdhafi but between al-Qadhdhafi and the people's committees on the one hand and the simple and modest Tunisian people on the other. The problem is not



between us and the Libyan people nor between the Tunisian people and the Libyan people. Every family in every village in the south and in the central part of the country has been victimized by the problem of the entitlements of its sons who worked in Libya. It is important that the Libyan regime realize this fact. This is the important thing.

#### Sympathetic Positions and Mubarak's Initiative

[Matar] Regarding the crisis which erupted suddenly with the Libyan Jamahiriyah, have you felt that there are Arab and international positions sympathetic to you?

[Mzali] I say that in the crisis which Libya has imposed on us by its attack on our workers and territories, great sympathy has been expressed, some of it openly, but most of it in bilateral meetings.

[Matar] Is the initiative for what looks like coordination between Egypt and Tunisia the result of the crisis between you and the Libyan Jamahiriyah?

[Mzali] President Mubarak's initiative and his dispatch of Usamah al-Baz to Tunis came in the wake of Libya's aggression against Tunisia. Al-Baz' second visit came in the wake of Israel's treacherous raid on Tunis. The Egyptian-Tunisian contact has occurred as a result of two attacks: A Libyan attack and an Israeli attack.

[Matar] How do you categorize your relations with the other Arab countries?

[Mzali] Excluding Libya, the relations with the others are divided into two kinds: Either very good or good.

#### Attack Against Whom: Tunisia or the PLO?

[Matar] Categorically, is the Israeli raid on Hamman al-Shatt, where the PLO headquarters are located, an Israeli attack aimed at Tunisia or at the PLO and has the Israeli aggression ended or will it recur as long as the PLO remains in Tunisia?

[Mzali] It is an Israeli attack against Tunisia. Tunisia is an independent state, a member of the United Nations. An Israeli attack has been perpetrated against it. We have made the world understand this and the understanding is reflected in the historic resolution condemning Israel, adopted unanimously by the Security Council.

[Matar] Do you feel that the PLO's stay in Tunisia will whet Israel's appetite for repeated aggression?

[Mzali] Tunisia is free to harbor and host whomever it wishes. We hosted the Algerians in the days of the revolution and we are prepared to harbor any struggler for freedom and to open our arms for whomever is engaged in confrontation against racial discrimination. The aggression was against Tunisia. As for Israel, it tries to give the impression that it attacked the

Palestinian leadership. To repeat, if the world did not view the Israeli raid as an attack against Tunisia, the Security Council would not have adopted the resolution it has adopted and the resolution would not have escaped the U.S. veto.

#### Ramifications that Will Intensify; Bleeding Tunisia Becomes Confrontation State

[Matar] Has it been possible to contain the consequences of the Israeli aggression against you?

[Mzali] What do you mean by "containment?"

[Matar] What is meant by containment is that the aggression has already taken place and that it is still possible to restore warmth to the relations between Tunisia and the United States; possible that the Palestinians will remain in Tunisia and will resume their activity; and also possible to wipe out the impression that the PLO is looking for a new place of residence?

[Mzali] The Israeli raid was staged with legitimacy given it by the United States. This is true. But the position taken by the world toward this raid has been good or, if we may use the phrase, tantamount to a balm for a very deep wound. The U.S. refraining from using the veto eased our reaction, as president and people, to its incomprehensible position on the raid -- a position which justifies Israeli aggression. This position was first expressed by the White House spokesman and then by President Reagan personally. An American envoy then came to us and explained his country's position.

[Matar] Did the explanation convince you and has everything ended?

[Mzali] The attack created ramifications that are still intensifying and has inflicted a wound that is still bleeding, what we want is for our Arab brothers to realize that Tunisia has, in spite of itself, become a confrontation state [with Israel] and that air cover must be secured for it.

#### Israel May Repeat Attack on Tunisia

[Matar] In the second interview I had with you more than 3 years ago, you explained to me this particular issue in response to a question I asked your answer seemed at the time as if it were a call to the Arabs, particularly to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and to the Gulf States, to buy an air defense network for Tunisia.

Were you then anticipating the events and possibilities and did you make an official request to which the brothers have not responded?

[Mzali] We said this 3 years ago and we are saying it again now. I add by emphasizing our full conviction that the danger to Tunisia has not ended and that Israel may repeat the aggression. The evidence to this is ample and perhaps the most significant piece of evidence is the statement made

by an Israeli official in comment on the Jarbah incident in which a Jew was killed by a Muslim -- a statement to the effect that Israel will not forget this incident and that it will avenge it. It is as if Israel wants to say that its mission is to defend the Jews of the world wherever they exist, keeping in mind that the Jarbah incident was between a Tunisian Muslim and a Tunisian Jew and that Israel has nothing to do with it.

[Matar] Is Tunisia capable of confronting a new Israeli attack?

[Mzali] Israel, which has already perpetrated the aggression, may attack at any time and may use any excuse to carry out its aggression. We are prepared to shoulder our responsibility and we believe that the Arabs should view Tunisia as a country that has become a confrontation state. We are fulfilling the obligation of fraternity and of solidarity with the Palestinian cause. This is not the first time we have paid this tax. We paid it for 8 years when Tunisia embraced the Algerian revolution and when we endured at the time the French aircraft's bombing of Saqiyat Sidi Yusuf and numerous villages in Tunisia.

[Matar] If the United States, which is a friend of Tunisia's and which is eager for the democratic course chosen by Tunisia, will not understand this and put pressure on Israel not to repeat the attack on Tunisia, then what benefit do you reap from this special relationship with the United States?

[Mzali] What should we do? Should we revile the United States? If we revile it, will we reap any benefit? What have those who have reviled the United States accomplished?

[Matar] I do not mean by my question that Tunisia should revile the United States. What I mean is to ask the prime minister about his idea of how to overcome this crisis in the relationship with the United States -- a crisis which the Israeli raid caused for Tunisia.

[Mzali] Life is struggle and hope. It is our duty as Tunisians and as Arabs generally to consider how to tackle this situation. It is a fact that Israel is the pampered child of the United States. But the solution is not vituperation. The solution lies in our examining the situation collectively and in finding the position with which the people are satisfied. I said in a speech heard by the Tunisians a few days ago that when the Egyptian Army crossed the Sinai, the United States established an air bridge to protect Israel. What is meant is that Israel is the pampered child of the United States and that Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi's daily reviling of the United States has changed nothing.

#### No Alliance Between Us and United States

[Matar] If the Israeli aggression against Tunisia is repeated and if the United States takes a negative position similar to its previous position or if it supports the aggression on the one hand and at the same time sends you an envoy to tell you words that do not convince the official or the citizen, then it may be incumbent upon Tunisia to reconsider its alliances.

[Mzali] There is no alliance between us and the United States. The tragedy is that public opinion considers Tunisia an ally of the United States. Tunisia is not an ally.

(Observation: Mohamed Mzali got irritated and I found myself rephrasing my question)

[Matar] I am sorry if I have phrased my question in a manner with which the prime minister has not been comfortable. Therefore, I will rephrase the question as follows: Should Israel attack Tunisia again, is it possible to expect Tunisia to reassess the friendly relationship existing between it and the United States?

[Mzali] Reassess in what sense?

Turning Toward Soviets Is Myth

[Matar] In the sense of turning eastward.

[Mzali] Meaning toward Russia?

[Matar] Toward whoever gives us weapons and stands with us.

[Mzali] Nothing will scratch your back like your fingernail. The question of turning to the Soviet to protest the U.S. position is a myth. This is because they are all similar. They all sell in dollars and all supply unsophisticated weapons.

[Matar] Then why isn't there at least an extremely sharp verbal position taken by Tunisia in relation to the U.S. position?

[Mzali] Complain? Attack? Resort to demagoguery? All this will be futile. It may lessen the pain a little but it will not solve the problem. We have, through official channels, emphasized extremely important positions. If it had not been for the resolution approved by the Security Council, which was not vetoed by the United States, we would have had a different position. We will not revile and it will do the United States no harm whatsoever for this or that circle to revile it.

What concerns me here is to reassure the readers of AL-TADAMUM, whose calm nationalist line we appreciate, is that there is no alliance between Tunisia and the United States and that no such alliance will come into existence. We are independent. We have friendships with numerous countries. Our friendship with the United States is like our friendship with France, Britain or China. They are all the same to us and the importance of each of them lies in its respect for our independence. We are not tied to any commitments and our ports receive all ships. In our ports you find the U.S. ship, the Soviet ship, the Italian ship, the French ship and so forth. On 3 December 1985, a Soviet marshal who is commander of the Soviet armies will pay us an official visit.

[Matar] But the visit's timing raises many questions.

[Mzali] We are independent and we cling to our decision-making and our independence.

[Matar] What is said is that the independent formula faces a bigger threat than the aligned formula.

[Mzali] Despite this, we cling to and defend the independent formula and we will continue to deal with all our friends.

#### Explanation for Brothers and Wishes Expressed to them

[Matar] Will your Arab movement henceforth focus on the fact that Tunisia has become a confrontation state and that, therefore, all the Arabs must deal with it as they deal with the confrontation states in the Arab East?

[Mzali] I believe that the Arab brothers have become convinced of this. I will certainly offer more explanations and express more wishes. We will try. This is our fate.

[Matar] Are you, for example, in the process of preparing specific requests to be presented to the Arab countries?

[Mzali] No. But when a country becomes a confrontation state, then what it needs from its brothers is well known. What we ask for, we asked for years ago.

[Matar] We understand from this that what you will do from now on is to revive these demands or to remind the brothers of them so that the demands may be reconsidered after having been shelved for a long time?

[Mzali] The brothers are aware of our circumstances and have known what Tunisia needs since it became practically a fundamental part of the Arab effort.

#### Optimistic and Reason Is Prince 'Abdallah's Approach

[Matar] Insofar as Tunisia's effort to clear the Arab atmosphere is concerned, have you done what is required of you and can we, as a publication, promise the reader that the Arab differences will disappear and that agreement will replace this Arab dissension which has gone on longer than the people can endure?

[Mzali] What has developed between Syria and Jordan, for example, is much better than we expected. When we started moving with Prince 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz and Chadli Klibi, the problem was not at all easy. But the situation has improved gradually and we are now exerting efforts to have something similar develop between Syria and Iraq. We also hope that our wishes will be realized. But if the brothers in Syria and Iraq do what the brothers in Syria and Jordan have done and achieve greater results than we expect, then we will be happier than they are with the situation.



[Matar] In light of the information at your disposal, are you optimistic?

[Mzali] Yes, I am optimistic. The reason for my optimism may be the role performed by Prince 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz -- a role for which he is to be truly thanked. We are actually facing a new and ideal model of intermediaries who tackle the difficult problems with the aim of surmounting them. As for us, I have accompanied and supported Prince Abdallah ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz in this difficult mission even though the circumstances required me to stay in Tunisia.

[Matar] In view of the difficult economic situation experienced by Tunisia and instead of resorting to the policy of borrowing, what prevents you from convincing the Arab states to allocate some deposits to Tunisia's banks in return for interest? You may thus find some who are more convinced of the deposits approach than the approach of giving loans.

[Mzali] We have constantly requested this. But, regrettably, some Arab countries feel more reassured if they deposited their funds in European and American banks. We wish they would deposit funds in our banks.

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## BRIEFS

TUNISIAN-GABONESE ACCORD--Libreville, 25 Nov (TAP)--During a ceremony held between the Tunisian and Gabonese delegations under the respective chairmanship of Mr Beji Caid Essebsi, Tunisian minister of foreign affairs, and Martin Bongo, his Gabonese counterpart, the following documents have been signed: 1) an agreement setting up a grand joint Tunisian-Gabonese Cooperation Commission. 2) a cultural, technical and scientific convention. The two ministers also initialed a report containing different actions to be undertaken between the two countries in certain specified sectors with a view to developing and strengthening bilateral relations and establishing a program of exchanges between the two countries. [Text] [Tunis TAP in French 1300 GMT 25 Nov 85 LD] 12624

ISRAEL-PLO TALKS--At the opening session of the annual meeting of the Parliamentary Association for Arab-European Cooperation, the deputy speaker of the Moroccan parliament, Ahmed Belhaj, called for Israel and the PLO to hold a direct dialogue aimed at finding a solution to the Middle East crisis. He said that there will be no peace in the Middle East as long as Israel insists on being hostile to the PLO, and added that the final solution lies in talks that bring together all the concerned parties, especially the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. He urged the EEC to contribute to finding a solution to the Arab-Israeli problem. [Excerpt] [Tunis Domestic Service in Arabic 2300 GMT 29 Nov 85 LD] 12624

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# TRADE RELATIONS WITH U.S.

Baghdad THE BAGHDAD OBSERVER in English 15 Nov 85 p 6

[Article by Tahir M. Al-Hadithi]

[Text] Economic relations between Iraq and the United States of America were recently discussed between Mr Clarence Brown, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Iraqi officials. Mr. Brown, who was on a visit to Iraq to attend the Baghdad International Fair of 1985, was received by Mr Taha Yassin Ramadhan, Member of the Revolution Command Council and First Deputy Premier.

Mr Brown expressed his pleasure over the participation by American firms in the Fair and over the developing commercial relations between Iraq and the United States. He also reiterated the willingness of American companies to reach economic and commercial agreements with Iraq in advanced agricultural and industrial sectors, in addition to promoting trade exchange between the two countries.

Mr. Ramadhan indicated the significance of Mr Brown's visit and said this would give him the opportunity to get acquainted and see the progress Iraq has made despite the fact that it was defending its sovereignty against the Iranian aggressors.

Mr. Ramadhan emphasised that the Iraqi leadership did not aim to use the Baghdad International Fair as an exhibition only. The aim was to provide the Iraqis the opportunity to see the latest developments in industry and modern technology in the developed countries in order to benefit from them [passage illegible]. He added that the increase in the number of participants in the Fair indicated the developing relations between Iraq and the rest of the world. Mr. Ramadhan said that the Iraqi leadership was planning to expand the Fair in size as well as quality of participation.

Referring to Iraqi-American economic relations, the First Deputy Premier said that as was the case with any relations between two countries, they should adopt a clear programme and build on a solid basis. This was necessary if the bases were to be used as foundations for extensive future relations built on mutual trust and willingness, he stressed. Mr Ramadhan added that Iraqi-American economic relations had stumbled and stagnated in the past to the degree that there was no dealing between Iraqi and American business establishments. If American firms were willing to expand their activities they

should appreciate the circumstances prevailing in Iraq and the way it deals with foreign firms and the good relations it has with many countries. This is especially so, because Iraq has such vast relations with many countries and is prepared to expand its cooperation on the basis of mutual interests.

Mr Taha Yassin Ramadhan stressed that the Iraqi-American economic relations have improved recently. This had been manifested through the visits of American officials to Iraq, agreements on cooperation between Iraqi and American business establishments and the increase in the exchange of goods between the two countries. This increase had been possible particularly after the American companies were convinced of Iraq's sound economic policy and Iraq's commitment to its obligations.

Mr. Ramadhan emphasised that the present phase in Iraq's history was temporary, because the size of economic and commercial activities was affected by the Iraq-Iran war. However, the cooperation will expand greatly in the future and this would require the companies to take into account the future of Iraq and the improvement of its economic position and not confine themselves to the present stage. This improvement has already become apparent after Iraq started to export its oil through Saudi Arabia in October 1985.

Mr. Ramadhan indicated that Iraq's positive stance with foreign companies should encourage them to continue and expand their cooperation and deepen the confidence between Iraqi and foreign institutions.

The First Deputy Premier then pointed out that Iraqi officials had a clear idea about foreign companies who work in Iraq. They take into account precision, efficiency, period of work and fulfillment of the provisions of contracts. Therefore Mr Ramadhan said those who had worked in Iraq with efficiency and precision may look forward to a better future not only in Iraq but also in other countries. The factors of quality and price are also of great importance, he stressed.

Speaking about the future of economic and commercial relations between Iraq and the United States, Mr Ramadhan said the two parties were eager to achieve a high level of cooperation and would establish sound bases to this effect.

Mr Ramadhan reiterated that Iraq did not lack human and material resources. There are large numbers of experts, scientists and technicians. Iraq has also gathered a great deal of experience through international cooperation, Iraqi experts have played a great role in building modern Iraq. The Revolution in Iraq pays great attention to building and promoting human resources.

For his part, the U.S. assistant Secretary of Commerce said he was impressed by the great development achieved in Iraq despite the difficult war conditions. He also praised the capability of the Iraqi armed forces in defending Iraqi territory and sovereignty and stressed that the world community hailed the peaceful attitude of Iraq and for abiding by the UN Security Council's resolutions and its cooperation with mediation committees.

Talking about economic and trade relations between Iraq and the United States, Mr Brown emphasised that American firms were willing to work in Iraq especially

in advanced industry, building dams and irrigation projects as well as in increasing trade between the two countries. He pointed out that the United States and Europe were well aware of the huge material and human resources of Iraq and he hailed the great development phase Iraq was going through. He pointed [word omitted] the important position of Iraq in the Middle East and its effective political and economic role because of its potentials, genuine leadership and the sound policies of its government.

Mr Brown emphasised that American firms were willing to increase the size of trade exchange with Iraq and wanted to reach agreement for economic and commercial cooperation with Iraqi establishments and this would help promote future relations and the activities of American companies in Iraq.

Answering a question from Mr Brown about the latest developments in the Iraq-Iran war and the position of Iraqi forces in the battlefield, Mr Ramadhan said, "we shall defend our country, no matter how long the war lasts. We do not have any designs against the Iranian territories and we are not aggressors. We want to achieve peace as soon as possible and we have done quite a lot in this respect."

Mr Ramadhan described the position on the front as excellent, and said the Iraqi armed forces in the sixth year of the war are strong and superior. They recently crushed an attack by the Iranian forces in the northern sector in a very short time, he said.

"Concerning the economic situation, our oil exports to the world are increasing and our development projects are carried out without interruption. We also have good international relations, Mr Ramadhan said.

Mr Ramadhan described Khomeini's policies as sick because they represent aggression, terror, domination and intervention in the internal affairs of neighbouring and other countries as well. He pointed out that the position of the world community--despite some improvements--leaves a lot more to be desired. "It should put more pressure on the aggressors in Iran to change their policy, particularly because the Khomeini regime does not respect international laws and codes nor the decisions of the world community. It rejects them and insists on pursuing its aggressive policy and considers the occupation of territories as legitimate."

Mr Ramadhan stressed that Iran had lost a lot as a result of Khomeini's policies. Its economy has deteriorated greatly and unemployment has risen. The conflict between the religious men and the army was continuous, and this has led to the absence of a central authority. There is no strategy for the development of Iran and there is no stability. Iranian opposition and people are increasing their armed activities against the regime.

In the end, the importance of drawing up a formula for the economic and commercial cooperation between the two countries in the coming years was stressed, especially since the Iraqi and American establishments share the desire to cooperate to serve their joint interests.

Translated from Arabic.

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## REVIEW OF DEFENSE INDUSTRY SALES IN CIVILIAN SECTOR

Tel Aviv TEKHOLOGIYOT in Hebrew Aug 85 pp 41-43

[Article: "The Civilian Side of the Defense Industries"]

[Text] The cuts in the defense budget and reduction in buying power of the Defense Ministry emphasize the importance of a trend which commenced a few years ago in the defense industries: production for the civilian market.

"This year a sort of saturation is being felt in the world military market," says Dr Arye Levy, director of the Research and Development [R & D] Coordination Branch in the Israeli Military Industry. "There are many manufacturers, and competition is fierce. Sales are always a function of wars or tension."

Dr Tzvi Me'iri, managing director of Galram, a civilian industry designated to exploit expertise of the Authority for Development of Military Means [RAFA'EL], maintains that "the connection between military applications and civilian industries is expressed by the desire to take a share of the military component of the national cake and return it to the civilian portion." In his opinion, this is the easiest means of encouraging economic growth.

## A Great Variety of Technologies

The variety of technologies used when developing military products is great, and for some of them uses can be found in civilian areas. Thus, for example, the development of the guided missile requires use of the following technologies:

## Optics

Sensors - radar, infra-red, television

Signal processing

Hydraulic, pneumatic, or electric actuators

Control engineering

Inertial navigation - acceleration gauges and gyroscopes

Devices for measurement of air speed and pressure

Computers with real-time programming

Pneumatic, hydraulic, electric and electronic power supply

Blast materials and rocket engines

Mechanics - fine mechanics, structures, composite materials, heat transfer and (zivud)

In addition to these, there are other technological disciplines which are used in the development of weapons systems: lasers; communications - voice, data and pictures, including image processing; antennae and emission; electromagnetic suitability; reliability engineering; quality control; nondestructive testing; environmental and field testing; operations research; production engineering; automatic testing equipment; microelectronics: semi-conductors (mainly sensors); integrated circuits for microwaves; hybrid integrated circuits; vacuum technology; adhesion technology; and computerized analysis and design.

#### Problems in Adapting to the Civilian Market

The problem in adapting military products to the civilian market lies in three principal factors:

- Security clearance of products causes producers to hesitate to transfer them into civilian hands because secrets could be leaked to undesirable elements. It must be understood that with the transfer into the civilian market the product or technology becomes public domain and henceforth is stripped of its secrecy.

- Problems in adaptation to civilian applications.

- High cost of the military product, which must meet special standards, something which is not relevant to civilian industry.

The desire to prevent military technology from falling into foreign hands has brought about government efforts in several countries to block export of military technology. However, when it was clarified that the same technology could be used in civilian applications, the barrier was burst. Thus, for example, there are components which initially started out in the United States in development for military purposes. However when a civilian market was created for this technology, the government did not succeed in blocking transfer of the technology to the civilian sector, with the exception of certain defense developments. Incidentally, in the civilian market the American government finds it difficult to prevent leakage of western technologies to the Soviet Bloc and periodically incidents of such smuggling are uncovered.

Adaptation of a military product, as is, to the civilian market is a difficult problem. In Dr Mei'ri's opinion, when an industrial plant manufactures a product which from the start was intended to solve a problem in the purely military area, the chances for such a product to be sold as is in the civilian market are nearly nil. However, there are also products whose initial purpose was to assist in the development of military products, for which civilian applications can be found.

Also, the relatively high price of military products in comparison with civilian products makes their adaptation difficult. Production of a product according to military standards demands precise quality control and reliability and greater supervision over the production processes, not to mention the much greater durability requirements than civilian products as well as equipping

them with systems and devices for which there is no demand in the civilian market. Thus, for example, the cost of a missile boat is much higher than that of a computerized cargo ship of greater girth and weight. A military computer is much more expensive than an identical civilian product.

A problem also exists in the behavior of the civilian market: Many manufacturers who have managed to succeed without a military product prefer to continue in this manner, unless the military product is very cheap, which is quite a rare occurrence. In this area, for example, experiments were made at adapting fuses for the automotive industry.

In addition to adapting products for the civilian market there are also efforts to adapt technologies. Thus, for example, today gallium arsenide is produced, chiefly in the United States, as a substitute for silicon, principally in military components. With the aid of this technology it is possible to build lasers for fiber-optic communications which are supplied to the civilian market.

Another technology used in producing missiles has been applied in the medical area (orthopedic implants). Experiments in this area are currently underway in an Israeli hospital.

Another example of technology transfer from military to civilian plants, is the transfer of technology for the production of special vacuum tubes from the military industry to the civilian. With the aid of this technology a special microfocus x-ray tube has been developed which is installed in the mammograph of Elscint. In this tube the size of the focus from which the x-rays exit is extremely small, thus making possible a high-resolution picture.

Another technological area is applications of lasers in the civilian market, a field still in its infancy.

Incidentally, original Israeli military technology did not exist until about 10 years ago (the term "technology" refers here to a means of employing materials and processes with the goal of producing products). Until about 10 years ago the military industry here took technologies based in other countries and used them to make new products. An example of this is the Kfir airplane, which is a combination of American and French technology. Another example: improvements in existing technologies during the upgrading of Sherman and Centurion tanks.

In air-to-air missiles of the first generation, Shafrir 2, a wave detector acquired abroad and classic electronics were used. The Israeli contribution was on the system side and in high reliability: high strike capability and low wear and tear.

Lack of technological expertise almost caused an end to the development of the Python 3 missile. The detectors for this missile were acquired from the United States but for security reasons the American government forbade their export. When this became clear to the people at RAFA'EL they were forced to develop the required technology on their own with the help of others. Thus an additional technology was developed: flares.

The contribution of military plants to the civilian sector finds expression not only in adaptation of products but also in transfer of knowledge to civilian manufacturers. Thus, for example, a manufacturer who serves as a supplier or sub-contractor to a security plant learns to produce in accordance with high standards and often with more sophisticated equipment than he previously possessed, not to mention learning new methods of quality control.

#### The Military Industry and the Civilian Market

One of the examples of sales by a military plant to the civilian market is that of the Military Industry. The Military Industry's principal purpose is to develop and produce weapons and ammunitions systems of various types. However, parallel to the military area, today it is selling to the civilian market, principally in the areas of chemicals and metals. At the same time, the civilian segment of the Military Industry is quite small - about \$6 million, which comprises about one percent of the company's sales in the last year. The marketing arm of the Military Industry to the civilian market is the Palindent company. The State of Israel, by means of senior employees of the Ministry of Defense and the Military Industry, holds the company's entire capital stock (issued and paid).

According to Dr Arye Levy, in the area of chemicals, for 20 years the Israeli Military Industry has marketed a chemical substance used for spraying cotton fields to remove the leaves from the plants and prepare them for picking. Another chemical area is that of supplying intermediate materials to the pharmaceutical industry, such as materials based on nitrate groups or that undergo nitration such as that performed for making explosives and blast materials. Another area is materials for color and moisturizers made on a nitro-cellulose base.

In the area of metals, the Israeli Military Industry supplies public telephones in the country, with total sales in 1984 of about \$1.5 million per year, including replacement parts. It also manufactures light arms for collectors and hobbyists, and replacement parts for buses.

#### RAFA'EL - Business Considerations

The executives at RAFA'EL foresaw 5 years ago a situation in which the IDT would be likely to reduce its purchases following a shrinking of resources. At that time, given the massive purchases by the defense apparatus, this kind of thinking was foreign to the military industries.

RAFA'EL executives understood that in order to deal with a possible situation of a decline in IDT purchasing, it was necessary to diversify the markets. Thus a decision was made to set up civilian subsidiary companies whose purpose would be to apply in the civilian market technologies and knowledge that had amassed at RAFA'EL and promote continued development and employment for RAFA'EL employees. This decision gave birth to the Galrom Corporation.

RAFA'EL's decision led to complaints by civilian groups who considered RAFA'EL's knowledge a national-government asset and demanded that it be made available to



civilian bodies, and not solely to subsidiary companies. Dr Tzvi Me'iri claims that the capital invested in research and development came from RAFA'EL's profits and thus are not an asset of the country. He says that, in his words, RAFA'EL is a kind of "transvestite" - an authorized government unit which behaves like a commercial company, although in fact it is not. RAFA'EL's path to the capital market is blocked and it is not able to raise funds on the stock market the way civilian companies do. Thus, for example, RAFA'EL is unable to reap any benefit from the Elscint Law.

"In addition," says Dr Me'iri, "there are at RAFA'EL military projects which were not developed for the IDF but rather from pure business considerations." Incidentally, up until a few years ago, RAFA'EL avoided exporting due to security considerations. Over the last 3 years a change in policy was instituted and today there are many orders for their products.

Dr Me'iri also deals with the firing of engineers at RAFA'EL following the reduction in the military budget. He claims this is not a "plague of dismissals," but rather a measure of instituting cuts and greater efficiency. There are now more people available for civilian activities. "This situation was foreseen but occurred more rapidly and with greater force," says Dr Me'iri. "We need a year in order to deal with this transition better."

In RAFA'EL over the years about 100 think tanks have developed specializing in some 400 technological disciplines. Each group has from 3 to 20 experts. RAFA'EL employs a total of some 6,800 employees, of whom a third are engineers, a third technicians and a third economists and managers.

One example of transfer of technologies developed at RAFA'EL to civilian applications is composite materials. Technologies of composite materials were developed for production of missile wings and antenna caps. The principal use of this technology outside of RAFA'EL is in the civilian aircraft industry. These materials, common today in world aircraft industries, are a metal substitute, with advantages of weight and strength, and are produced from such materials as carbon and glass by a process of soaking in chemicals and drying in controlled heat and pressure conditions.

[Box on page 42: Text] Israeli Military Industry Sales Over the Last Year: \$520 Million.

Last year the Israel Military Industry's sales came to about \$520 million, and together with its sub-contractors reached a total of about \$600 million.

Investment in research and development at the Military Industry is about \$30 million per year. Most of the Israel Military Industry's products are fruits of its own R & D. In addition, it supports R & D at RAFA'EL by about \$4 - 7 million per year, with the goal of advancement and development of products for the Israel Military Industry.

Forty percent of the scope of the Israel Military Industry's turnover is for the Ministry of Defense (this year's scope is still unclear) and 60 percent of its products are destined for export.



The Israel Military Industry employs about 15,000, of whom about 3,500 are State employees and the rest are employed by contract according to the terms of the metal industry.

The Israel Military Industry is composed of 10 production divisions, divided into 36 plants. Weapons production ranges from the smallest caliber (5.56 mm) to the Merkava cannon with a diameter of 105 mm. One of the successes of the Israeli Military Industry is the 'Uzi, which today has sold more than 1 million units on five continents.

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## BRIEFS

OIL PRODUCTION FIGURES--Over the last decade investments in oil and gas exploration came to approximately \$266 million, according to data of the Ministry of Energy. Some \$103 million of this was financed from the state budget, \$57 million from independent sources of the National Oil Company and \$106 million from private investors and public companies. Out of this budget, \$66 million were spent for infrastructure development, and the remainder was invested in drilling. Data of the Ministry of Energy show that since the commencement of drilling activity 20.5 million barrels have been produced in Israel--a quantity lower than the daily oil production of OPEC members (which today stands at 24 million barrels per day). Oil production last year came to 403 million barrels, worth \$8 million. Daily oil consumption of the State of Israel is approximately 150 thousand barrels; thus the annual production is sufficient for no more than 3 days' consumption. Up to today not all of the wells drilled are producing commercial quantities of oil and the only drilling being carried out is at Sodom Hill 1. At present drilling has ceased since the drill is stuck and financing to dislodge it is not available. These days Hammer Group people are preparing a drilling plan for the area of Negev Hill. In this project about \$20 million will be invested, half in drilling and half in geophysical work. [Text] [Tel Aviv HA'ARETZ in Hebrew 22 Jul 85 p 10] 9182/12859

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## WATER MAINS TO ALL LARGE TOWNS BY 1990

Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 5 Nov 85 p 4

## [Text]

IT IS a brave head of department who will announce a specific set of targets for a project of any kind. But in November last year, Mohammad Kilani, the head of Jordan's Water Authority, had done just that when he had said that the authority intended to have all Jordanian settlements of 500 people or more connected to a main water supply by the end of this year and all settlements of 2,500 or more connected to a main sewerage system by 1990.

Twelve months later, Mr Kilani can be pleased with the progress the authority has made towards those goals.

By the end of this year, 90 per cent of Jordanian households will either be connected to a water supply or work to connect them will be well under way. As far as possible, the remaining 10 per cent will be connected by the end of the decade. The qualification is necessary because some settlements are just too small or too isolated for a piped water supply to be feasible. Bedouin tents also do not lend themselves well to piped water, though some sites are being provided with communal taps.

The water authority is also making good progress on the establishment of sewerage networks and treatment plants. Some 30 per cent of households are now connected to a proper sewerage network, and this is due to rise to 65 to 70 per cent by 1990.

The Amman network has expanded and new systems are under installation in all large towns. Plans are being drawn up for all settlements of over 2,500 people. Smaller settlements can manage with more traditional solutions to the problem of waste disposal, but any special problems will be dealt with.

Mr Kilani emphasises that the government has given such priority to the expansion of the water supply and sewerage system because it sees it as a major factor in the prevention of epidemics and overall promotion of good health.

Because of this emphasis, waste-treatment facilities have also been given great importance. The new treatment plant at Khirbet Es Samra on the outskirts of Amman is due to come into service by the end of the year and will be able to deal with the capital's waste-water for the next 10 years.

It should also provide a valuable boost to water supply as re-use is an integral part of this system as well as of one being installed in the port city of Aqaba.

People do tend to feel a little nervous about the idea of re-use of waste-water for agricultural purposes. Perhaps this is why the Water authority has been careful to publicise the fact that the country's Royal Scientific Society has already signed a contract under which it will carry out systematic testing of the water as it enters the plant at Khirbet Es Samra and at all stages as it goes through the treatment process and out on its way to the King Talal Dam.

The authority is now planting 50,000 trees around the plant itself, including 20,000 olives, to show just what can be done. A further 50,000 forest trees will be planted in 1986-87 and by the time they grow to full height, adding to Jordan's greenery and possibly even helping to encourage more rainfall, there is little chance that anyone will even remember where the water that made them grow came from.

# COMMUNIST PARTY CHIEF COMMENTS ON SOLUTIONS TO CRISES

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 11-17 Nov 85 pp 20-22

[Article by Reem Drouby]

[Text]

**Do you consider the Tripoli conflict completely over; have all parties surrendered their weapons and why is Tawheed leader Sheikh Said Shaaban not satisfied with the Tripoli agreement?**

The Tripoli conflict is over in one way, and we are confident it will not erupt again in the form of an armed struggle. The agreement is being implemented strictly on the security level, and all weapons are being collected from the various rival forces.

However, the Tripoli conflict will continue as a political, ideological, popular and media struggle and signs that it may flare up again militarily still prevail as the Islamic Unification Movement (Tawheed) continues to charge the air with vindictive political and sectarian statements against the patriotic forces and Syria, while it is forming secret organizations through which it plans to carry out terrorist acts and military operations against the patriotic forces and Tripoli's leading national figures, and the Arab deterrent forces.

This requires serious preventive treatment on the following levels:

1 — The political level, whereby the national political leadership of Tripoli, which is constituted of the various national parties, forces and independent leaders, headed by Prime Minister Rashid Karami, must assume an effective role in bringing the city back on its feet and creating a moral shield against any forces that seeks to recreate the atmosphere of conflict and fighting in the city.

2 — The progressive and national forces must work together and present a common front in order to be able to deter and uproot all evil intentions and forces.

3 — The Arab deterrent forces must be supported materially and morally so that they can continue playing their important role and finally stabilize the situation in Tripoli and eliminate any probability of renewed fighting there.

As to Sheikh Said Shaaban not being satisfied with the Tripoli accord, that is his affair. Moreover, we know that

some factions within the Tawheed movement opposed the agreement signed by Shaaban in Damascus. We hope he will be loyal to his commitment and will not cover up for the practices of the forces that only agreed to the ceasefire in the face of an imminent defeat and to satisfy the public opinion. If Shaaban can control these forces, fine. Otherwise, the Lebanese and Syrian forces that support the agreement will carry out their commitment to hit all agents that try to sabotage it.

**What do you know about the Syrian-sponsored tripartite accord, and will the factions that have objected to it be able to obstruct its implementation?**

I do not know the details of this agreement since I am not directly involved in the negotiations taking place in Damascus. Two national factions we trust are participating in these negotiations, under the supervision of Syria whose determination to end the crisis we also trust completely. However, we in the Lebanese Communist Party have a clear position toward what is being conducted, and have no illusions about the possible success of the negotiations. And although we may not object to the details of this agreement, the fact remains that it was not negotiated in the ideal circumstances that could guarantee its success and protect it against the forces that would seek to sabotage it.

We believe the negotiations should not have been conducted by the leaders of the National Unity Front alone, but by capable representatives chosen by this front, and equally capable delegates of the other side, who would keep their commitments to the agreement. Nor is secrecy a necessary ingredient for the success of the negotiations but quite the contrary, these should have been accompanied by open, frank, serious and responsible discussions in which all the factions would participate, speak out their opinion, and proclaim their commitment to the agreement.

Consequently, we consider that the sectarian nature of the negotiations will make an agreement impossible. We are very pained as we say it, but there is absolutely no chance for

an agreement between the sects in Lebanon, for however capable a lawyer is, he cannot win a case that is doomed to fail. The sects are no longer capable of reconstructing Lebanon, they are no longer capable of even temporarily patching up the pieces of their torn country. A radical reconsideration of the way efforts to save the country are conducted is essential. We are in no way implying that we will present any obstacle to the negotiations, we sincerely wish them success, but we are not fooling ourselves and have no hopes of such a success.

Another major obstacle to the success of these talks is that the demands of the national faction (Amal and the PSP) seem insignificant and minimal for the public opinion represented by this faction, while they are seen as draconian by the public opinion represented by the Lebanese Forces. All the concessions that could be obtained in the field of political confessionalism do not constitute the minimum level required by the people represented by our dear brothers Nabih Berri and Walid Jumblatt, yet these same concessions seem gigantic and almost impossible for the faction represented by Elie Hobeika. Therefore, and in the best of circumstances, the concessions agreed upon will not satisfy our people, while Elie Hobeika cannot even guarantee their implementation. And that is not taking into consideration the bad intentions of those who initially disapprove of the agreement....

**It is said that no matter what efforts are exerted, the solution to the Lebanese crisis cannot materialize unless accompanied by an international agreement. What is your comment?**

This is not true. The Lebanese crisis has two aspects. One, the internal aspect, results from the crisis of the political, economic and social system in Lebanon, while the external aspect is the result of the rational relation that links between Lebanon and its direct surroundings. Any faction that ignores the internal Lebanese aspect of the crisis is, willingly or unwillingly, guilty of lack of insight. The factions that overlook the regional crisis and its repercussions on Lebanon are also guilty in that they are trying to conceal the impossibility of reaching a final solution to the Lebanese crisis independently of the solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

**The citizens are afraid of "surprises" such as the assassination of a major leader or an upheaval in a party. What is your comment?**

These fears are justified since the factions harmed by the prospect of a solution will spare no effort to obstruct this before the solution is officially announced, and should they fail to do so before the public announcement, they will try again later by assassinating one or more leaders, staging an upheaval in a party, or through acts of kidnappings and other similar practices.

Nor should we forget what Israel and South Lebanon Commander Antoine Lahd are preparing for the Jezzine and Sidon areas, and the repercussions this will have on the Lebanese crisis, even after the announcement of a solution.

**Do you think the tripartite accord will get Lebanon out**

**of its crisis, or will it just lead to a truce?**

I have already said that this agreement has not been reached yet... Anyway, should it be signed, it requires great solidarity among the national ranks, and the dissipation of all confessional or sectarian differences among the patriotic factions, because these differences are making the other faction more reluctant and hesitant about the agreement.

Solidarity among the national Lebanese forces, plus the essential Syrian support, are prerequisites for the success of the negotiations. But I would like to say here that we want Syria's role to go beyond that of a political and moral support. We want this support to translate itself into a material Syrian presence on the ground, with an active role for the Syrian forces.

**Are you for or against a national conference?**

We believe that discussions around the contents of the agreement are necessary, in whatever context they may be held. We call for a national conference of all the Lebanese citizens, that would be attended by all those who approve of the bases of the Damascus agreement.

**Former President Camille Chamoun rejects the idea of a national conference to be held outside Lebanon. What is your comment?**

That is just what I meant by saying that there are forces with whom we should not negotiate the fate, place or structure of a national conference or solution, or whose opinion we should even consider. Camille Chamoun's position is known to all. He is a prominent symbol of the isolationist hegemony, a prominent symbol of the Israeli option, and a prominent symbol of Lebanon's deviation toward the West. These three factors are what destroyed Lebanon.

**Former President Suleiman Franjieh also said the tripartite agreement concerns the three negotiating parties but does not involve him. How would you interpret this?**

It does not concern him directly because he did not participate in the negotiations. We had said the same thing when we stated that we were not directly involved in the negotiations, but the fact remains that these concern us and former President Franjieh since they deal with the fate of Lebanon.

**Do you think Israel or PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat will try to thwart the Damascus agreement provoking battles in South Lebanon or the camps?**

This is certainly true. But a third faction will also try to thwart the agreement, namely the U.S. which is advising its allies in Lebanon, in the government circles in the Lebanese Forces militia and other circles to try and complicate things and gain time, while promising them that the day will come when a new regional power will allow them not to make any of the concessions they now see themselves forced to do. But the Palestinian, Israeli and American efforts will all be vain, since America and Israel have already lost most of the influence they had in Lebanon, and will continue doing so whereas the Palestinian right wing is isolated in the region, and has received a severe blow in Tripoli. ●



**PHALANGIST OFFICIAL INTERVIEWED ON INTRA-CHRISTIAN STRIFE**

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 11-17 Nov 85 pp 24-26

[Article by Nadim Abou-Ghannam]

[Text]

**How long will the Phalangist-Lebanese Forces conflict last, and how will it develop?**

This conflict is an internal affair and various efforts are deployed to find a solution to it.

**What have these efforts achieved?**

There are serious efforts to study the situation, and these are following their natural course.

**When do you expect a joint meeting of the Phalangist Party and the the Lebanese Forces to be convened?**

Meetings between the two parties were not suspended, and are continuing in order to study the visions and conceptions of each faction.

**Do you expect any military clashes between the two?**

I do not think this is likely at all, despite the fact that some undemocratic practices that do not comply with the known party line have taken place.

**Who is the decision-maker in East Beirut now, the Phalangist Party or the Lebanese Forces?**

What decision?

**The Phalangists and Forces always issued common decisions...**

The Phalangist Party is a political party that has always had and will always have its own political decision.

**And when will joint Phalangist-Forces decisions be made?**

When we estimate that the welfare of the nation requires that.

**How would you comment on the tripartite meetings in Damascus?**

Commenting is irrelevant now that the negotiations are nearing their end, and detailed or less detailed information about their results has started to leak.

We are basically in favor of these talks, but it is very

necessary that we and everybody else be informed about the draft that has been formulated to end the Lebanese crisis, especially as the draft cannot be finalized until the legal constitutional institutions pass it. The Constitution states that any project to change constitutional clauses must pass by the cabinet that later refers it to parliament, which can pass it if it is approved by the majority. Hence the secrecy around what has been agreed is useless since those who are meeting in Damascus have no final decision-making powers.

**Various factions have said that the negotiators in Damascus only represent their own organizations but not the authorities or any other party. How would that reflect on the agreement or its implementation?**

I have just said that only those who are negotiating in Damascus are committed to whatever they have agreed upon, since parliament is the first and last reference on constitutional reforms, or what is being called constitutional reforms.

Hence I consider that the Syrian role is one of conciliating various points of views after a study of the various work programs presented, and this opinion has already been voiced by major Syrian officials. Syria's role is to bring the various points of views presented by all the Lebanese factions and leaders closer, as a first step toward convening a national conference and to put the deputies in the atmosphere of these agreements, since it is preferable that they should know or participate in all that is going on.

**Do you think the tripartite agreement will lead to a truce or a final end to the Lebanese crisis?**

One of the major questions we asked about the draft pact is whether it provides for a transitional period. If it does, then all meetings and blueprints are futile. We recall the Geneva conference, when we thought we had reached final decisions. Then came the Lausanne conference, and a plan was presented which was endorsed in the ministerial

statement. And although we approved of the ministerial statement and participated, as did other factions, in the government on the basis of this statement, we now see that this very statement has become unsatisfactory for a faction of the Lebanese. I wonder why we ever agree on something only to reject it later.

But that is nothing new. The Constitutional Document that was formulated during the term of the late President Elias Sarkis was also unanimously approved by all members of parliament. But like other papers, it ended in the trashbin, and new demands and accords are appearing today. This is why there are fears that agreement reached now will also be just a transitional period leading to new demands.

**The tripartite meetings in Damascus are negotiating the abolition of sectarianism, yet the negotiators themselves represent three sects. Isn't this somehow contradictory?**

Contradictions abound... One Lebanese faction says that the Lebanese events are a civil war between the various sects, that kidnappings and killings are carried out on the basis of one's religion, and that all that is going on in Lebanon on the security level has a shameful sectarian nature. Can any bill decreed by the government or passed by the parliament eliminate sectarianism from the very minds or hearts of the citizens? The latest events have sown the seeds of sectarianism very deep in the hearts of the Lebanese, and if we sincerely wish to abolish political sectarianism we have to uproot these seeds. But those who approve of what has been agreed in Damascus do so from a sectarian position, and those who object to it also do so because such a sect was not represented. In fact, we are no longer speaking of confessionalism, but of sectarianism.

We insist on having a transitional period during which each sect can secure the largest number of deputies representing it. Some have even suggested the formation of an upper house, and sects are already competing on which sect should preside at it. People are speaking of a transitional period to be at most five years long, at the end of which political sectarianism would be abolished, and we hear suggestions about an upper house. But such a body is usually created to represent the various sects or cantons. And since there are no cantons in Lebanon, how could we have an upper house if we seek to abolish confessionalism?

**Will Syria be inviting the Phalangist Party to Damascus soon?**

I was recently in Syria for the meeting of the American congressmen of Arab origin, and I met then with Syrian Vice-President Abdelhalim Khaddam who briefed me on the broad lines of the draft pact. We discussed these at length.

As to receiving an invitation, we can contact the Syrians anytime we wish, and they can get in touch with us whenever they want. Such formalities are not present between us and the Syrian officials. When we find it necessary to go to Damascus we do the necessary contacts for that, and when

the Syrian officials think it necessary to inform us about details, they do not stop at any specific formalities.

**When Khaddam briefed you on the broad lines of the pact did you approve them or leave them open to study?**

I opposed what was presented to me and said that the final decision of the Phalangist politburo would only be taken after we are informed about the details.

**Former President Camille Chamoun said that should a national conference be convened, it must only take place in Lebanon. What is your opinion on this?**

Before a national conference is convened, a number of smaller congresses must take place. The Christian leaders must meet among each other and agree on a common agenda, the Muslim leaders must also do the same thing, then contacts should be made between the two sides to bring the two agendas closer, and then a national conference may be dispensed with. If that is the case, the government, which represents all the Lebanese, can study the suggestions made and refer them to parliament.

**Can we say the end of the war has begun?**

I think the end has begun, despite the clouds we still sometimes see on the horizon.

**Jezzin MP Emond Rizk called for a UNIFIL deployment in Jezzin, while Sheikh Mohammad Mehdi Shamseddin said this would be a gift to Israel. What is your comment?**

The international forces are deployed in most southern regions, and there have been suggestions that they should deploy in all the South. I strongly favor a peaceful solution to Jezzin which is the only Christian town remaining in the South, and consider that whoever prompts a displacement of the inhabitants of Jezzin would have put the final touches to demographic segregation and the partition of Lebanon. Consequently, we must not stop at formalities but should all seek a solution that would provide for a continuing Christian presence in Jezzin, because that presence is of the utmost importance to the nation.

**PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat last month threatened an imminent military flare-up in the camps, but nothing of the sort has happened. Do you think an armed confrontation has simply been postponed?**

Arafat has done more than enough in Lebanon, and though we now look at the Lebanese events as a sectarian crisis or a result of a need for political and constitutional reforms, let us not forget that these started in 1975 because of the armed Palestinian presence in the country. ●

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## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### PNC CHAIRMAN ON RELATIONS WITH JORDAN, SYRIA, EGYPT

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 16-22 Nov 85 pp 23-24

[Interview with Shaykh 'Abd-al-Hamid al-Sa'ih, chairman of the Palestine National Council, by Hamida Na'na'. "We Pray for the Success of the Jordanian-Syrian Reconciliation and We Call on Damascus to Join our Agreement with Amman"; in Cairo, date not given]

[Text] Everyone in Cairo is talking about the return of Egypt to Arab ranks. They emphasize that this return, by means of an Arab summit meeting making a unanimous decision to reverse the decision of the Baghdad summit, will not be easy as long as Egypt is officially committed to the Camp David accord. It seems that the Palestine Liberation Organization now has another idea for fashioning a renewal of relations with Egypt. It intends, following the official visit of Yasir 'Arafat to Cairo, to draw up a "working paper" plan to put before the conference, the thrust of which is that each Arab state be left free to take whatever steps it wants concerning the form of its relations with Egypt. This would bring about renewal of relations without causing a breach in the Arab consensus.

AL-TADAMUN met with Shaykh 'Abd-al-Halim al-Sa'ih, the chairman of the Palestine National Council in Cairo. He participated in a conference on the biography of the prophet and the sunnah that met at al-Azhar. We talked with him about the current situation of the Palestinians, the significance of the presence in Cairo, the intent of Yasir 'Arafat's visit, the Jordanian-Palestinian dialogue and other topics. The text of the interview follows below:

[Question] May we be given the most recent situation of the Jordanian-Palestinian negotiations after Britain's refusal to meet the Palestinian side in the joint delegation and after the hijacking crisis of the Italian ship, the "Achille Lauro?"

[Answer] The Palestinian and Jordanian sides have reached agreement to continue to work together and on joint coordination in accordance with the agreement signed by King Husayn and Mr Yasir 'Arafat on 11 February 1985. It has now become clear that Jordan and the PLO consider this agreement the strategic policy from which they start and according to which they will move, provided that this is under the UN umbrella, with the attendance of the five

permanent members of the council and those who are competent and have standing, including Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and the PLO in a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation, which means a joint delegation with a Jordanian side and a Palestinian side, the two sides forming a joint delegation agreeing on the bases and coordination. This joint delegation has begun its work and has taken up its task in the visit it made, headed by Mr Yasir 'Arafat, to China and then there was the delegation that went to London for a meeting with the British foreign minister, which did not, however, take place.

[Question] In your opinion, why did the meeting not take place? What are the dimensions of the story of the statement? Was there prior agreement between the PLO and the Jordanian delegation concerning the subject of the statement or not?

[Answer] Many rumors have been published concerning the subject of the British foreign minister not meeting the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Among them are those which detract from the search for the truth of what happened. In any case, a meeting took place between King Husayn and the Jordanian delegation and Mr Yasir 'Arafat and the Palestinian delegation. The meeting was dominated by a spirit of brotherliness, frankness and agreement on coordination between them, as well as formation of a committee to draw up general rules to prevent a repetition of what happened in London.

As for coordination between the Jordanian side and the Palestinian side by their leaders and officials, this did not happen, and therefore the meeting did not take place. But the recent Amman meeting emphasized the necessity of future coordination to avoid repetition of the error.

[Question] King Husayn clearly supported the British point of view. Was he speaking in his name or in the name of the Jordanians and the Palestinians?

[Answer] He was speaking in his capacity as the king of Jordan, not in the name of the Palestinians. The recent agreement between us is not to stir up the details of what happened so that we do not differ about points of view. In the present stage, it is important to us to draw together, not apart, because the nature of the problem requires joint Palestinian-Jordanian effort and coordination in the coming steps.

[Question] Did the agreement actually result in renewal of contacts with the British?

[Answer] No. The agreement did not result in anything like this, because the appointment with the British foreign minister was cancelled.

[Question] Was it cancelled, at your request, or was it postponed until you agree on a form with the Jordanians?

[Answer] In fact, Bishop Iliya Khuri requested that the Jordanian delegation contact the British Foreign Ministry to postpone the appointment, but the



Foreign Ministry hurried to issue a statement, after which nothing took place concerning this.

[Question] Do you think that the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement is still really a sound basis for movement? Do you think that circumstances and the balance of forces currently extant are suitable for a just solution of the Palestinian problem?

[Answer] We do not have a political solution in our hands. But we are trying to reach a solution that guarantees to the Palestinian people its right to decide its fate and to establish its state, in accordance with what was published in the Palestinian-Jordanian statement. In the international arena, according to what is currently visible, no plan for a solution acceptable to the Palestinians or to the Jordanians exists. But this does not mean that the Palestinians and Jordanians will not remain in constant contact to reach a solution to this problem, because it is important to both of them. The Palestinians have stated, and still state, that their acceptance of a political solution does not mean surrender to a situation that is contradictory to international resolutions or incompatible with the higher interest of the Palestinian problem. It also does not mean abandonment of armed struggle. Further, the Palestinians have stipulated and repeated that they still recognize the policy enunciated by Yasir 'Arafat at the United Nations, the policy of a rifle in one hand and an olive branch in the other. So far, the signs indicate that Israel and the United States do not want a political solution guaranteeing the right of the Palestinian people. Rather, they want to make the Palestinians, and the Arabs generally, surrender and capitulate to the situation. This policy and plan--we will not accept it, not the Jordanians, not the Palestinians.

[Question] It is mentioned frequently that Murphy, in his recent secret visit to Amman, carried new American proposals, and that Mr Yasir 'Arafat and King Husayn studied these proposals in their meetings that took place recently in Amman. Is this true?

[Question] Murphy did come on a secret visit... this is true. But he did not bring anything new with him. The United States has nothing new. It continues to refuse to meet with any delegation that includes Palestinians, whether they are members of the PNC or the executive committee.

[Question] Murphy came to Amman after the failure of the meeting of the Palestinian-Jordanian delegation in London, after the hijacking of the ship and the reactions to it and after Shim'on Peres' statements at the United Nations. Perhaps he did not carry anything new for you Palestinians, but perhaps he presented something to the Jordanian side?

[Answer] After the recent meeting in Amman between the Jordanian side headed by King Husayn and the Palestinian side headed by Yasir 'Arafat, King Husayn issued an official statement in which he said that he does not accept direct negotiations with Israel and that he does not accept individual or partial solutions. I think that the source of the news about Murphy's visit is Israel. As for the Peres initiative, it is incompatible with the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement that considers the PLO the sole legal representative of



the Palestinian people. We rejected the initiative completely. The Peres proposal will remain an Israeli proposal rejected by the Arabs.

[Question] It seems that the PLO has changed its strategy since the departure from Beirut. Do you still adhere to the charter, for example?

[Answer] Our strategy is what is contained in the Palestinian charter and the resolutions of the Palestine national councils, particularly the 13th session that met in Algeria and the session that met in Amman, which include continuation of the armed struggle along with acceptance of a political solution that guarantees the Palestinian people its right to decide its own fate and to establish its state. The PLO can not deviate from this line. If it deviates, it would require agreement of two-thirds of the members of the PNC, not just of those in attendance, to implement what would be agreed. Therefore, the PLO will continue to be bound to this path and to the Amman agreement, and the PLO will not deviate from it.

[Question] What are the current capabilities of the PLO to be able to achieve everything that you mentioned?

[Answer] National rights are not measured by material capabilities. National rights are sacred, they may not be surrendered. The leaders of the people do not have the right to surrender. But it is possible to accept phased solutions within international and Arab capabilities and circumstances.

[Question] Do you consider the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement a guide for action in this stage? Why did you not try to put this agreement before the Casablanca summit to have the Arab majority present adopt it?

[Answer] The Casablanca summit agreed to support the Fes resolutions. The Jordanian-Palestinian agreement was not presented because it does not differ from higher Arab interests. The Jordanians and the Palestinians did not think it necessary to present it. They considered it to be similar to any agreement between two Arab states. It does not need the blessing of the summit and the entire [Arab] nation. I want to emphasize that the Fes resolutions, which are favored by the consensus of the Arab nation are considered to be the political path on which we are agreed and the direction in which we are traveling.

[Question] After Yasir 'Arafat's visit to the states of the Gulf and to Saudi Arabia, do you have information as to whether the summit will meet at its appointed time in Riyadh?

[Answer] We are optimistic that the summit will meet at its appointed time, given that the committee to clear the Arab atmosphere has some success in ending the differences between Jordan and Syria. We pray that God will give up successful results, because a simple meeting of the full conference will pave the way for the opportunity to discuss the problems existing among the Arabs, as well as pave the way for opportunity to create a unified stand to counter the challenge imposed on the Arab and Islamic nation by the United States and Israel. I hope that the Arab leaders will not waver from their

stand of solidarity in order to save their nation, their existence and their culture.

[Question] Are there new contacts between you and Syria?

[Answer] The PLO is open, but there is nothing to indicate that Syria has changed its position. We hope, if the summit conference meets with the attendance of everyone, that it will pay very serious attention to the issue, so that the Arab leaders are able to settle the causes of the differences currently existing between us and Damascus.

[Question] But so far, publicly announced Syrian policy to is the downfall of the Palestinian-Jordanian agreement, which you consider the basis for movement. How is it possible to bring about reconciliation?

[Answer] We counter with a call on Syria to join this agreement and to work together to achieve the higher interest of the Palestinian problem and the Arab nation.

[Question] To turn the conversation to Egypt--you are in Cairo, as are a large number of Palestinian officials. For some time, Cairo has witnessed visits by various important Palestinians. What are the true facts of your policy toward Egypt? Has the PNC made any clear decisions on renewing relations between the PLO and Egypt?

[Answer] Egypt's exclusion from the Arab summit meetings was a result of what came out of the Baghdad conference and statements and declarations immediately after it accepted the Camp David accord. The Palestinian visits to Egypt fall within the frame of efforts expended freely to return Egypt to its natural position as leader of the Arab struggle and leader of the Arab and Islamic nation. I believe that President Husni Mubarak is now following a wise policy. We hope that he continues to move away from the policy of Camp David and returns Egypt to its natural place.

[Question] But, Egypt, and President Husni Mubarak in particular, does not think circumstances favorable for abrogation of the Camp David accord. He recently emphasized this with leaders of the opposition, saying: "You are demanding of me what Egypt does not have the ability to bear, that is, abrogation of the Camp David accord. If I decided to abrogate it, it would be necessary for me to prepare for war."

[Answer] There is a difference between our talking about abrogation of the Camp David accord and our talking about Egypt moving away from the policy of Camp David. I believe that Egypt is not saying that it rejects moving away from the Camp David accord. Therefore, the resolution of the PNC in its 16th session made it clear that the PLO will draw closer to Egypt to the degree that Egypt moves away from the policy of Camp David.

[Question] There was vehement reaction by all Egyptian officials after Abual-Abbas' statement, in which he said: "The positive result of the hijacking operation against the Achille Lauro was to break the special relationship

Egypt has with the United States. It is an affair that by its nature distances Egypt from Camp David."

[Answer] Abu-al-'Abbas undertook the operation without consulting the PLO. We cannot charge the PLO with the result of the statements delivered by this or that Palestinian official. What disturbed Egypt, I believe, was not the contents of the statements, but their form and the timing of their publication. Egypt does not want to be given directives by others. Rather, it follows the inspiration of its own conscience and consciousness and the path that it thinks suitable to moving away from Camp David. No one can tell Egypt; "Do this" or "Do not do this."

[Question] Has the PLO decided to open an investigation into the hijacking of the Italian ship and the circumstances of this hijacking?

[Answer] Abu-al-'Abbas denied that the operation was planned in this manner. Further, he denied most of what was said about the time and the place. Perhaps there is a shortage of acts to engage in a thorough investigation of this whole affair.

[Question] Do you think that the next Arab summit meeting will make a decision on Egypt's return and are you working towards this end?

[Answer] In regard to Egypt's return if the matter were in our hands we would not hesitate. But Egypt's return is an Arab decision, and this decision must have as its goals the achievement of the higher Arab interest.

[Answer] What is the significance of you, as a man of religion, heading the PNC at this stage?

[Question] I feel that my nation has called me to assume the responsibility and the sacrifices. I did not undertake this responsibility voluntarily, by which I mean that I withdrew at first and excused myself. But when the PNC insisted on the necessity of my assuming the responsibility, I did not withdraw and I did not hesitate because I felt that withdrawal would put me in a position where I did not want to be. I think that it is incumbent on all Palestinians to assume their responsibilities in these circumstances. They announce their satisfaction and their position through the legal organizations of the PLO, because this is more useful and more effective in attaining sound and healthy results.

[Question] Is this call directed at the members who did not attend the recent PNC meeting held in Amman? Where are you concerning your relations with them?

[Answer] Three days ago a meeting of the PLO was held in Amman to which were invited the members of the PNC present in Jordan. The invitation was sent to all of them, with no distinction between those who attended the PNC meeting and those who refused to attend. Some of those who did not attend the PNC meeting came and participated in this meeting.

[Question] Who, for example?

[Answer] Representatives from the Popular and Democratic Front and the communists attended.

[Question] Is this a step toward reconciliation?

[Answer] Yes, It is a step, though not complete. In this session, one of the members of the Democratic Front spoke and asked that an opportunity for reunification and a return to Palestinian unity be given. Brother Abu Iyad, a member of the central committee of the Fatah movement, responded with welcome and readiness to the idea of unity, saying that in the current situation it is necessary to reunite and mutually forget differences.

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## PALESTINIAN AFFAIRS

### PLO EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE MEMBER DISCUSSES PEACE PROCESS

London AL-TADAMUN in Arabic 16-22 Nov 85 pp 25-26

[Interview with 'Abd-al-Rahim Ahmad, a member of the PLO executive committee, by Najih Khalil "There are Ideas that Encourage Us to Continue towards Peace"; in Amman, date not specified]

[Text] What was the picture of the Palestinian position on the eve of the reversal that happened to the meeting of the joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation with the British foreign minister, and what happened during the frank meeting between the Jordanian and Palestinian leaders, and where is the peace process in the Middle East going? These are some of the questions that AL-TADAMUN put to Mr 'Abd-al-Rahim Ahmad, a member of the PLO executive committee. This is the interview that took place in his office in Amman.

[Question] Where has the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement arrived in its movement at the international level, especially after the failure of the meeting that was to be held with the British government and after Shim'on Peres put his initiative, which some observers have described as a blow to the Arab peace movement, before the international community.

[Answer] As is well known, in a political movement, there is success and failure. However, this does not mean that the task, in its intent, has suffered a reverse or been stricken by failure. It is also known that joint movement is able to put itself forward successfully at the international level, particularly at the Western level. However, what happened in Britain made an impact, there is no doubt. But we must understand that what happened is part of a political movement that aims to put our just problem before the international community. I do not think that a single visit or a single success will win victory for this problem or that a single failure will cause it to fail. But it is important that we work, in faith, as Palestinians and Jordanians, to support the abilities of the Arab nation to put our Arab problem before the international community.

As for what Peres put before the international community, we reject it, as do our brothers the Jordanians. Peres wanted, by means of his initiative, to appear to the world as a man with ideas calling for peace. But a careful reading of his speech to the United Nations makes clear that he wants a solution after the pattern of Camp David, which we reject. Our task, in this



respect, is to reveal the true nature of the claims of Peres by every ability available to us.

[Question] It has been repeated recently that there will be a review of the circumstances surrounding the failure of the mission of the joint delegation in Britain. Does this mean that contacts are still taking place with the government of Britain to hold another meeting?

[Answer] We will never retreat from the task of putting our problem before the governments of Britain and other countries in an official manner. We will continue to expend joint efforts to try, to the extent of our abilities, to get over the difficult circumstances that prevented holding this meeting, and to try to put our view concerning our Jordanian-Palestinian opinion before the British.

[Question] How do you assess the political efforts expended by the Jordanian side that were presented to you during your recent meeting?

[Answer] We begin our evaluation of some among us with a positive assessment of any efforts expended to explain the idea of our fight, struggle and just problem to the international community. From this perspective, we understand the efforts expended by the Jordanian side as if they were intended for the general, joint welfare and intended to open up a horizon before our political and international movement. The Jordanian brothers worked hard in this area. They undertook meritorious efforts. They presented in detail to us everything that was presented to them and they listened to our point of view.

[Question] Can we say that the Jordanian side brought new ideas with it concerning the peace process from Washington?

[Answer] As I said, the ideas that the brothers in Jordan presented had one goal, about which I spoke. But the details remain the property of the Palestinian leadership. We do not think that it is useful to talk about them, not because they are secret or unpublishable, but out of consideration for the efforts that the brothers have expended and for the goal represented by the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement. We think that the matter remains outside the scope of communication and publication at this stage.

[Question] Can we say that these ideas are encouraging for continuation of the peace process?

[Answer] For a large part of them, yes.

[Question] What are the new bases on which you agreed with the Jordanians for action during your recent meeting?

[Answer] They are the same bases as the point of departure for the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement.

[Question] Talk has increased recently that the PLO will recognize resolution 242. Was something like this presented to you in the recent meeting with Jordan?

[Answer] This subject was not presented to us, because the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement discusses the UN resolutions and the Security Council resolutions together. The agreement does not make a distinction between this or that resolution.

[Question] Including resolution 242?

[Answer] All of the Security Council and UN resolutions. There are other resolutions that are much more important than resolutions 242.

[Question] After the end of your negotiations with the Jordanian side, announcement was made of formation of standing committee. What is the nature of the activities of this committee?

[Answer] It is not true that there is a joint committee. Jordanian-Palestinian relations are beyond the issue of formation of a committee to study details. I believe that we are through studying details because our relations with Jordan are based on frankness and openness.

[Question] But the formation of this committee was announced officially.

[Answer] If that is so, the goal is to solidify and organize contacts to meet any new factors that lie across the path of our work until we find solutions for them. I think that the committee's intention is to create a kind of working group able to respond in a responsible way to the new factors and challenges encountered by the joint effort, particularly when it is difficult for the two sides to meet on short notice.

[Question] After the collapse of the London talks, King Husayn said that he would reevaluate his relations with the PLO, just as he would reevaluate the joint movement. Did something like this happen during the discussions?

[Answer] Yes. Evaluation of the past course took place in a spirit of brotherhood and joint endeavor in the path of our work, and particularly our movement on the international plane. There were assessments by both sides of the positive results of this movement. There was emphasis on the need for the organization of meetings and for their concentration at the responsible level to get over the obstacles that lie across the path of this course.

[Question] It is clear in the Arab atmosphere that there are Arab reconciliations going on among Damascus, Amman and Cairo. What is the effect of something such as these reconciliations on the position and political situation of the PLO?

[Answer] The PLO is a part of this nation, and is affected by its condition, negatively or positively. If the condition is healthy, then the PLO is stimulated and is affected positively by this condition. And the reverse is

also true. Consequently, every condition of Arab solidarity will be reflected in a positive manner on the course of our Palestinian national work and on our situation as a liberation organization, at the various Arab and international levels.

[Question] How do you look at the Jordanian-Syrian reconciliation, and what is the effect of this reconciliation of the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement?

[Answer] I do not think that there is a relationship between the Jordanian-Syrian reconciliation and the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement. This agreement is a Jordanian-Palestinian matter. However, it is in need of Arab support. We say that the agreement is a mechanism for the implementation of the Arab Fes resolutions, which have won Arab consensus. Any Arab effort toward solidarity will strengthen the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian movement, and will not contradict it.

[Question] But there are those who think that there is a strong relationship between the two subjects. Syria's opposition to the agreement and its considering it a separate solution brings out the fact that political conflict revolves around these matters.

[Answer] If Syria says that the agreement is a partial solution, that is its opinion. Our position is to convene an international conference to solve the problem. We emphasized this in our agreement with Jordan. In any case, the Jordanian-Palestinian agreement is not a topic of discussion between the two sides during the Jordanian-Syrian reconciliation sessions. Jordan considers it a Jordanian-Palestinian matter to which no one else has any relationship.

[Question] Are there signs of a Syrian-Palestinian reconciliation?

[Answer] I do not have information and I do not feel that there are signs of reconciliation, because the Syrians are still locked in their position, on the pretext that a separate solution will be concluded.

[Question] It was recently brought up forcefully that Egypt will play a major role in the negotiation process. Can we know the nature of this role in the current political trend?

[Answer] Any political action, particularly for us Palestinians and Jordanians, must support the Arab nation in every way. Consequently, Arab solidarity is an important matter in supporting our political movement in the international arena. It is known that Egypt is part of this nation. Consequently, talking about Egypt's role is talking about the role of the Arab nation in all of its capacities. Egypt is part of these capacities, which are to carry out the Arab role of pressing toward a just solution to the Palestinian national problem. I do not think that this statement applies just to Egypt, within its current limits, but rather it applies to all of the Arab efforts.

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## LONG-RANGE DEVELOPMENT PLANS OUTLINED FOR AL-QASIM

Riyadh AL-RIYAD in Arabic 5 Sep 85 p 4

[Article by Rayhan al-Harbi: "Al-Qasim Province: A Comprehensive Plan for Development"]

[Text] In the past few years, al-Qasim Province has seen rapid development in all areas--agriculture, education, construction, health, electricity, the economy, communications, and social services. This development has gone far in stopping the migration of people from the province, and has contributed greatly to achieving national social and economic development goals.

Al-Qasim is considered one of the Kingdom's fourteen historical administrative areas, and Dariyah, situated on the Mecca-Basrah road, was its first well-known population center. Subsequently, a central heartland emerged for the province, consisting of the Buraydah-'Unayzah-al-Rass area, and was given priority during the preparation of the comprehensive regional plan, the principal guidance plans, and the construction plans for selected population centers in al-Qasim Province.

### The Goals of the Comprehensive Development Plan for al-Qasim

These goals are as follows: providing assistance and technical advice to municipalities and village complexes; preparing a comprehensive regional development plan; and preparing principal guidance plans and construction plans for 14 population centers and eight selected village complexes.

Intensive studies and surveys have been conducted in the province, and the preliminary results were summed up in the form of a regional plan based on a strategy of selected regional development. The construction plans for 11 population centers and eight villages are now being prepared.

### Present (Natural) Conditions

The natural conditions of al-Qasim Province have determined two types of settlement and development, both of which depend on water. The province is divided into a western part, composed of ancient crystalline rock formations with limited amounts of water, and an eastern part, composed of sedimentary rocks containing the principal ground water reservoirs, which hold huge amounts of reserves.

The other principal natural features include Wadi al-Rammah, which crosses the province from east to west and which was the principal source of water until technical developments in drilling and pumping made the extraction of ground water possible. At present, the ground water reservoirs are the main source of water, and in turn influence the types of development possible in al-Qasim.

The climate and soil reflect the desert conditions found in the central part of the Kingdom, but the province's elevation and inland location (far from the sea) make al-Qasim's climate colder and not very humid. From the standpoint of agriculture, the province's ground water sources have given al-Qasim its standing as one of the Kingdom's principal crop-producing areas. Historic and geological evidence points to the presence of mineral resources in the province, and prospecting has begun in order to determine their economic value. The presence of bauxite holds out excellent hopes, and an intensive search is now under way for non-metallic minerals, which are basic to the cement and building material industry.

#### Population and Settlement in al-Qasim Province

The population of al-Qasim is about 380,000, of which 325,000 are settled and 55,000 are Bedouin. The settled population has increased at the rate of 3 percent a year ever since the 1974 census, and the Bedouin population has dropped by about 20,000, from approximately 75,000 in 1974 to 55,000 in 1984.

The cities have grown rapidly because of the migration from the villages to the urban areas, and therefore the villages have seen a net drop in population.

Two-thirds of the population lives in the triangle defined by the three main cities of Buraydah, 'Unayzah and al-Rass; this area is referred to as the central heartland. All the urban centers of 300,000 [sic] or more are situated in this central heartland. On the whole, there are about 450 settlements in the province, in 50 of which there are more than 500 inhabitants. Two important characteristics should be pointed out because of their importance to the province's future development: approximately 50 percent of the population is less than 15 years of age, and illiteracy has significantly and noticeably declined in recent years.

#### Economic Conditions in al-Qasim

Employment has increased significantly on the regional level, from 65,000 in 1974 to 77,000 in 1984. This growth basically occurred in three sectors: trade, government services, and building. At present, the private sector employs two-thirds of the total work force and the public sector employs the other third.

Agriculture has expanded as a basic activity in the province's economy, but at the same time there has been a drop in overall agricultural employment in the province for two reasons. First, the main growth in the agricultural sector has been in the cultivation of wheat, an activity which does not employ



a great many workers. Second, those who in the past had been full-time farmers now consider themselves otherwise; i.e. they are employed at other jobs but still keep their farm holdings. At present, four-fifths of the land devoted to agriculture is planted with wheat, and this area is rapidly expanding because of government assistance.

Industrial employment has tripled in the last 3 years, and at present provides one-tenth of all jobs in the province. In any case, most existing industries employ fewer than 10 people. Industrial products exported out of the province include cement, bottled water, and light beverages. Al-Qasim has a long history of trade, and this sector's growth has spurred expansion in the agricultural sector. This growth has also been followed by expansion in the building industry.

#### The Province's Roads

The road network in al-Qasim Province depends basically on desert roads. Al-Qasim has one of the most concentrated road networks in the Kingdom. Two-thirds of the roads are main or secondary roads, i.e. two-lane roads with paved surfaces and compacted shoulders, concentrated in the eastern and central parts of the province.

#### Types of Settlement (Distribution of Population Centers)

In al-Qasim there are about 450 settlements, most of which are very small with fewer than 500 inhabitants each. There are several settlements where the population is less than 300 persons each. The size of these settlements is basically due to two factors: their recent establishment in response to the government program to settle nomadic Bedouin, and the fact that the size of individual settlements in al-Qasim Province is dictated by the availability of water and arable soil. There are also social and cultural factors which have caused these settlements to remain small. For example, tribal or family groupings break down into smaller units, which later become separate settlements and spread throughout the province. However, there are relatively few settlements in the extreme western and south-western areas, where it is extremely difficult to obtain water. It is also harder to reach these areas by main roads, and therefore they are more remote and isolated.

The province's principal urban centers are restricted to the small heartland located in the middle of eastern al-Qasim. These cities were established a century ago or more, and were the traditional nuclei from which development gradually spread to other areas. These cities' histories, size, and the major facilities and services they offer confirm that they will continue to be the heart and focal point of the province.

#### The Pyramidal Sequence of Settlements in al-Qasim

A pyramidal sequence has been drawn up for the settlements, on the basis of population, services, location, attractiveness, and service areas. Three levels of population centers can be differentiated within this pyramid: regional centers, local centers, and minor centers ranked according to groups labeled A, B, C and D.

The regional and local centers are those defined by the third development plan and by other studies, and consist of Buraydah as a regional center and 'Unayzah and al-Rass as local centers. After that, settlements are classified according to the A, B, C and D groups.

### Main Issues

The principal, fundamental issue is how to provide opportunities for improving the quality of life for the present population of al-Qasim Province, while at the same time creating living conditions that future inhabitants will find civilized and attractive, thus reversing the earlier inclination of inhabitants to leave the province. As part of the answer, earlier investments in the province have created infrastructures in no way inferior to those available elsewhere in the Kingdom; this applies in particular to housing, education, health services, roads, electricity, and communications.

Investment in the agricultural sector has been successful in achieving the goal of helping attain national self-sufficiency in wheat cultivation, and has been an incentive in the growth of agriculture-related commercial activities and in the introduction of new levels of technology into the province. Agricultural investment has also contributed to the significant increase in total production, by providing employment opportunities. In addition, with the al-Qasim Industrial City, the cement plant, and the proposed oil refinery, the first step has been taken towards industrial investment.

Urban development has been influenced by investment in government buildings, by housing assistance, and, in the past few years, by the extension of public utility grids such as water, sewer and other networks.

### The Strategy

In light of an analysis of present conditions in the province and the potentials for future growth, three alternative economic strategies have been examined.

The first alternative provides for continuing the current course of development, which is obviously dependent on the agricultural sector.

The second alternative calls for shifting the emphasis at the soonest possible opportunity to industrial development, and continuing in this direction.

The third alternative provides for a composite development strategy in which the short- and medium-range emphasis will be on agriculture while preparations are made to shift to industrial production in the long run.

The comparative positive aspects of these three alternative economic strategies have been evaluated with reference to short- and long-range national planning goals, and the third alternative, i.e. the composite strategy, has been selected as being preferable.

The reason for this is that over the past few years al-Qasim Province has received plenty of investments for agricultural development, including a 2.5 billion Saudi riyal loan from the Saudi Arabian Agricultural Development Bank alone, and it would make sense to benefit from these investments while preparing to diversify into other sectors.

## The Regional Plan

The regional plan is trying to encourage development in three ways: by outlining viable, successful alternatives for the production sectors; estimating the amount of growth which must take place in other sectors in order to provide the province with a skilled, motivated labor force; and assessing the requirements and the main recommendations which must be followed in each sector--be it agriculture, mining, industry, education or health.

## Development Goals

The regional plan for al-Qasim Province involves three sets of planning goals covering housing and employment, in addition to a series of proposals for the utilities which must be provided for the province's main urban service centers. The long-range goals and proposals based on these goals are as follows.

1. As for population goals, including population growth and distribution, migration out of the province will be halted by the end of 1990, and beginning in that year the number of Saudi inhabitants will show an upward increase, according to the natural rate of population growth. Analysis of the population composition of al-Qasim Province shows that the natural growth rate in this province is 2.9 percent a year.

2. In the area of population distribution, the strategy provides for the possibility of concentrating development in a specific number of urban centers in order to continue three main trends: continued migration from the countryside to the city; a more rapid growth rate in the present urban centers, particularly the main centers of Buraydah, 'Unayzah and al-Rass, than in other population centers; and selective development of centers in rural areas, according to their location, influence, and the principal effect they have on the distribution of population. That is, by 2050 central al-Qasim will acquire 68.6 percent of the total provincial population, whereas at present it has 56.2 percent of the population. This will be offset by a drop in the relative share of population in the subsidiary western and eastern parts of al-Qasim. The drop will be greater in the western than in the eastern part of al-Qasim, in view of the availability of better growth potentials in the eastern part. The population of both parts will increase from 115,000 to 148,000 persons in the western part, and the total population of the subsidiary area in central al-Qasim will increase from 203,000 to 460,000.

## The Service Industry

Greater encouragement and support must be given to industries in this sector, particularly the construction sector, which can play a skilled part in carrying out the proposed urbanization program. Growth in other sectors, such as trade and finance, is related to increasing economic activity and rising individual spendable income.

## Transportation

The transportation strategy is based on two main elements: expanding and improving [transportation] facilities, including the road network and the airport, and making preparations for bringing in the railroad during the second half of the planning period.

## Long-Range Goals

There are long-range goals for the urbanization and services infrastructure in al-Qasim. A list has been drawn up of the infrastructures, utilities and services which must be available in all urban centers and main services centers in al-Qasim Province, as dictated by the pyramidal sequence of population groupings and according to the deadlines for providing such services during the periods 1985-1990, 1990-1995, and 1995-2005. Accordingly, this list can only be a general guideline, since in the rapidly-expanding settled areas of al-Qasim Province, these services must be provided in stages in order to keep up with the increase in population. Therefore, during the 1985-1990 period, in a regional center like Burayday, the sewer grid, for example, should be built to serve 150,000 persons at the most, which is the targeted population for Buraydah in 1990, and not 250,000 persons, which is the targeted population for 2005.

## Settlement Patterns for 2005.

The main purpose of regional planning is to encourage the inhabitants to stay in al-Qasim Province by making it a more appealing, attractive place to live. This basically requires expanding the employment base and making it more possible for local residents to obtain utilities and services.

An analysis of the province's materials and resources base indicates that these two requirements can be satisfactorily provided by concentrating development in a limited number of settlement centers. In al-Qasim Province, this means achieving a denser population in the central heartland, in addition to stepping up selected urban development in the rest of the province, which has a predominantly village character.

The population is concentrated in the central heartland because of natural and economic factors. The natural factors are important in that part of al-Qasim Province where there is abundant ground water, since water is a basic requirement for development in a barren area, especially for an agrarian society. The economic factors reinforce the natural conditions. Abundant potentials for employment in urban development and services lie behind the province's limited natural resources, and we find, for example, that the three main growth areas for employment are health and education; trade, transportation and finance; and services based on urban development. The same holds true for other main sectors, such as construction and government services.

Even though many of these activities could spread out into the villages, it is more economical to concentrate them instead of spreading them out over a wide area. Similarly, the pattern of migration from villages to urban centers, in

al-Qasim Province and in the Kingdom as a whole, indicates that the population is demanding better urban services. The strategy will increase the possibility of accelerated urbanization.

By the end of 2005, the province will be predominantly urban, for three-fourths of the population will be living in the central heartland, while about 16,000 persons will be living in other parts of the province. However, all of this latter group, with the exception of about 10,000, will presumably be settled.

Compared with 1983, the basic changes will be as follows:

1. By 2005, there will be seven population centers with more than 10,000 inhabitants each, as compared to three in 1983. In any case, Buraydah, 'Unayzah and al-Rass will remain the province's main centers, and their combined population will be 400,000 persons, while the population of the other four centers will be 70,000.

2. A second group of population centers will arise, each having between 3,000 to 10,000 inhabitants. There will be 12 such centers in 2005, whereas there are five now. The main guidance plans and the construction plans will cover 10 of these 12 centers; the two not covered by these plans are al-Batra' and al-'Ammar. This second group of population centers will be widely scattered throughout the province, to ensure that most of the population will live within 60 kilometers of available services. Village population will more than double, from 15,000 persons in 1983 to 38,000 persons in 2005. Two of the village groupings are expected to see extraordinary growth. One is Dariyah, the natural center, which will be linked to other parts of al-Qasim Province by a paved road. The other village which will see rapid growth, once the Ha'il-al-Batra' road is completed, will be al-Fawarah, in the vicinity of which a new military city for the National Guard will be built.

8559

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## KHADDAM SEES BENEVOLENT ROLE IN LEBANON

Beirut MONDAY MORNING in English 18-24 Nov 85 pp 16-22

[Text]

Syria's main trouble-shooter in Lebanon, Vice-President Abdelhalim Khaddam has shed some further light on the tripartite accord negotiated in his presence in Damascus between representatives of the Lebanese Forces, the Amal Movement and the Progressive Socialist Party.

Khaddam, a recognized authority on Lebanese affairs, said on November 12 that the trouble here stemmed from the fact that Lebanese citizens were affiliated to their nation «by proxy», namely through their affiliation to a sect. Hence, he said, some factions «welcomed» the Israeli invasion of parts of Lebanon, because they were not attached to the national land as one whole entity.

Khaddam scoffed off the Maronite fears of being relegated to «second-class citizens», saying the accord provides for equality between all the Lebanese, and that equality *does not* mean classes.

«Why talk of sectarian guarantees, he said. In Lebanon, the president of the republic, the army commander-in-chief, the commander of the military police are Maronites. Prominent posts are held by Maronites. Yet how many Maronites have fled the country? How many thousands have been displaced, how many thousands killed? What guarantees has the sectarian distribution of posts offered them, he asked.

Khaddam did not feel the need to give a direct answer on whether Lebanese presidents have abused their privileges, saying any layman's answer would be amply sufficient.

The tripartite accord, he said, provides for the formation of a new «national unity government» to include the armed factions, since these are part of the political life in Lebanon. However, he added that under the accord, no one would bear arms anymore.

He repeated the Syrian opinion that the American initiative has no chance of succeeding in the region.

Following is the full translation of the interview:

**What are the problems you have had in a decade of dealing with Lebanese politicians?**

In Lebanon, as in other countries, there are generations. In Lebanon, there is the «independence generation» made up

of the fathers of independence and those who formulated the present formula, there is also a second generation which can be said to have grown up in the shadow of the «independence generation», and finally, there is a third generation which grew up in the atmosphere of the bloody battles that have unfortunately taken place in Lebanon.

Consequently, if we are to seek the best means to end the Lebanese crisis, we must consider this reality in an objective and realistic manner.

But let me stress that these three generations are not restricted to one region or one specific faction in Lebanon, but that through my experience and various contacts and meetings with Lebanese officials, I have sensed it everywhere. Each generation has its own conceptions and ideological or political background, and each hardly agrees with the others.

**There is some doubt in Lebanon that those who bore arms will turn into ordinary citizens as soon as they lay down their weapons. How would that affect the peace pact currently being negotiated?**

There is no clear distinction between the armed and unarmed factions in Lebanon. It is true that these two factions exist, but in reality the unarmed factions have often proved more destructive than the armed.

The distinction should be made on the basis of ideas, opinions, political conceptions. The armed men are Lebanese citizens, yet they acted as personal tools of politicians and, from what I gathered from the majority of them, they have engaged in a war others had decided for them, others who wanted them to be a tool of destruction without a say or role in the construction of the future Lebanon. This is why the question does not concern the armed men, but those who took and are taking decisions, those who have used the armed men for their goals.

**But can those who bear arms implement a security accord?**

Had the agreement been signed, the armed men would naturally have implemented it. One clause (of the pact) provides for the dissolution of armed and semi-armed organizations and for the surrender of weapons to the state.

This clause was to be implemented, and we were confident it would have been carried out.

**Some factions believe that the main benefactors of the accord are the Sunnites, since, not having taken part in the militia fighting, their losses have been minimal. How would you react to such a view?**

In Syria, we do not look at the Lebanese situation through the sectarian divisions prevailing on the Lebanese scene, because we believe these divisions to be the cause of the Lebanese problem, and the accord that was scheduled to be signed does not take anything from one faction in order to give it to another, but rather takes from all to give to Lebanon. It would be impossible to substitute one sectarian solution for another, or to replace the hegemony of one sect with that of another. The accord was to restore the decision-making to the Lebanese people and citizens, and to restore peace and sovereignty to Lebanon as a state and people, not to any one faction. Syria cannot participate or sponsor an accord that cements sectarian partition, hegemony or trends.

**Certain leaders of the Lebanese Front, after gathering information about the draft pact, have said it constitutes a complete Syrian takeover of Lebanon. What is your comment?**

Such a statement does not deserve to be answered, and I think those who made it do not really believe what they said, since they know very well that Syria has no goals in Lebanon apart from that of seeing it regain its unity, sovereignty, independence, and prosperity, on the basis of the reforms which would allow all Lebanese to have equal rights and duties. The only distinction between the citizens would then be based on how much each offers to his country.

**Some Lebanese factions are saying that the new pact would make the president a mere figurehead. Is this true?**

There is a president of the republic in Lebanon, and the accord does not make him a figurehead, though it does put authority in its natural place. The president of the republic, in the new accord, is the country's leader and the symbol of its unity. He is responsible for protecting the constitution, he chairs the Defense Council and the government in certain specific circumstances, namely the formulation of the budget, deciding upon war or peace, declaring a state of emergency, and calling for a cabinet meeting when the welfare of the nation dictates this.

There are different political systems. A system can be a democratic, parliamentary one, or a presidential one within the context of a democracy and parliament, whereby the government is accountable to parliament. Therefore, the president must be the one to take decisions, since he is the person who will be held accountable. In addition, giving the government the right of decision-making gives everyone a chance to participate in taking decisions, since everyone would be responsible.

However, should the Lebanese choose a presidential system, the president of the republic would be responsible to the people, and would therefore have to be elected by the people, regardless of sectarian affiliation, and every citizen

would have a chance to participate in the election.

Moreover, if a president does not preside over the government, that does not mean that he is a cipher. In Syria, the president does not preside over the government or the executive body, yet the quality of the work of this body is very satisfactory.

There are numerous daily problems in a state, and the president of the republic cannot possibly take care of all these never-ending problems. If he did, he would be concerning himself with minor problems that are somebody else's responsibility, and neglecting major issues.

In Syria, the president has an immense amount of work, and were he to concern himself with details, he would not be able to lead, administer and orient the country in the manner which, as everyone says, has led to great achievements on the internal, Arab and international levels. In no country is the value of a president measured according to achievements in daily issues, but in the major achievements the country has realized through his good administration.

**Christians, and more particularly Maronites, fear that if the accord is signed, they will become second-class citizens. Is that right?**

No, it isn't. The accord dealt with essential issues. It aimed at abolishing political sectarianism in order to achieve equality among all Lebanese. Does equality mean there will be classes of citizens? The accord states that the only distinction between the citizens will be based on how much they offer to their nation. Does that mean that a Lebanese citizen will become a second-class citizen? If the accord aims at reconstructing the nation on democratic bases that eliminate the causes of the crises which frequently erupted there, does this mean there is a distinction between the citizens?

Let's speak objectively. In Lebanon, the president is Maronite, the army commander-in-chief is Maronite, the commander of the military police is Maronite, and many of the top security and economic posts are held by Maronites. Did all this guarantee security and stability for the Maronite citizens?

Let's look at the reality on the ground. Certain Maronites do hold prominent posts, but how many thousands of Maronites have emigrated? How many thousands of Maronites have been killed in this war? How many have lost their sons or husbands, how many have lost their homes or been displaced from their villages? Did these posts provide them with any of the guarantees such as those offered by a modern united and solidary state where each citizen feels he has a nation to which he is directly affiliated, and not by proxy.

In the present circumstances, the national affiliation in Lebanon is an indirect one, namely by being affiliated to one sect rather than through loyalty to the country. The political structure of Lebanon did not give any citizen the chance to be attached to his land and nation, and this explains why a large number of Lebanese welcomed the Israeli invasion of their country and capital, and actually dealt with the invader, though he was invading Lebanese land.

I think the real reason for the absence of national reactions

lies in the fact that one is affiliated to Lebanon through his affiliation to his sect. This is why the guarantees that must be sought now are guarantees for the citizens rather than for the sects. When we speak of guarantees for sects, we are implying that the country will remain torn to shreds, with each sect demanding equal guarantees. If the presidency of the republic, coupled with wide-ranging prerogatives, is the privilege of one sect, the other sects will ask for equal privileges. Therefore, since the country has one president, not two, three, four, five, six, seven or eight, the privileges cannot be allocated to specific individuals but will lie in a national system, whereby the Lebanese citizen would be attached to the Lebanese nation, the Lebanese land and the unity of the Lebanese people. This provides guarantees for all, whereas sectarian guarantees are guarantees of divisions that are bound to lead to the partitioning of Lebanon, thus achieving Israel's ultimate goal.

**What is the proportion of Maronites compared to other communities in Lebanon?**

You know that Lebanon is not Syria. We have no such statistics nor do we care for such information. In Syria, we do not consider such issues and do not look at the internal situation in any Arab country through its social structure, but we deal with people on the basis of their political beliefs. We do not think it important to know the proportion of the various sects because we cannot help or conceive of a solution based on sectarian distribution.

**Should one of the three factions that have negotiated the tripartite accord decide not to sign it, what will become of the pact? You said in your meeting with the Lebanese Bar Association that there are substitutes. What are these?**

The failure to sign the accord does not mean the end of efforts to reach entente. Syria's President Hafez Assad is determined to spare no effort that can help end the state of war and achieve national entente in Lebanon, and we know that he is devoting most of his time and efforts to this cause.

During my meeting with American congressmen of Arab origin, I said that the warring factions were courageous in that they have sought to restore peace, and that we hope some politicians too will be courageous enough not to obstruct the orientation toward peace.

Of course, the failure to sign the accord will lead to resentment and disappointment, but it will not constitute a relapse since Syria is determined to continue its work until the crisis is ended.

We know the scope of the American and Israeli attempts to thwart this accord, and I wish to say one thing to those who heed the American and Israeli advice. Let them look back at the past and see that such counsels have only caused them harm. It is time everyone was motivated by Lebanon's interest rather than the interests of others.

**Are the negotiating factions committed to the implementation of the tripartite accord? Does its signing necessarily imply its implementation, or is it but a draft liable to amendments?**

The accord is a work program that should have been presented in a larger context, that is, in a national conference. It is a program that will be passed by parliament and the constitutional institutions.

**Does it have to go through a national conference, the parliament and various constitutional channels, in order to be implemented, or can it dispense with a national conference?**

This accord formulates the means of restoring peace to the country and it is only natural that we should all strive to provide it with the widest support possible. We dislike the idea that any faction should be outside this accord, but in the final analysis, the important thing is that the fighters, who constitute the new generation spawned by the war, have been able to negotiate, since it is this new generation that will live in the context of the new situation, if we take into consideration their real and political age.

But that does not mean the others must be excluded from the accord, and this is why we have looked for the best means of providing it with the widest support and participation possible.

**Who would supervise the implementation of the accord militarily? Would Syria impose it by force on those who opposed it?**

Syria does not conceive of imposing anything on any Lebanese faction. We wish to achieve entente through dialogue since we believe that the correct and safe way of putting an end to the present situation in Lebanon can only come through dialogue and entente.

**Would the Syrian Deterrent Forces deploy in all the Lebanese regions?**

That will be discussed in the light of the security plan that will be agreed by all factions.

**I take it then that Syria has no intention of abandoning President Gemayel.**

I am surprised you should ask such a question.

**How would you describe your relations with the Lebanese Forces, and with its chief executive, Elie Hobeika, in particular?**

Various contacts and meetings have been conducted with the Lebanese Forces, and from these we have sensed a trend toward achieving peace. We considered this orientation as serious and worthy of attention, and this paved the way to the tripartite negotiations with the representatives of the National Unity Front.

**Syria has the right to have a special relationship with Lebanon. What is the scope of this relationship?**

You know that Syria and Lebanon are sister states, with very important historical and geographical links and common interests. As to the extent of the relationship, this would be defined by the Lebanese in the light of what serves Lebanon and Syria. I say it is up to the Lebanese to define the relationship because certain people are trying to harm both Lebanon and Syria by instigating doubts among the Lebanese about it.



Yes, the relationship between Syria and Lebanon must be special and must be based on what would serve both countries especially as Syria has no goals in Lebanon and does not seek to have hegemony over its sister Lebanon is a sister state, and we cannot base our policy of cooperation with any Arab sister state on principles of hegemony

**Yet some still say Syria is seeking to restore «Greater Syria»? How would you reply to those who hold this view?**

Arab unity is a political conviction of all Arabs, and we hold it to be the fate of the Arab nation. However, those who are suggesting that we seek to establish unity between Lebanon and Syria are themselves seeking to obstruct the path to entente. Of course we dream and hope that the Arabs can some day achieve unity, and this dream is not only Syrian, but exists among the Lebanese, Egyptians, Palestinians, Iraqis and throughout the Arab world

**You have said that the U.S. and Israel are trying to block the Lebanese accord. Which faction do you think will benefit from such a move, and what means might it resort to in order to carry out American and Israeli designs?**

The U.S. and Israel are certainly exerting every effort to obstruct accord, the U.S. for reasons relating to the region, believing that Lebanon is a burden on Syria. Israel is motivated by the same reasons, but it also desires to see Lebanon partitioned, since its idea of security is based on two considerations: regional expansion to what it calls «secure borders», and the wish to see the Arabs too divided to be able to oppose it or confront it

**You have said in a previous statement that the U.S. is trying to carry out the second phase of the Camp David agreement. What are the goals and broad lines of this phase?**

The second phase of Camp David provides for separate negotiations with the Israeli enemy. Any sort of negotiations with this enemy would represent the second phase of Camp David

We believe that peace was agreed upon at the 1984 Fes summit. However the Arab decision and the Camp David decisions are two different things. Therefore, any attempt at conducting direct or indirect negotiations with Israel constitutes one or more steps on the road to Camp David and will be met with an adequate Syrian response

**As an authority on Lebanese affairs, do you think the Lebanese presidents have abused their privileges?**

Any Lebanese citizen can provide an ample answer to this question.

**Does the draft accord provide for the formation of a new government, and is this government to be constituted of the armed factions?**

The accord naturally provides for the formation of a new national unity government to group all factions. The armed factions are part of the political life in Lebanon and all those who believe in this accord, those who are linked to it and those who have contributed to its success must participate in the new government

**Do you think the new Lebanese formula, if implemented, will be really enduring, or might it break down after a number of years?**

Lebanon has tried the sectarian formula since 1860 in some of its regions, and in all of its territory since 1943. Yet the only visible result of the implementation of the sectarian formula is pain and misery. I think the formula suggested now is a Lebanese national one, and the one most likely to succeed.

**Do you think the politicians have been wrong since the beginning because they refused to let the militias participate in negotiations, and particularly in the Geneva and Lausanne conferences?**

In Lausanne, we clearly felt that the absence of armed organizations, which had by the time gained a political role, did contribute to not reaching an agreement. However, it is the fact that some leaderships always look at Lebanon from where they stand, rather than where Lebanon should stand, that contributed most to the failure of Lausanne.

**Who will appoint the new deputies?**

The issue of appointment results from the collapsed state of security.

Lebanon is living in an atmosphere of civil war, of fighting, and a transition period is a must. But let us look at the present parliament and, with all due respect to the important political role it has assumed by remaining a symbol of the unity of the nation, for being indeed the only constitutional institution that represented Lebanon's unity, we cannot but admit that this parliament has appointed itself and renewed its terms time after time, though it was first delegated by the people for a four-year term.

**What if the Christians and Lebanese Forces refused the suggested formula?**

This matter concerns them. We have never and will never put pressure on any faction. The country is theirs and the future is theirs, and they decide what they think is best for their country. Naturally, every faction will decide what it thinks best for the country. We play the role of a mediator. This, as I have had frequent occasions to say, requires from us to be at equal distances from all the factions.

**Do the current negotiations aim at a truce or a final end to fighting?**

What is being negotiated, or what has been agreed, provides for definitive peace in Lebanon since the implementation of the agreement would leave no one armed.

**The accord mentions a security plan. Does this mean a Syrian deployment in all parts of Lebanon?**

As I have told you earlier, the accord provides for the formation of a security committee that should supervise the security situation in all parts of Lebanon. If this committee asks for Syria's help, Syria will consider if this help is really necessary. But of course, it is this security committee that decides where, when and how help should be offered. But Syria has absolutely no intention of making even a simple step forward out of its own initiative.

Syria's role is one of help, and when it is asked to help it will consider its capacities and circumstances, and, should it agree to heed the call for help, it will do what is asked of it

**You told the Lebanese Bar Association that the return of the displaced to their homes will be completed during a five-year transition period. What are the guarantees for this?**

The implementation of the accord completely guarantees this.

**Let us move to the broader Arab context. Will an Arab summit be held and will Syria participate in it?**

As you must know, there is no clear talk of an Arab summit and we have no information saying that such talk is being conducted.

**President Hafez Assad had suffered from health setbacks in the past. Has he completely recovered, as we hope he has?**

President Assad enjoys an excellent health and as you can see, he is carrying on his activities and leading the country very energetically. Thank God, his health is now better than ever.

**What are the obstacles facing an international conference on the Palestinian issue in which the Soviet Union would participate?**

The refusal of Israel and its allies of the formula of an international conference, which should be sponsored by the United Nations and based on its various resolutions.

**What will the repercussions of the Reagan-Gorbachev summit be concerning international peace and a solution to the Lebanese and Middle East crises?**

The Reagan-Gorbachev summit is undoubtedly of the utmost importance and will have major repercussions on all international causes. If the Soviet Union and U.S. achieve some detente between themselves, this will reflect positively on all international issues, but if they fail to reach an understanding, this will also reflect on the world in general but negatively of course.

**How would you describe the relationship between Syria and the Soviet Union, and between Syria and the U.S.?**

The Soviet Union is a friend that is always by our side and offers us all sorts of aid that allows us to confront the enemy. Our relation is based on the cooperation pact that was signed by the two countries, and it is evolving very smoothly and positively.

As to the U.S., our relationship is linked to the American position toward the Arab-Israeli conflict and the various regional issues.

**How much has your relationship with Jordan improved, and what about the Jordano-Palestinian accord?**

We have had two meetings in Riyadh and are having a third one today (Tuesday 12). We have agreed on a number of important points during the previous meetings, namely:

1. abiding by all the Arab summit resolutions
2. rejecting all individual or partial solutions — hence we consider the Amman accord dead and buried;
3. agreeing that the Fez resolutions are the guidelines of the Arab peace plan;

4. peace must be cemented through an international conference sponsored by the United Nations.

These are the major points. As to the bilateral relations, a meeting will be convened to discuss the various issues and we expect it to bring some positive developments in the relationship between the two countries.

**King Hussein has announced his determination to restore links with Syria, and at the time states that he will not give up the Amman accord. Can the expected Assad-Hussein meeting be convened in such circumstances?**

We believe the Amman accord is dead, since it was based on the Jordan-Arafat axis, which is an individual one. We have refused such individual moves in the Riyadh meetings. Our relation with Jordan or any other country is based on a very clear and stable policy, namely that the conflict with the Israeli enemy is a global Arab struggle and no Arab faction may work to end it except in the context of a wider Arab move.

On the other hand, we do want peace but peace has its conditions. These are the Israeli withdrawal from all occupied lands and a recognition of the rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to return to their land, decide their fate and establish an independent state. This requires the establishment of a balance between us and the enemy, coupled with discussions through an international conference to be sponsored by the United Nations.

**Has Yasser Arafat been «crossed out» from the Syrian dictionary, or are any efforts done to bring about a rapprochement between Syria and the Palestine Liberation Organization?**

The question — and I do not want to speak of names or individuals — is one of method. The method which Arafat and some of his brothers have adopted completely contradicts the interests of the Palestinian cause and people. This goes against the Syrian policy and consequently we will have nothing to do with it since we do not build our policy on emotional or personal bases, but on styles and methods. In this sense, the position of Yasser Arafat does not concern us, but concerns the Palestinian people.

**You mentioned a «balance» with the Israeli enemy. How far have you gone in this direction?**

This is one goal we seek to achieve and for which we have exerted and are still exerting great efforts. I think we have achieved a lot in this direction, but we still have much more to do.

**Is a military confrontation with Israel likely?**

As long as the battlefield is present, we must expect attacks and military confrontations.

**You have overcome five assassination attempts yet you have never been more determined to carry on...**

Anyone working in the national field must realize the dangers surrounding him and put up with his special circumstances. I have been helped in this by the support granted me by President Assad, the Syrian people and the clear, determined and national policy adopted by Syria.



**How would you describe the Arab support to Syria ?**

I cannot say it is very regular. Some Arab countries have suspended their support but we expect them to reconsider their decision and resume this, since support is needed for confrontation. We hope they will.

**How would you describe your relationship with Saudi Arabia ?**

This relationship is good and based on mutual respect and the various agreements between the two countries.

**It is said the Syro-Iranian relationship has deteriorated of late, and that Iran is considering the suspension of economic relations with you. Is this true ?**

The Syro-Iranian relationship is not based on interests but on a strategic conception. We hold the Iranian revolution to be a great gain for the Arabs and the region, since it has ousted the Americans and raised the slogan of Arab participation in the liberation of Jerusalem. Moreover, this revolution — were it not for the present (Gulf) war — would have had the opportunity of participating directly in the confrontation with Israel, and we would consequently have been able to realize its importance and the importance of Iran's siding with us, compared to its siding with Israel during the Shah's rule.

Our relation with Iran is good and there is no reason to suspend it.

**It is also said your relationship with Iraq has significantly improved, and that the resumption of friendship is now possible. Is this true?**

There has been no new development in this field.

**Should Egypt bring some amendments to the Camp David agreement, would you consider restoring your**

**relationship with Cairo ?**

It is not a matter of amendments but of politics and policies. Does Cairo think the Camp David trend is beneficial to Egypt and the Arab nation ? That is where the problem lies. If Cairo realizes what Camp David does — against the Egyptian and Arab interests, it must take adequate measures to renounce it, and it will then find Syria by its side, supporting it and cooperating with it. However, if it considers that Camp David serves the Egyptian interests — and that is what we and the Egyptian people deny — a meeting between Damascus and Cairo is unlikely.

We want Egypt back in the Arab ranks, and what links between us and Cairo is stronger than what links between any two other Arab countries. Together we have fought the Tartars and Mongols, the Crusaders and Israelis, and there is a strong emotional and long-dating relation between the Syrian and Egyptian peoples.

We are struggling with the Egyptian people to restore Egypt to its natural place in the Arab ranks by thwarting the Camp David agreement and the peace treaty with Israel.

**It is said that a Jordano-Israeli statement will be issued providing for an Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and West Bank, and the formation of a committee that will assume autonomous rule for five years in these regions. How would you comment on this ?**

We completely reject this suggestion. There can be no Israeli or American peace in the region. The U.S. is not qualified to assume a peace role since it is biased toward one of the factions. The U.S. follows the Israeli policy and not only is an Israeli or American peace rejected here, but it also has no chance of success. ●

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CSO: 4400/60

## BRIEFS

**SOVIET OFFICERS ARRESTED**--London, 22 Nov, IRNA--Fifteen Soviet Army officers in Kunduz were arrested due to poor performance and inefficiency and returned to Moscow, it was learnt from the mujahidin sources in Kabul, Afghan press reports received here from London say. The reports say that the officers reportedly served at an important supply centre of Dasht-e Abadan in Kunduz Province in northern Afghanistan, which was hit on October 8 by mujahidin missiles. Several army vehicles were destroyed and over 20 Soviet Karmal troops were killed in the operation, AAP said, noting that the Soviet officers were arrested for "failing to defend the supply centre." [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1558 GMT 22 Nov 85] /9599

**'HEAVY CASUALTIES' REPORTED**--London, 26 Nov, IRNA--Afghan mujahidin have reportedly attacked Soviet-Karmal troop concentrations in Herat Province in the last two weeks, inflicting heavy casualties on the invading forces, according to AGENCY AFGHAN PRESS reports here. Meanwhile, Radio Kabul has announced that Afghan Prime Minister Soltan Ali Kgshtmand was assured in a meeting of the military command in Herat that the occupying forces were trying to cope as best as possible in the face of continuing mujahidin activities. The assurance given by the deputy defence minister is an indication of the difficulties faced by the joint forces in the face of continuing mujahidin activities. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1542 GMT 26 Nov 85] /9599

**RAID REPORTED**--London, 28 Nov, IRNA--Afghan mujahidin in a lightning raid on an important security post killed 6 Soviet-Karmal troops 30 km south of the provincial headquarters of Jowzjan near the Soviet border, according to Afghan agency press reports here. Meanwhile, another group of mujahidin ambushed a military convoy with rocket fire, destroying a tank and its 8 crew members, near Shirin Tagab town north of the provincial capital of Maymanah in Faryab Province, the report added. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1905 GMT 28 Nov 85] /9599

**SOLDIERS REPORTEDLY DEFECT**--Qom, Central Prov., IRNA--Over 500 Afghan Government soldiers accompanied by a high ranking officer joined the Afghan mojahedin in Jaghuri, Ghazni Province last month, said reports reaching here. According to reports joint Soviet-Afghan forces launched a brutal attack against mojahedin in the strategic area of Jaghuri using 900 tanks and military personnel carriers as well as gunship helicopters and Soviet MIGs. During the operation the mojahedin inflicted heavy casualties on the joint forces destroying a number of their tanks and personnel carriers and downing helicopters. The joint forces are said to be surrounded by the Afghan mojahedin in the area. 15 mojahedin have so far been martyred or wounded, said the reports. [Text] [Tehran IRNA in English 1637 GMT 1 Dec 85] /9599

MUJAHIDIN REPORTEDLY DESTROY POST--Last Friday the Afghan Muslim revolutionaries attacked a position belonging to the Karmal force in (Kand) region in Nimruz, in the southwestern part of Afghanistan. They destroyed the post and killed a number of members of Battalion 917, Brigade 4. They also inflicted other grave losses on these forces. As for battles that took place on 23 November in western Afghanistan, the Afghan Muslim revolutionaries killed approximately 100 troops of the joint Soviet-Karmal forces and shot down a number of helicopters belonging to the Karmal troops. [Text] [Tehran International Service in Arabic 0700 GMT 2 Dec 85] /8309

CSO: 4604/13

## GOVERNMENT CRITICIZED FOR LIMITED REHABILITATION EFFORTS

New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 6 Nov 85 p 4

[Editorial: "How Can They Be Rehabilitated?"]

[Text] The first anniversary of Indira Gandhi's assassination and Rajiv Gandhi's election to the government was celebrated almost simultaneously. People remembered these two events either with sorrow or happiness. However, did anyone shed a tear or try to console the bereaved families who suffered during the anti-Sikh riots after Indira Gandhi's assassination? Even people who were outraged at Mrs Gandhi's assassination admit that mostly innocent people were victimized in these riots resulted by mass hysteria. We do not understand why our anger unites us in mass destruction, but when it comes to reconstruction there is no unity. How many families suffering in how many riots were rehabilitated as the result of a group effort? We leave the whole responsibility of rehabilitation on the government and its investigation commissions. After all, this is our own government and the members of investigation commissions are our own people. Their attitude toward people ruined in riots cannot be better than ours. Since Delhi is our capital, efforts to rehabilitate people affected by the riots here were criticized. People who were victimized in other cities during the same period were not even mentioned in the newspapers. In Delhi they made big promises to pay restitution to the victims. However, if you visit these riots victims, you will find that nothing has been done to help them physically or emotionally. Government aid never reaches those who rightfully deserve it. Some examples of this practice can be seen among the victims of the Bhopal gas leak. The Madhya Pradesh government, just like the Indian Government, also gives detailed accounts of rehabilitation work. We, however, fail to see any tangible results. Our bureaucracy's corruption and the lack of empathy is not limited to the Bhopal's gas crisis and Delhi's November riots. Our voluntary organizations also show their sympathy and service for a few days. How many organizations came out to help in Delhi last year? Some of them even did an admirable job for a while. Then, everyone returned to their usual jobs, leaving the uprooted people in the streets. We may not expect understanding and sympathy from our bureaucrats, but we do expect service and help from our voluntary organizations. Our social mentality just does not allow us to finish any good deed with sincerity. The problems of the victims of Delhi's November riots are more psychological than physical. They were hard working people and their widows do not want to live on any charity. Whatever aid was given should

have been delivered in a way to make those families feel safe and secure. Rehabilitation is a state of mind, and only the society can help attain that. At the anniversary of the November riots, people in Delhi, Kanpur, Bokaro, Indore and other cities should have asked themselves if they had helped the victims feel safe and confident. Our deeds to help our victims are a measure of our humanity and social responsibility.

7997/12795

CSO: 4624/6



## LIFE STYLE OF PUBLIC CORPORATION OFFICIALS CRITICIZED

Calcutta RAVIVAR in Hindi 13-19 Oct 85 p 13

[Text] How would you like to be paid 60,000 rupees as annual salary, 36,000 rupees as house rent allowance, 84,000 rupees as entertainment allowance, 48,000 rupees for car expenses, 3,000 rupees for servants, 15,000 rupees for telephone, 10,000 rupees for club expenses and 80,000 rupees for family air and railway travel?

You would protest that it is a pure dream. But, no, it can be a reality, even in a country like India where the annual per capita income is a mere 200 rupees and where about 300 million people live below poverty level. Yet, this dream can come true for you, too, provided you are one of our society's new princes, if you are one of the ever-growing class of the administrators and officials of public sector undertakings.

For example, the salary and perks of any official of a corporation will excite the envy of any former prince. The monthly salary of one corporation's 23 officers is 2,500 rupees which is admittedly low, but the annual expenditure on their benefits, namely entertainment, car, bearer, electricity, residence, furniture and foreign travel amounts to 1.1 million rupees. The annual report of the corporation makes no mention of the expenditure on telephones, clubs and recreation.

In the course of just 3 years, the top ranking officer of this corporation squandered 1.1 million rupees on foreign travel alone. This globe-trotting included jaunts to every capital of the world -- London, Paris, Rome, Washington, Tokyo, you name it. Hardly anyone in the corporation can describe, with any accuracy, the mission of this world travel. Ask anyone and the standard reply is that it was to get orders. But to get answers to specific questions about the product for which orders were taken and how much the order was worth could take months and, at that, only if the corporation is willing to reply.

Why does no one point a finger at this princely life style and at this extravagant waste of the taxpayer's money? The answer to this question is not difficult. It is the top politicians of this country who not only permit corruption, but also encourage it. Are they not the major partners in this plunder?

It is said that if any former cabinet minister pays all the taxes as any other citizen, he will need an annual income of at least 1 million rupees to maintain his life style. This is the very minimum. Then how can they have the face to ask the petty princes under them why they are squandering money? Even the former ministers, whose number is ever increasing, never express any unhappiness, because who knows when their turn for power might come. For this reason they keep frequenting the corridors of power and make every possible effort to maintain their old splendor. Many of these has-beens still have the backing of financiers who continue to invest money in these old war horses in the fond hope that one day fortune might smile again and their investment will return many fold.

The policy makers of this country adopted the strategy of planned progress. It was believed that the public sector would function in such a manner as to become an example of efficiency and professionalism. But what is the situation today? They have become a byword for inefficiency and mismanagement. Every year committees are set up to suggest ways of reforming the public sector. But they, too, can suggest little else than superficial reforms. It is one thing to do some superficial mending of the administrative machinery and make it workable, but it is quite a different matter to create machinery with enough foresight that it may attain the objectives laid down.

The going-ons in the public sector are coming to light because a parliamentary committee, based on public-sector bylaws, and a few other members took a lot of trouble to investigate how the public sector works. Some facts about the splendor in which public sector administrators live and the way they waste money are quite shocking.

It is not as though the parliamentary committee learned all these facts effortlessly. These corporations placed all kind of obstacles in the way of the committee to prevent it from getting the information. Committee members were disappointed at the reluctance and rudeness with which even incomplete answers were given. While asking questions about how the money was spent, the committee had to contend with the unconcealed displeasure of many corporations. A report by the committee says: "With all these limitations, the picture that emerges from the investigations is living proof of the kind of princely life the top officers of these corporations lead."

12286/12955  
CSO: 4625/5

DANCING MONKEYS CONSIDERED INAPPROPRIATE FOR COUNTRY'S IMAGE

New Delhi JANSATTA in Hindi 2 Nov 85 p 4

[Article by Shyam Jha: "Sending Dancing Monkeys Abroad Cannot Help Country's Image as Technical Power"]

[Excerpt] Rajiv Gandhi wants to enhance our country's image as a technical giant in order to increase foreign investments. In order to foster this image, the Festival of India was staged at the cost of millions of rupees in Paris and Washington simultaneously. However, we did not see anything except tribal and monkey dances. In that evening in Paris, all we saw were some tribal dances, mime from Uttar Pradesh and the Bhangra dance from Punjab. In Washington, Rajiv Gandhi's friends Rajiv Sethi and Pupul Jaikar (who is given the responsibility of changing India's image abroad) were directing some monkey dances. There were some Indian classical music programs also. But what was there to represent modern India?

India has been known as the country of beggars and jugglers for centuries. All foreigners ask us if India has a railroad. Are there telephones in India? One has to be diplomatic in such situations. People just do not believe when we carefully explain that India has rockets and makes satellites.

A few years ago, an exhibition about science and technology in ancient India was held in the British Museum in London. This exhibition was greatly liked and was widely covered on television and the other news media. The Indian government, however, just does not try to show that we are an industrialized country.

Indian citizens abroad have either very good jobs or are in business. They would like to return to India when it advances in various technical areas. The Indian government also wants foreign currency investment here. This currency, however, cannot be attracted by showing monkey dances and juggler acts.

We do not mean to relinquish our culture in favor of Western values. We have to balance our image between the old and the new to pave the way for our progress. Last year two Indian movies were shown on French television. Both were directed by Satyajit Ray. One movie was about Brahmin and untouchable relations and the other was about a famine in Bengal. That is all the Indian films the French saw. You can guess what kind of image they have formed about

India. A common question the French ask Indian people is: "Do Indian people die on the streets?" Of course, poverty is everywhere. A few people died in Paris during the last winter. France, however, does not publicize this fact. We have the rich and the poor in India. The gap between the two is greater than in any other country in the world. When India sent help to famine victims in Ethiopia, some Western countries remarked that India should first provide square meals to its own population and only then should it try to get laurels helping other countries at the international level. Right now, instead of being praised for doing a good deed, we are made fun of.

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CSO: 4624/6

## RAJAVI KEEPS MEETING WITH HUSAYN QUIET

GF231812 London KEYHAN in Persian 14 Nov 85 p 1

[Text] Paris--King Husayn of Jordan, who was visiting Paris last week, met with Ma'sud Rajavi, the leader of Mojahedin-e Khalq. Rajavi met with the king twice, on Wednesday, 6 November, and Friday, 8 November, at the king's residence in Paris. Rajavi's press office in Paris refused to comment on the location, length, and topic of discussion during these meetings. KEYHAN's correspondent was told that there will be no further comment to the information published in the French press; which only published news of this meeting. However, this meeting caused reactions in political circles abroad. In connection with this meeting the Front for the Liberation of Iran, in a letter to King Husayn by its leader Doctor Ali Amini, expressed his concern. He wrote: The people of Iran for a long time have considered his majesty, who was one of the closest friends of the late Shah, as a friend of Iran and as a foundation for peace and stability in the Middle East.

The Shah of Iran, in connection with this meeting, told our correspondent: "When I heard of this meeting I wanted to obtain the formal text of the discussion and wanted to learn of the nature of the event, so that I would understand what the meeting was really about. I did not want to do anything or say anything without weighing the matter. I accept that other people's meetings have nothing to do with us. However, if the meeting is about Iran and Iranians, we cannot remain indifferent. I will have to act according to the responsibility I have accepted. I will not comment further until I have received the formal text of the discussions. However, I will remind you that on the way to liberation of Iran and reaching the supreme goal ahead I would be willing to ask others for moral support. This does not mean that we will permit others to interfere with the future of Iran."

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CSO: 4640/89



OPPOSITION PAPER COMMENTS ON HUSAYN-RAJAVI MEETING

GF231944 London KEYHAN in Persian 14 Nov 85 p 1

[Editorial: "The King and the Guerrilla"]

[Text] The king of Jordan, Husayn, certainly does not elect to meet people through a lottery, he selects them because it is in his interest. Such interests led to the annihilation of the Palestinian forces in his country on one occasion in such a manner that they ran to the Israeli wiper in fear of the Bedouin soldiers of Habis al-Majali. On another occasion it calls for 'Arafat to come to Amman to discuss the basis of a Jordanian-Palestinian proposal for joint peace discussions.

In such a manner Jordanian politics move from one end of the spectrum to another. Thus, in his recent trip to Paris, the king of Jordan grants an audience to the head of an organization whose most desired revolutionary goal is the overthrow of all monarchies. When the news of the meeting between Mas'ud Rajavi and King Husayn of Jordan appeared in Paris nobody wanted to believe this, least of all those with the closest ties to the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization. However, they met not once but twice. Political circles in Paris say that it was arranged by Palestinian and Iraqi officials, which seems a distinct possibility. In any case, when there is need for a meeting, a middle man can always be found. What reasons did Mojahedin-e Khalq and King Husayn have for a meeting? With respect to King Husayn's reason right now we can only say that he did not want to ignore a request by his Iraqi and Palestinian allies.

In addition, any sort of influence, either in the present political arena in Iran or in a future one, can be very tempting for the politicians of the region. Iran, as a neighbor, has many memories of the Hashemite dynasty. Such a temptation has coincided with efforts by the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization to rid itself of its current crisis. The national resistance council designed to expand the political and social base of the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization has turned into a center from which all the participating forces are escaping. Following Bani-Sadr's separation, the Kurdish Democratic Party, the Union of Iranian Communists, a faction of the National Democratic Front, and various individuals have left it. After the passage of a few years the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization has returned to the starting point. It used every opportunity it had to obtain support from recognition by leftist organizations, and now it is shooting arrows in a range where there is a change of hitting the prey. This is why any source from the U.S. Senate to Western Europe's Christian Democratic Parties are targets.

In this endeavor, the Mojahedin-e Khalq organization is forced to throw dirt on its past quickly and forget it; forget those days when it was hunting U.S. diplomats and advisers in the streets of Tehran as the most desirable prey; forget the days when it sent its cadres to the Palestinian camps in Lebanon to learn how to overthrow monarchs. The terrorist Mojahedin-e Khalq organization had chosen the right path at the time to achieve revolutionary credibility. However, this was not of use in the face of the credibility Khomeyni had attained. Now, in a free and democratic country, what the Mojahedin-e Khalq needs most is a revolutionary legitimacy covered with democratic credibility. One can understand such a need.

It is possible that some French and American senators do not know the difference between Mojahedin-e Khalq and Afghan Mujahidin, who have been risking their lives in a battle of life and death with the occupation forces. What about the king of Jordan? He should be far more informed of the situation in Iran and understand where Khomeyni and any of the forces opposing him stand. There is no doubt that the king of Jordan and those who arranged the meeting know what they are after. Yet some of the instruments used to achieve their goals may be far worse than they think. The Mojahedin-e Khalq organization has used the meeting with the king of Jordan to boost its international credibility without any consideration for the repercussions such a meeting can have for them. They will certainly lose some things through such a meeting and have probably decided the loss is worth it. However, what will the king of Jordan gain compared to the damages caused to long friendships?

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CSO: 4640/89

OPPOSITION PAPER COMMENTS ON LEFTIST INFLUENCE IN REGIME

GF281340 London KEYHAN in Persian 21 Nov 85 p 1

[Editorial: "The Creeping Coup of the Left"]

[Text] The danger from the left is threatening the system of the Islamic Republic this time from within rather than from outside. The Tudeh Party, Freda'iyān-e Khalq guerrillas, Peykar, Ranjbaran, the Union of Iranian Communists, and all other leftist organizations have at least been superficially destroyed, thus giving the opportunity to the fifth column of communism in Iran to do their deeds from inside the system under the banner of defending Islam and the revolution. It does not matter to international communism whether Nuroddin Kianuri and Ehsan Tabari are within the prisons of the Islamic Republic. What is important is that Mir Hoseyn Musavi, Musavi-Kho'iniha, and other "musavis" manage to turn the system from within toward the direction desired from the start. These are currently the winning aces of the left.

One can see the end of the Imam's line right now, even though it is currently going through internal confusion and will be traversing a civil war in the future. It is not surprising that the leftists, wearing disguises, are carrying out in Iran the same techniques used in Eastern Europe during and immediately after the Second World War. What is cause for surprise is that their opposition is either silent or, being opportunists, has taken up their tune so that even the leftists are amazed. It was Lenin who said that the capitalists who will be hanged will sell the rope for their own hanging.

Maybe this did not happen in Russia, but it did happen in Eastern Europe and is now being repeated in the Islamic Republic. That groups of capitalists who deal in anything, bowed to the presence of the Imam for the sake of "service". Do they not feel the noose around their necks now? As soon as they smelled large profits they lost their reason until now, when Islam slapped them in the face through the hands of the prosecutor general, Hojjat ol-Eslām Val Moslemin, Seyyed Mohammad Musavi-Kho'iniha. Have they come to their senses?

With great caution they distanced them selves from anything that had the slightest tint of struggle against today's oppressive regime in the hope that the Islamic Republic would eventually favor them and allow them to

struggle with each other to rush and kiss the hand that was preparing to slap them in the face. They were hoping to be able to sit down again, after communism had taken over some part of the country and in the event they managed to escape with their lives, and say that Western leaders again cooperated and dropped Iran into the arms of communism, the same way they forced the Islamic regime on us in February of 1979. One should ask them, considering you as the opposition communism has no need of plots by others. Was it not you that sent millions upon millions into the hands of Musavi-Khomeyni as Imam's share? Yet when the nature of the oppressive regime became clear, you did not spend one penny to fight it? That is why another Musavi -- this time, Musavi-Ardabili -- has given them what they deserve, this time telling them that even if they give their entire wealth to the Islamic Republic they are still in debt.

They are after your life and you still hope for the Islamic Republic to give you another green light. We warn you, if you went toward the precipice with your eyes closed when you were supporting Musavi-Khomeyni, your eyes are open this time.

We warn the West not to ignore the creeping coup of the left within the Islamic Republic, the same way they ignored the Islamic revolution. The cold war between the left and right in Iran may seem like an internal struggle now, but if it heats up tomorrow it will involve you as well. International communism is testing one of the best opportunities for the takeover of Iran today in front of your eyes.

We warn the great sources of emulation not to stop short in the face of the creeping coup of the left, as they did in the face of the Islamic revolution. You should not sit in the hope that Khomeyni will take care of the left, given his extensive powers. During the past 7 years, Khomeyni has bowed more to the left than to anything else throughout his life. He is surrounded by the left. The influence of the left begins at the door to the Imam's bedroom. Khomeyni has never been able to operate freely outside the influence of the left in issues such as the occupation of the U.S. Embassy, foreign policy of the Islamic Republic, and the ceaseless defense of the Marxist prime minister of the Islamic Republic, Mir Hoseyn Musavi. Khomeyni's natural animosity toward and borne hatred for the West prepared the grounds for a left turn in Iran from the first day that the Islamic Government came into power and even throughout the revolution. The left is using this right now. Today, irrespective of the destruction of known leftist organizations, stopping the creeping coup of the left has become more difficult than it was yesterday. This will be impossible tomorrow.

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CSO: 4640/90

JOURNAL INTERVIEWS GULF REVOLUTIONARY FIGURE

GF011544 Tehran AL-SHAHID in Arabic 23 Oct 85 pp 32-35

[Interview with M Jabir, chief of the Culture and Information Office in the Islamic Revolution Organization in the Arabian Peninsula, by an unidentified AL-SHAHID correspondent--date, place not given]

[Excerpts] [Question] Observers note that there is a clear diminution of the political role of the Saudi regime on the regional and international levels to the extent that the stardom on the Arab arena has passed to the Jordanian and Moroccan kings on the one hand, and to Syria on the other. Is there an explanation for this diminution?

[M Jabir] The Saudi political role in the Middle East does not exist by itself, but is a branch of the U.S. role in the region. This role has been subject to a considerable decrease during the past 2 years in a way that has been unprecedented in the past 15 years. The causes for this decreased role go back to the failure of the U.S. efforts to consolidate the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty "Camp David" and the failure to drag other Arab countries along that path. They also go back to the severe defeat that the United States suffered in Lebanon following the blowing up of the Marines headquarters, and then the U.S. Embassy in Beirut. The climax of this failure has been Israel's defeat and withdrawal, which in fact signifies the announcement of the impotence and failure of the U.S. political plan in the Middle East. Since that time, Washington has begun to implore this or that country to guarantee the security of its nationals against the danger of the Islamic revolutionary movement. The diminution of Saudi influence in the Arab world is an automatic consequence of the ebbing of the U.S. power which feeds it and breathes life into it.

[Question] This explanation might be true of Saudi Arabia's role in the countries which are directly connected with the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the Saudi retreat appears complete even in those countries which are relatively far from the arena of conflict.

[Jabir] In principle, it is not possible to separate Saudi Arabia's role in the confrontation states from its role in the other countries. Both are one. Saudi Arabia has been making this effort on behalf of the United States ever since Nixon consecrated his theory which is known as



"the theory of the two mutually-supporting pillars" which provided for Saudi Arabia and Iran -- in the Shah's days -- to play the role of the U.S.-Arab agent. However, there is another matter which we must not forget, namely that Saudi Arabia was a country which exported capital in the past decade. By relying on the huge revenues of petrodollars, it was able to have a decisive influence on the governments of the region which were in dire need of the necessary money to develop their countries and consolidate their power. If Saudi Arabia had not been a financing source to those governments, they would not have paid attention to it, and consequently it would have been unable to play an integrated political role. At present, oil revenues have dropped by more than half, which has made Saudi Arabia unable to distribute millions of dollars here and there to buy allegiance, or silence, from the other governments, as it used to do.

[Question] Is there a connection between the new Islamic resurgence and the ebbing of the Saudi role?

[Jabir] The connection is evident in relation with the Lebanese question, and the Saudi-Iranian relationship. The Saudi role is successful in the other issues, in view of the fact that it is acceptable to the parties involved, or because it is able to surmount the obstacles and problems in those issues by appeasing all the parties with money or by U.S.-supported political pressure. However, both these means have failed in Iran and Lebanon, since the core of the matter there is the Islamic revolutionary movement. This movement is in principle based on contradiction to the political equations in which countries like Saudi Arabia and the United States play a role. This movement does not sell political stands for money and pays no heed to the threats of U.S. force.

The principles of the Islamic movement in Lebanon -- as in Iran -- its strategy, and the theoretical and political concepts which govern it are in total contradiction with the principles of the Saudi regime and its strategies. Consequently, Saudi political action is unable to relate to this movement. Wherever this movement is active and effective, Saudi influence will be difficult and unlikely.

[Question] Regarding Saudi-Iranian relations, is there any new development, especially after the visit of Saudi Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faysal to Tehran?

[Jabir] Without doubt, the relations between the two countries have improved a little since the same time last year. In fact, Saudi Arabia has made desperate efforts to improve its relations with Iran. But although there are some in Iran who call for improving relations with the Saudi regime, Iran will not be able to promote its relations beyond the tactical limit, because it represents a popular Islamic movement based on formulae which contradict the Saudi formulae, and that the credibility of the revolution, its continuation, and stability is linked with its adherence to its original line which stressed its victory. Accordingly, we think that Iran will not further promote its relations beyond the tactical relations which

aim at solving the current disputes between the two sides. In its attempts to improve relations with Iran, Saudi Arabia takes one step forward, one step backward. From one side it tries to neutralize Iran in the current struggles in the region, and on the other side it tries to eliminate the aggressive image of the Saudi stand toward the Islamic Republic regarding the Haj issue and the war against Iraq. Saudi Arabia is trying in this way to convince Iran to accept certain facts which it considers vital for the continuation of the dialogue on issues of conflicts between the two countries.

On the other side, Saudi Arabia fears that normalization of relations with Iran will lead the Iranians to carry out their plans, especially concerning Haj, which the Iranian Muslims always try to convert into a season of acquaintance with the people of the Islamic world, and to transfer their expertise and the ideology of the Islamic revolution to them, a thing which endangers the stability of the Saudi system and weakens its position in the Islamic world. As I have said, Saudi-Iranian relations will be confined to the tactical side which leads to solving current problems only.

[Question] It is known that the peoples of the country have different levels of awareness and reactions toward the authorities. Do you think the current situation will lead all the regions to rebel, or will only certain regions rebel?

[Jabir] It is true that there are differences. But I can affirm that the outrage is sweeping all regions of the countries, even among sectors known to be loyal to the royal family. In some regions which have recently witnessed popular opposition, such as the western region, the state of outrage can be described as boiling. Rebellion is unlimited. If it develops, it will be an explosion which will shake the very foundation of the corrupted regime. For example, the region of Hijaz, which is of human and spiritual importance to the Saudi system, is currently witnessing economic difficulties and cultural oppression. This happened when a number of intellectuals criticized the ban imposed by the royal family on culture and intellectuals against it, although most citizens are against the official stand of the royal family. Currently this dispute is developing and a large number of people are participating in it. We should not forget that Hijaz witnessed an armed uprising in early 1979. In other regions, such as the south and Riyadh, citizens clashed with the police following the increase of fuel prices. All this indicates that the near future will be very harsh on the royal family.

[Question] How does the Islamic movement make use of such circumstances?

[Jabir] The Islamic revolution organization endeavors to deepen this popular stance and to drive the people to adopt the stand of real opposition to the regime. It also endeavors to organize pioneering work with the masses, as well as spread the revolutionary concepts and methods of popular work among the people. At the same time, we try to expand to the sectors which are still far from the line of the revolution. We also take advantage of this atmosphere to raise and deepen the basic demands of the Islamic

movement, such as the fall of royal rule, the establishment of Islamic rule, the establishment of individual freedoms, and equality before the law. And we always affirm to our citizens that the economic crisis is only the result of this family rule.

[Question] Some observers talk about an extraordinary resistance in certain circles, faced by the ineptitude of the Islamic revolutionary movement in containing and organizing this resistance. How true is this?

[Jabir] What those observers said is not far from the truth. Our people -- their enemies thought they eliminated their personality and destroyed their spirit of challenge -- once again proved that they are a genuine and brave nation. If these characteristics can be found in a nation then events move in their favor.

[Question] Some revolutionaries, whatever their experiences in this field, see that the popular movement tends to be anarchist, as every group moves on the basis of its personal conviction as well as the impact of its personality on work. Thus we find ourselves before a group of movements that do not have a common denominator.

[Jabir] That might be true if we assess the masses movement in accordance to organization standards; this is basically a mistake because the popular movement has its special standards and its own mechanism that is hard to apply to the organization. Similarly the standard and the apparatus of the organization do not apply to the movement of the masses. With regards to the organization we find that it is necessary to unite the idea and the methods of the movement and deal with the dissimilarity of the personalities in its ranks. The popular movement should avoid all this and look to the final result, whether or not it is in the interest of the Islamic work. We believe that this result will be in the interest of the Islamic movement and in the interest of the Jihad and revolution.

[Question] Are you not afraid that your stand will lead to multiple loyalties and numerous leaderships, and consequently to the disintegration of the popular movement?

[Jabir] Even if that takes place it will not be a frightening matter. We endeavor to activate the people and not to impose our leadership on them.

[Question] Allow us to move to the subject of the detainees. What is new in this matter? As everybody knows, Amnesty International has also mentioned this.

[Jabir] The oppression continues and arrests have become daily news, and it does not seem that they will stop soon. At the moment there are tens of the most honorable citizens in prison, including intellectuals, teachers, engineers, scholars, and even elderly people, such as 70-year-old men. We have called on Amnesty International and the international human rights committees to intervene and rescue those dear ones. We affirm that the continuation of the Islamic movement and its steadfastness and the

deepening of its roots is the radical solution to the question. As long as the Al Sa'ud family rule the country, the oppression will not stop and usurpation of citizens' rights will continue. It is necessary to resolve the core of problems by uprooting this devil's tree from our pure Islamic land.

[Question] What is the popular reaction to the continuation of the arrests?

[Jabir] The direct reaction was to demand their release by sending popular delegations to the officials and sending messages and cables and making phone calls. The intelligence director of Al-Dammam, the administrative capital of the eastern region, asked the telephone company to change the telephone numbers of his administration to end the disturbance caused by continuous phone calls on the detainees. What we fear is that the region is heading toward violence; there are interesting phenomena in this regard. People are turning toward extremism and there are sides that want to exploit this direction. If the Saudi Government continues to arrest citizens it might find itself before a state it will be unable to resist. I do not want to give further information on this.

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CSO: 4604/11

## COMMISSION SET UP TO INVESTIGATE GHARAZI'S ALLEGED CRIMES

GF222007 (Clandestine) Voice of the Liberation of Iran in Persian 16300 GMT  
22 Nov 85

[Text] According to reports from the capital, a commission has been set up to investigate the crimes and violations committed by Mohammad Gharazi in the regime's petroleum ministry. This commission -- which includes two employees of the International Affairs Department of this ministry, the deputy of Hoseyn 'ali Montazeri, and the deputy of Mir Hoseyn Musavi -- will investigate the various cases of oil sales to the world market in which Gharazi, the former oil minister and nephew of Mohammad Beheshti, has allegedly committed embezzlement and take bribes. These violations consist of eight cases of misappropriation of funds in the sale of retail consignments of crude oil and of taking bribes from the international buyers and brokers of oil who have deposited astronomical amounts in Gharazi's account in the British Bank in London. Twenty-three cases involve awarding unacceptable concessions to some customers of the oil ministry, and finally seven cases consist of formulating ambiguous and impractical transactions with some foreign companies for completion of industrial plans in order to amass bribes. The result in these companies' lawyers have filed for breach of promise against the regime in international and Iranian courts.

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CSO: 4640/88



## OFFICIAL WARNS OF CONFISCATIONS

GF28154 (Clandestine) Radio Iran in Persian 1330 GMT 28 Nov 85

[Text] A judge, quoting sources close to Prosecutor General Musavi-Kho'iniha, has revealed that the revolution prosecutor's office plans to confiscate on behalf of the Islamic Republic, the money of anyone with assets of more than 10 million tumans. Talking to our correspondents, this judge stressed that Musavi-Kho'iniha does not pay attention to Islamic decrees, as he has stated several times. He rejects the Koran's decrees on ownership. The judge warned that should clerical circles and sources of emulation continue their silence against tudeh'i mullahs, other events concerning a gradual dissolution of Islamic laws will take place which will doubtlessly catch everyone unaware. He added: It is a misconception to believe that the Government of the Islamic Republic will tilt toward communism in the future. The truth is that the current regime has already passed the first stages of becoming a communist society. It is following the pattern of Cuba and Nicaragua in this matter.

This judicial official asked people, particularly religious groups, not to downplay the changes in the Islamic Republic and the rise to power by the leftist faction and to carry out their religious and nationalist duty of denouncing the dangerous rule of Ruhollah Khomeyni before it is too late. He stressed that the leftist faction of the Islamic Republic has prepared expansive plans, not only regarding wealth and ownership, but also on judicial harshness. The guards have now been given permission to arrest and imprison people in order to spread terror and fear. He added: The more terror the regime uses, the more popular resistance increases, showing Islamic regime. For example, now the level of insults against the regime has reached such a level that it is now the hezbollahis who are afraid of people, rather than the other way around. A day does not pass when hezbollahis are beaten up by the people, particularly the youth who have lost all patience with the bullying of the agents of the regime. Recently a group of youth who were arrested by Jamaran's Islamic revolution committee guards reacted so severely that it resulted in a harsh clash in the committee. This resulted in the death of an 18-year-old boy and the wounding of a number of guards. Members of the family of an armed force officer executed by agents of Khomeyni held demonstrations by his grave in Behesht-e Zahra. This was supported and welcomed by a large group of youth. Any insult imaginable was hurled at Khomeyni and his croney mullahs. The guards stationed at Behesht-e Zahra intervened and a severe clash broke out.

What is most important is the presence of youth and even children no older than 10 involved in various forms of peoples resistance on the streets of Tehran and other places. Such resistance is heartwarming, since it shows that the brainwashing of children in schools has created an adverse reaction, making the children resist the system rather than people. He added: I give the people of Iran the good news that no action can help the continuation of Khomeyni's regime. This is something that even many of the elements of the regime in the judicial system, courts, and revolution prosecutor's office confess to. In their private discussions they fearfully say that it is too late now and that any action to save the Islamic Republic is useless.

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CSO: 4640/88

COMMENTARY VIEWS PRIME MINISTER'S PRC VISIT

GF011344 Karachi DAWN in English 25 Nov 85 p 7

[Editorial: "Friendship Renewed"]

[Text] The warm welcome accorded to Prime Minister Mohammad Khan Junejo and his entourage during the week-long visit to China underlines the enduring quality and strength of relations between Pakistan and China. Mr Junejo's tour, his first official trip abroad, was meant to foster closer understanding between Beijing and Islamabad by establishing personal contact with the leaders of the other side. But the visit was more than simply a gesture of goodwill and friendship. It was in keeping with the long-established tradition of periodic visits and exchanges at top levels of the leadership of the two countries to keep their bilateral relations in good repair and to explore newer possibilities of cooperation and understanding. The aim this time was also to review developments on the international and regional fronts as much as to examine the scope of expanding areas of economic cooperation. As such, apart from bilateral ties, the situation in Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, Kampuchea and the situation in the subcontinent figured prominently in the talks. Embedded in deep mutual trust and a commonality of principles rather than political expediency, Sino-Pakistan friendship arises out of a similarity of perceptions of issues of international and regional importance.

Thus, the two sides stand for the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan and Kampuchea, the cessation of the Gulf war, a just and durable peace in the Middle East, as also for the realisation of equality and justice in South Africa. In the context of Afghanistan, China informed Pakistan that it gives top priority to this issue in its own talks for normalising ties with the USSR. The Prime Minister also informed his Chinese counterpart of Islamabad's efforts to promote regional cooperation and improve its relations with India. Beijing has always supported the joint efforts of the South Asian countries to promote understanding and cooperation among them on the basis of the principles of independence, non-interference, sovereign equality and mutual benefit. Its own on-going efforts to improve its relations with India and the Soviet Union are a good example for other nations to emulate. What is especially gratifying for Pakistan in this context is the consistency China has displayed in its attitude towards its allies despite the tugs and pulls of international diplomacy.

On the economic front, the Chinese Government offered to install two turbines at the Jamshoro hydel project. This should help raise the energy output by 425 megawatts. Beijing has also offered to help in the proposed expansion of the Heavy Mechanical Complex and the Heavy Forge and Foundry at Taxila to make them capable of manufacturing electric turbines. Chinese assistance in these projects should help Pakistan raise its domestic production of capital goods and cut imports. Mr Junejo also disclosed that China is to help Pakistan in the establishment of a Heavy Electric Complex at Haripur. For this purpose China has extended long-term credit of 10.86 million dollars for the supply of machinery, equipment and plant design. The project is expected to be completed in three years and attain full-capacity production in seven years. The Heavy Electric Complex is to manufacture power transformers that should meet the requirements of WAPDA [water and power development authority] and the KESC [Karachi electric supply corporation] and help increase the total generating capacity of the country at a cost lower than what would be involved if the transformers were to be imported.

But while Pakistan has received much economic and technical assistance from China, the two sides have not been able to develop bilateral trade on a scale warranted by the special relationship that exists between them. The total turnover at the moment stands at a mere 200 million dollars. To help devise steps to enlarge the volume and commodity range of commercial exchanges, the Joint Ministerial Commission is to meet in Islamabad in the first quarter of 1986. Since cotton is no longer expected to figure significantly in exports from Pakistan, it is essential that new items be identified. China has already expressed its interest in higher imports of rerolled iron sheets and scrap as also in fertiliser and agricultural commodities. Both sides have also stressed the need for substantially raising overland trade via the Karakoram Highway as part of the drive to attain a higher level and a more diversified pattern of trade exchanges. Overall, the visit was a successful one and will doubtless provide an impetus to the strengthening of cooperation and understanding between the two friendly nations.

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CSO: 4600/112

KALABAGH: JUNEJO SAYS RELEVANT ISSUES TO BE EXAMINED

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Nov 85 p 8

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Nov 13: The Prime Minister Mr. Mohammad Khan Junejo has said that a decision will be taken by his government on Kalabagh Dam project after examining all relevant issues.

After hearing a briefing by the Provincial Government and the WAPDA, at a high level meeting held at the Governor's House here today. The Prime Minister said that a sub-committee of the Federal Cabinet would examine the project in depth and submit its report to the Cabinet for a final decision.

The Prime Minister reiterated that his government would not take any step against the interest of any province and that there was consequently no need for alarm as a final decision will be taken by his government only after all aspects of the project and its implications had been examined.

Those attending the briefing included,

Lt. Gen. Fazle Haq, Governor of NWFP, Arbab Mohammad Jehangir Khan, Chief Minister NWFP, Federal Minister Dr. Mahboobul Haq, Federal Minister for Water and Power, Mr. Zafrullah Khan Jamali, Federal Minister for State and Frontier Region, Northern Areas and Kashmir Affairs, Syed Qasim Shah, Provincial Ministers, Deputy Chairman Planning Commission and high ranking Federal and provincial officers.

Mr Junejo, who flew into Peshawar today for a day's visit attended a number of meetings which discussed development projects in the NWFP, administration of Tribal Areas and the relief measures for the Afghan refugees.

The meeting was attended by the Governor, the Chief Minister, Federal Minister, Mr. Zafarullah Khan Jamali, Syed Qasim Shah, Provincial Ministers and senior Government officers.—APP

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CSO: 4600/111



## AJK PRESIDENT CONDEMNS CONCEPT OF INDEPENDENT KASHMIR

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Nov 85 p 4

[Text]

LAHORE, Nov 4: The AJK President, Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan, called for promoting Pakistani nationalism for the solidarity of Pakistan adding that the support of the concept of independent Kashmir or recognition of Azad Kashmir would be tantamount to suicide.

Addressing the lawyers' forum at Gulistan-e-Fatima here, he said that such secessionist concepts did not enjoy mass support nor anybody offered sacrifices in 1947 for any other concept except the ideology of Pakistan and Islam.

The forum was organised by Chairman Refugee Board of the Muslim Conference, Raja Afarsiab advocate and was also addressed by retired Justice Shaukat Ali, retired Judge Aftab Furrukh, Khalid Ranjha, Malik Saeed, S. M. Zafar, Malik Aslam and Sultan Mahmood Chaudhry.

Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan said that the people of Kashmir had no other goal except accession of the entire state of Jammu and Kashmir in sacrifices for this very objective.

He said, "we cannot betray our *Shaheeds* (martyrs) who laid down their lives for acceding to Pakistan.

The AJK President said that the people of Kashmir were not directly a party to Tashkent or Simla agreements, "but we would not create any difficulties for Pakistan under the present circumstances: It also did not mean that we have relinquished our struggle for freedom." Kashmir, he said, was the lifeline of Pakistan and we will con-

tinue our struggle on every front until this lifeline is freed from India.

He said that the 22 lakh people of Azad Kashmir and Jammu and Kashmir refugees living in Pakistan would spare no sacrifice for the defence of Pakistan.

Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan said that if India was not willing to settle Kashmir dispute then Pakistan can take it up with the UN Security Council as the issue still existed on its agenda.

Sardar Abdul Qayyum Khan also addressed a function organised by Kashmir's accession to Pakistan council and said that during the past 10 years the historical and political reality of Kashmir issue had been relegated to the background and the same was required to be revived by setting up accession to Pakistan councils at every place for the guidance of the younger generation. The AJK President said that by voting Muslim Conference into power the people had supported the Quaid-i-Azam's saying that Kashmir was the Jugular vein of Pakistan.

The function was presided over by the convener of the council, S. M. Bashir and was also addressed by the eminent jurist, S. M. Zafar, Muslim League leader Ahmed Saeed Kirmani, Provincial Industries Minister, Ghulam Haider Wain, Mohammad Aijaz Momin, retired Maj. Gen M. H. Ansari and Khaksar leader Khan Mohammad Ashraf Khan.—APP

/9274

CSO: 4600/96

## CHAFFAR KHAN APPEALS TO PUNJAB MASSES FOR UNITY

Karachi DAWN in English 6 Nov 85 p 2

[Text]

PESHAWAR, Nov 5: Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, veteran Khudai Khidmatgar leader has called upon the masses of Punjab to foil the attempts of Punjabi and Zamindars who appear determined to further disintegrate Pakistan. He asked them to work collectively and in close coordination with the people of smaller Provinces who had been persistently victimised since Independence.

Addressing the people and defunct NDP workers at Mardan, Ghaffar Khan asked the people to be on their guard, keeping a close watch on the vested interests. It was for the people of Punjab to deal with these elements strongly and effectively in order to create better understanding with the people of other Provinces.

He regretted that the masses in smaller Provinces had been exploited, both economically and polit-

ically and ruthlessly victimised in the name of majority.

Ghaffar Khan, who stood for non-violence throughout his life, advised the people not to indulge in violence on any issue, as it would delay the process of democratisation in the country, strengthening the hands of dictatorship and of the forces of exploitation.

**KALABAGH DAM:** About the proposed Kalabagh Dam, Abdul Ghaffar Khan warned that the Pukhtoons, already suffering from the construction of Tarbela Dam, could not permit further encroachment on their lifeline of agricultural land. The Dam would turn the whole of Peshawar Valley and Kohat into a big uninhabitable lake and, therefore the Pukhtoons would resist the project. He asked the authorities to immediately give up the project and avert danger to national cohesion and to fertile lands of NWFP.

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CSO: 4600/96

MRD CONVENER SAYS MOVEMENT TO BE LAUNCHED IN 1986

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Nov 85 p 8

[Text]

KARACHI, Nov 4: Mr Pervez Saleh, convener of the MRD for the current three-month term and acting Chairman of the banned Qaumi Mahaz-i-Azadi, arrived here on Monday from Lahore on a brief visit.

He held detailed discussions with the MRD Secretary-General, Khwaja Khairuddin, regarding the MRD affairs. Others who met him were Mr Iqbal Haider, Secretary-General, and Mr Azhar Jamil of the QMA.

Mr Saleh, in a statement said that 1986 would be a "year of the MRD movement" and that no indemnity bill could make anyone immune from accountability.

The MRD convener contended that the fact that the National Assembly and the Sind Assembly could not discuss the "indignities and sufferings" caused to the people of Sind during the 1983 movement as well as the Thori railway crossing firing incident, showed how "utterly helpless" the parliamentarians were.

Besides, he said, the water problem in Sind and other provinces had been mishandled, and a political capital made of it. Even today, there was no water south of Kotri Barrage, while drought conditions prevailed in Tharparkar, he pointed out.

He cautioned against a serious threat looming large with the proposed construction of Kalabagh dam and a further division of the Indus water.

Mr Saleh demanded the release of Rasool Bakhsh Palcejo, Fazil Rahu, Makhdoom Khaliqzaman, Jam Saqi, Jamal Naqvi, Masroor Ahsan and other political prisoners.

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CSO: 4600/96

## ASSEMBLY DEBATES RETURN TO 6-DAY WEEK

Karachi DAWN in English 6 Nov 85 p 2

## [Text]

ISLAMABAD, Nov 5: The National Assembly on Tuesday held an inconclusive debate on a private motion for dispensation of two holidays in a week, with an explicit demand for reversion to old practice of six-day working week.

The motion, moved by Syed Asad Gilani (Lahore) and supported by 24 out of the 25 speakers today, will now be taken up on the next private members' day.

Syed Asad Gilani, Syeda Abida Hussain, M. Hamza, Dr Sher Afghan, M.P. Bhindara, Shah Turabul Haq, Nasir Ali Baluch, Pir Mohammad Ashraf, Maulana Gohar-rehman, Bashir Randhava, Haji Fazle Raziq, Raja Shahid Zafar, Begum Sahna Ahmed, Sahibzada Fatehullah, Haji Yunus Elahi Sethi, Haji Mohammad Saifullah Khan, Mohammad Saqwar, Mohammad Usman Ramz, Sheikh Rashid Ahmed, Chandhri Mohammad Iqbal, Mohammed Nawaz Wial, Mohammad Mansur, Ghulam Mohammed Chishui, and Mozaffar Hsshmi, strongly endorsed the motion.

They termed the government decision of two holidays a week as "sentimental," and "improper" and noted that it was for this reason, that the decision was revoked in provinces and several other departments. The existing

situation of two holidays a week in the secretariats, at the federal and provincial levels, smacked of "double standard" approach, which ran counter to the national cohesion and discipline.

The speakers particularly referred to the hardships of the female employees and the lower rung government servants and said that the two holidays a week decision had created innumerable problems for them with no let up.

They, therefore, demanded that the decision be revoked forthwith, as a developing country like Pakistan could not afford this "luxury".

It was insisted by them that Pakistan should look towards countries like Korea for achieving socio-economic progress, rather than emulating "unrealistic" example of the industrialised Western countries, which had already achieved economic progress.

Some of the speakers, however, proposed that Friday should be declared half day, with Sunday as the weekly off day.

Earlier, Syed Asad Gilani speaking on his motion pointed out that the practice of two holidays a week had caused immense loss to the nation.

The House will meet again tomorrow at 4 p.m.

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CSO: 4600/96

## FEARS OF BIG BUSINESS ON RETURN TO DEMOCRACY ANALYZED

Karachi DAWN in English 7 Nov 85 p 7

[Article by Sultan Ahmed]

[Text]

PRIME MINISTER Junejo has mentioned the fears of businessmen and industrialists in Karachi about the future of the country after the elections and installation of a civilian Government.

He said that some of them met him in Karachi last month while the National Assembly was discussing the eighth Constitutional Amendment Bill and expressed their dismay over the lack of consensus on constitutional issues.

Such apprehensions over the return of democratic institutions as Martial Law ends is not something new for big business and industry in Pakistan. They voiced the same kind of fears as the Martial Law regime of Ayub Khan was coming to an end, as the much touted Decade of Development was closing, following widespread uprisings in the country.

President Zia himself had several times earlier stated that one of the reasons why he was prolonging Martial Law was the fear of democracy among the investors. And last month he said that prices in the Karachi Stock Exchange had crashed because of the wrangling over the 8th amendment and delay in the National Assembly in approving the bill as presented by the Government.

Fear of democracy in a substantial form among the businessmen and industrialists in Pakistan is not something fanciful but real. And

they voice that openly in private conversations with Pressmen.

And this is not a peculiar feature of Pakistan. Big business in other developing regimes with military or strong arm regimes identifies itself with such regimes and fear the return of democracy. It feels safer and confident by looking itself to a few strongmen at the top instead of identifying it with the broad masses at the bottom.

## Democracy

Some of them openly say that "Martial Law is good for business." They fear that with the end of Martial Law labour will become restive and assertive. Fear of nationalisation is not there among them to any great extent now. And as they accepted this regime they were ready to enter into partnership arrangements with it when they went to the official investment institutions or banks for loans under the Islamic banking system. Under other forms of government may be far more apprehensive of such partnership deals instead of maintaining the traditional lender-borrower relations.

They are delighted by the vast tax relief they have got which reduced tax on personal income at its peak from 66 per cent to 45, and corporate tax from 55 per cent to 40, and did away with tax on dividend income. The export and import policies, too, have become very liberal, and they don't want any reversal of them.

Their slogan that "martial law is

good for business" is more like a refrain of the slogan of General Motors "what is good for General Motors is good for American." Except that we don't have anything like GM in our midst, only small assemblers.

If the approach to trade and industry to freedom was uniform it would have been understandable. That is not the case. Instead they clamour for de control, de regulation, de nationalisation themselves. They demand as few controls on imports and exports as possible, and as much freedom from foreign exchange control as obtainable. And they want low taxation along with low interest rate on the funds lent to them for investment or export. And they want to be able to go abroad without restrictions. And they insist on the right to invest their capital without the formalities of sanctions or other tedious official procedures.

I am not arguing that these are unreasonable or excessive demands. The more striking is the fact that while they want all the rights or freedoms for themselves, they want none of that for political leaders or the workers. In the political sphere they prefer the kind of absolute control martial law symbolises.

They don't see the contradiction in their approach. When Eric Fromm wrote his book "Fear of Freedom" he spoke of the readiness of people in the 20th Century to exchange their liberty for security, which gave birth to authorita-



rian regimes. In our case, it is not poor and unemployed who are seeking such security but the very rich and economically mighty

## Political power

Stanley A. Kochanek in his book "Interest Groups and development" writes that big business in Pakistan is not interested in exercising or acquiring direct political power. But that is not the case now. After Gen. Zia nominated a former President of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Sheikh Ishtat Ali, as his adviser on internal trade and Mr. Hamid D. Habib as adviser for export promotion, with the status of Minister of State for both, and Mr. Javed Sultan Japaniwala, then President of the Karachi Chamber of Commerce, as Sind's Finance Minister following Mr. Ashraf Tani, another industrialist, businessmen have a different approach to politics.

When Mr. Yousuf Zia was President of the FPCCI he was nominated member of the Majlis-i-Shoora while his predecessor, Mr. Maher Alavi was nominated member of the Sind Advisory Council. And now, following the elections, Speaker Fakhr Imam says that out of 237 members of the National Assembly 16 are industrialists and 31 businessmen, while the strength of the lawyers which used to be large has shrunk to 21. This became possible because of the non-party elections which kept the regulars out of the elections and left the field open for many new comers.

The Chief Minister of the Punjab Nawaz Sharif is an industrialist as also the Federal Commerce Minister Salim Saifullah. Interior Minister Aslam Khattak, too, is an industrialist. Such extensive rep-

resentation for trade and industry in the Central and provincial Cabinets, and the National and provincial Assemblies has given them a large political dimension which they did not have. And they may not come to these bodies in such large strength in a normal election with all the parties contesting. Hence the kind of fears trade and industry have voiced to the Prime Minister about the shape of things to come after January 1.

The identification of the FPCCI and the provincial chambers with the regime has been too strong and too open. Members of the executive committee of the FPCCI used to complain that their President Aziz Zuhair was greeting major official announcements too readily, without consulting them. And such announcements included the referendum and non-party elections.

Mr. Abdul Jabbar Khanam, a former President of the Karachi Chamber, hence gave notice of a motion to the last general body meeting suggesting that the chamber de-politicise itself and play a professional role. Evidently that did not find favour with the elements with strong political ambitions. If such total identification with the regime was not there, the apprehensions about a return to democratic forms, even partially, would not be so strong amidst big business.

There is real fear among the industrialists that the kind of control which they exercised over the workers may not be possible after Jan. 1. But the fact is that despite the close relation between the regime and big business the liberal 1972 labour policy could not be amended during the last eight years. Conferences, committees and Cabinet sub-committees met several times but nothing came out of that. So instead of amending the law in the manner sought by the employers they were allowed to flout that law freely, and the notori-

ous "group system" came into vogue in textile mills in the city. Contractors became the real bosses of the workers instead of the mill owners and beat up or tamed "recalcitrant" workers effectively. It may be difficult to follow such primitive practices after martial law goes.

## Real fear

What trade and industry in Pakistan are not able to realise is that in many countries which have had both absolute dictatorship and democracy there has been far more economic growth in a democratic setup. Look at Germany, Italy and Japan. They achieved a higher rate of economic growth as democracies than under Hitler and other despots. As new democracies this vanquished too could economically overwhelm their victors in World War II. Compared to them Spain and Portugal which were under dictatorships for too long remained poor, and are now finding it hard to make even modest economic progress.

Clearly trade and industry in Pakistan have to identify themselves with freedom and democratic institutions, not just of fearing both. In a democratic order they may not be able to make very high profits or pay very low wages or evade taxes in the manner made possible by the whitener bonds. But they will certainly prosper with considerably more confidence in an open society. And positively they cannot be asking for all the freedoms for themselves, and simultaneously ask that the rest of the nation should remain bound down. They cannot expect to be an island of freedom for long in a society where authoritarianism prevails everywhere else. Hence let them become realistic and enlightened, and liberate themselves from their own exaggerated fears.

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CSO: 4600/106

## INDUSTRIALISTS' 'DISTASTE FOR DEMOCRACY' QUESTIONED

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Nov 85 p 5

[Text]

AS THE hour approaches for another transition from military to civilian rule in Pakistan, notice is once again being taken of the industrialists' alleged preference for an authoritarian dispensation. While one must be wary of the tendency to readily generalise from the particular in such cases, the trepidatory vibrations being generated in this respect, especially by a section of big investors, cannot be easily ignored. However, the explanation for this phenomenon is somewhat harder to assimilate, given the historical fact that democratic forms of governance have seldom been held incompatible with free enterprise. The answer, therefore, must be sought in the specific conditions of this country's political processes and their relation to the pattern of economic development.

For the first ten years of Pakistan's existence, although feudal interests dominated the parliamentary facade, the civil bureaucracy availed itself of the opportunity afforded by political instability to establish and consolidate its control over the government machinery. Consequently, those desirous of setting up industries and importing the machinery and expertise required for the purpose learnt slowly but surely who it was they had to do business with for obtaining the

necessary licences. The power structure remained essentially unaltered in the 'decade of development' that followed, although private investment on an ever-increasing scale began to be far more actively encouraged. This did not, however, presage a decrease in the acquired proneness to unethical practices, and the marriage of convenience between the captains of industry and the bureaucracy continued to thrive. Besides, the dictatorial Ayub regime provided a safeguard against the bothersome nuisance of unfettered trade-unionism — until a combination of economic and political contradictions resulted in an inevitable explosion. It is to be noted that industrial workers played quite a significant role in the latter phase of the struggle that led to the fall of the Ayub Government.

In contrast, several leading industrialists are thought to have contributed substantially in financial terms towards the upsurge that preceded the overthrow of the Bhutto administration. However, their disenchantment with the pseudo-democratic experiment of the seventies is attributable to the haphazard nationalisation policy which was then in vogue rather than any thorough bureaucratic shake-up. The PPP leadership pursued its scheme of takeover by the

State of certain large concerns more out of narrow political considerations and as a personal vendetta than as a plan aimed at socialising the means and relations of production. But the fact that no major structural changes were intended failed to placate affected or endangered capitalists, who viewed the policy as an assault on their profits. Large-scale private investment declined considerably in view of the prevalent uncertainty, and it was not until the succeeding Martial Law administration had established itself properly that the economic climate was once again considered favourable by investors. Under the present regime, industrialists have reason to feel more secure, since rhetoric about the desirability of a welfare State has been generously tempered with the grant of generous incentives to those willing to invest.

Incidentally, large industrialists' nervousness about democracy is not shared by most owners of smaller concerns, not only because they have less to lose and less danger of losing it in case of nationalisation, but also since they require fewer bureaucratic favours. The fear of big capitalists emanates largely from the experience of the Bhutto years. Besides, they are aware that in most Western democracies corporate capital has had to make vital concessions, learning to accept State intervention in certain important sectors to contain the seeds of discontent and prevent the possibility of violent change. In Britain, the Conservative Government's attempt to roll back the welfare State has increased class polarisation to an extent that serious repercussions are expected in the years ahead. Thus, industrialists here suspect that the free play of democratic

forces in Pakistan could create a situation that would necessitate the curtailment of their vast economic powers. Though the present Assemblies contain more than a sprinkling of industrialists, they are still dominated by feudal elements. Besides, there is general agreement that the capitalists who got elected owe their seats to the fact that polls were conducted on a partyless basis. Unlike the feudals, most industrialists have refrained from identification with political parties, either out of disdain for democracy or because they harbour few illusions about their popular standing. Hence, while they may have little to fear from the dispensation likely to follow immediately in the wake of the lifting of Martial Law, apprehensions about the course events could take a few years from now are not surprising. The only treatment that can be prescribed for this variety of 'acquired immune deficiency syndrome' is that patients should reconcile themselves to the idea that the State cannot be indefinitely expected to pamper and protect them. They ought to learn to live in an environment that could often turn turbulent, and for that purpose, they must discard the notion that profits are the sole rationale of their existence. It must also be realised that national well-being cannot be measured in terms of GNP alone. If industrialists, both major and minor, could learn to accept the desirability of more rational and equitable wage structures for industrial workers, the right of trade unions to exist and operate in an environment free of coercion, and the fact that production should primarily be geared towards increasing public welfare, they might be able to see and understand that democracy is not the dragon that they have been accustomed to believing it is.

## PROBLEMS OF RETURNING MIGRANTS VIEWED

Karachi DAWN in English 7 Nov 85 p 7

## [Text]

THE Federal Minister for Overseas Pakistanis informed the Senate the other day that the creation of 3.52 million jobs during the Sixth Plan period would provide employment not only to the majority of job-seekers in the country, but also to returning migrants. This amounts to an oversimplification of the most difficult and complex socio-economic dilemma which the country has had to face since the manpower export boom of the mid 70s. The problem has been brewing since the very beginning of the manpower exodus, and the absence of a coherent policy to regulate the outflow and in regard to the immediate and long-term implications of it has proven costly. Immense economic benefits could have been derived from planned utilisation of home remittances. However, for lack of guidance and suitable avenues of investment, migrants and their families were allowed to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on luxury goods and ostentatious houses while home remittances rose from 334.2 million dollars in 1975-76 to a record figure of 2.9 billion dollars in 1982-83. This proved helpful to the balance of payments, but made deep inroads into the socio-economic fabric of the country, abetted by factors such as large-scale corruption and smuggling. Non-productive

spending sprees created socio-economic maladjustments and strengthened inflationary pressures. The country had to pay a heavy price, as the shortage of trained hands, due to emigration of technical and managerial personnel, considerably slowed down progress and adversely affected the pace and quality of development.

There are various estimates about the number of emigrants, but all experts agree that they were about 2.3 million Pakistani expatriates abroad at the peak of the emigration wave. Now the process of reversal has begun, with the last two years witnessing a significant drop in home remittances. There has also been a corresponding increase in the number of returning migrants. However, no steps are being taken to monitor the pattern and rate of the economic slow down in the oil-exporting Middle Eastern countries. It is essential that the Pakistan embassies, assisted by experts, should immediately undertake close scrutiny of the fast changing economies of labour-receiving Arab countries, whose oil incomes are rapidly falling. Official budgetary cuts in development outlays and declining private investment rates should also be studied to assess job market conditions in both the short and long run. A detailed survey of Pakistani manpower

employed abroad should urgently be undertaken with a view to determining their professional and skill-wise categories. The findings of these surveys and studies would greatly assist the Government in learning which categories of expatriates are likely to return home permanently, and thus to prepare contingency and long-term plans for their employment or rehabilitation on a self-help basis.

The Overseas Pakistanis Minister's reference to new job opportunities during the Sixth Plan was too general and failed to indicate specific plans for effectively dealing with the problem of returning migrants. A recent private study confirmed that expatriates face both economic and social readjustment problems of a serious nature on returning home. While re-entry into the community and family in the larger sense poses social, psychological and material problems, it is pertinent to note that only about half the returnees are able to find gainful employment, and even some of these have to wait

for one to two years. Others remain unemployed. Another disturbing factor is that the capital (savings) the unemployed returnee brings back is rarely sufficient to set up a small trade or cottage industry. Many of them lack the managerial skills needed to run businesses successfully. Moreover, the problem of re-employment or rehabilitation will accentuate as their inflow continues to rise in the coming years, since the labour-receiving countries are likely to further cut down their official and private development plans and other projects. It is still not too late, however, to devise schemes for utilising remittances for productive purposes and setting up cooperatives and small-scale turn-key business projects which would help penetrate opportunities for employment. Efforts must be focused on projects that could help a returning migrant from a rural background to settle down in a business or small agro-industry in a familiar environment, instead of being sucked up by the already overflowing urban centres.

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CSO: 4600/106



## JATOI EXPRESSES CONCERN OVER LAW, ORDER IN SIND

Karachi DAWN in English 7 Nov 85 p 5

[Article by Sadiq Jafri]

[Text]

KARACHI, Nov 6: Mr. Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, President of PPP, Sind, has said that "disenchantment among the people of Sind is stronger today than ever before."

He was talking to *Dawn* on Wednesday after a week-long visit to his home village, Moro, New Jatoi.

Explaining the situation in the interior of the province, Mr. Jatoi said: "Law and order has been completely destroyed; people don't feel secure, even in the daytime. Safe travel across the province has become almost impossible. Cases of dacoities and kidnapping have increased manifold. The police do not even register complaints as they do not like reports about crimes to be published in newspapers. Kidnapping for ransom has become a routine."

He said further that the people of Sind were facing multiple problems. They did not have jobs; they were being subjected to excesses of both the police and dacoits; corruption had increased; and the much-publicised steps for improving living conditions in Sind had proved fruitless, he added.

Mr. Jatoi gave the example of Dadu Industrial Estate which, he said, had been set up in the middle area and hence it was not easily approachable. It was mostly benefitting the capitalists who were investing there to enjoy the tax holiday. The local labour force was

unable to derive benefit as he could not opt for on-site housing and could not reach the mill area in the absence of road and transport.

All other socio-economic developmental activities had resulted the same way, he observed.

**SERAIKI ISSUE:** Mr. Jatoi, who is himself a Saraike-speaking Baruch, on a question about seraike issue, emphatically demanded that the status of Bahawalpur, which had been of a state till its merger with One-Unit, should be restored. It should have been done with the break-up of One-Unit, he remarked.

He said Bahawalpur had never been a part of Punjab — traditionally or culturally.

About the demand of Saraike as a separate province or autonomous province, Mr. Jatoi said the decision should be left to the people of the area, who could express their opinion through referendum or election on one-to-one vote basis.

However, he said, he was not ready to allow a single inch of land to be included in any other province or unit. "That is why I cannot suggest a seraike province comprising some areas of Punjab. I am only talking about Bahawalpur."

**MARTIAL LAW:** Mr. Jatoi said he believed that the military regime was not going to lift Martial Law.

"You can see that less than two months are left to the deadline set by the Prime Minister, but there seems to be no sign of the lifting of Martial Law."

However, he felt that even if

Martial Law was lifted, the Amendment Bill was there. It would simply be "a Martial Law under the constitutional cover," he added.

Commenting on the continuation of Gen. Zia-ul-Haq as President, Mr. Jatoi opposed the idea that the CMLA should remain President even after Martial Law was lifted. "He did not contest any presidential election," Mr. Jatoi remarked.

**PARTY REORGANISATION:** The Sind PPP chief said proposals for the reorganisation of the party had been prepared during the party chairperson, Benazir Bhutto's recent stay in the country while certain things were still under consideration. An announcement in this regard would be made at an appropriate time.

He clarified that the whole organisational setup of the party would not be changed. Only those offices, which were lying vacant for one reason or the other, would be filled. Office bearers, who had become inactive and were not ready to fulfil any responsibility, would also be replaced, he said.

**REGISTRATION:** About the conditions for registration of political parties, provided in the proposed Political Parties Bill, Mr. Jatoi said it was undemocratic and, in principle, the PPP was opposed to it. However, he said, the Central Executive Committee of the party would consider the issue when the time came.

# POLICE UNCOVER SUBVERSION PLANS

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Nov 85 p 1, 8

[Article by Saghir Ahmad]

[Text] KARACHI, Nov 13: Police have seized a letter in which the ring leader of the four dacoits killed on Tuesday had asked for funds under the "Baluchistan Scheme".

This is by far the most significant and also the most intriguing evidence collected by police till late tonight in this case, well-placed sources said.

Sources would not divulge the name of the addressee but said the letter was recovered from the nephew and brother-in-law of deceased Amanullah who lived in the rented house in Block 'L' where the police made the pre-dawn raid on Tuesday.

The letter was enclosed in an envelope and was ready to be mailed. It reported urgent need of funds which was another intriguing point as police have so far recovered looted property worth about Rs 300,000 from their possession.

In another development, police have established that there were at least 12 members in the gang, if not more.

Four were killed in the encounter; three were taken into custody in the raids; and three are clearly identified but are on the run. Two have to be picked from amongst the suspects in police custody.

The three women taken into custody from the house in Block 'L' have been set free. One is the

widow of Amanullah. The other is her sister, and the third is the house maid.

On the other hand, police have so far held 12 persons out of which nine are stated to be enrolled as students in Dawood Engineering College.

All 12 were picked up from the "Baluch Hostel" where the first part of the gun-fight took place on Tuesday.

It has also been established that the four dacoits used Room No. 4 as their hide-out. It is also from this room that the entire seizure has been made. This includes the looted property, six revolvers, ammunition etc.

Majority of the 12 persons including the students are of Iranian Baluchistan origin, sources said.

Police have not been able to find out the vegetable vendor whose push-cart was found within the hostel premises, and it is now being suspected that it was used by the gang as a cover for some mysterious activities.

The FIR registered at North Nazimabad Police Station showed official arrest of three persons viz Nawaz Mubarki, Mohammad Ramzan (hostel's care-taker), and Akbar Ali. They were produced before a court which remanded them into police custody for seven days.

On the official wanted list are Husain (an Iranian national), and

Ibrahim, and Mohammad stated to be residents of Tando Jam. Several raids were conducted but they were not found.

Close questioning of the arrested persons had led to useful information, sources said adding that Nawaz had confessed being member of the gang which, according to Nawaz, had committed at least 10 dacoities, including the Korangi UBL branch case and the murder of Sardar Maula Dad.

The other two viz Ramzan and Akbar have been charged with harbouring criminals and possession of illicit arms.

Search for the dacoit injured in Korangi Bank dacoity case earlier this week is still in progress. Police believe two more gang members were with the injured dacoit at some hideout.

Meanwhile, post-mortem of the four dacoits was completed today. The bodies were then placed in the cold storage for identification for a week.

The IGP has simultaneously formed a special investigation cell for the case. Another team has been formed to identify policemen who performed extra-ordinarily well in the operation and worthy of reward. At the same time, 750 empties were recovered from the places where the dacoits entrenched themselves for the encounter with the police.

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## ROBBER KILLED BY POLICE SAID TO BE IRANIAN NATIONAL

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Nov p 1

[Article by Sadiq Jafri and Hanif Hassan]

[Excerpt] KARACHI, Nov 13: Amanullah Mubarak, leader of the dacoits who were killed in encounter with police on Tuesday in North Nazimabad, was an Iranian national and was living in Pakistan under the fake name of Rasheed. He also had a Pakistani passport under the same name, sources said.

His younger brother, Mohammad Mubarak, son of Islam Khan, who had enrolled himself in Karachi University Department of International Relations on April 14, 1981 in BA Honours, left Pakistan two weeks ago. His address, according to the University record is: Chani, Iranshehr, Baluchistan, Iran. His Iranian National Identity Card No. was 460388.

Amanullah was wanted by Pakistani police in several cases. The Iranian government had also reportedly demanded his and his accomplices' extradition.

According to the police, the cases in which Amanullah and his accomplices were involved, were: encounter with Pakistani law-enforcing agencies two years ago at Pak-Iran border area, Dalsar, in

which several officials were killed; they were later arrested and sent to Machh Jail from where they escaped on May 22 this year, killing two jail wardens; they killed one person at Gadani in a highway robbery; they were involved in several dacoities and robberies in North Nazimabad, Orangi Town and Defence, and also the recent Korangi bank robbery; they killed Sardar Mir Moola Dad, an Iranian Baluch leader in Gulshan-i-Iqbal on Sept 27.

The murder of Mir Moola Dad, a member of Irani Parliament during Shah's time, and the tribal chief of the entire plain of Dashtiari in Iranian Baluchistan, was the biggest crime committed by Amanullah and his accomplices.

A senior police officer had termed it a political murder rather than a result of tribal rivalry.

According to published reports Mir Moola Dad, who migrated to Pakistan after the Shah's fall, with his family, had bought a bungalow in Gulshan-i-Iqbal in 1979. He had no apparent source of income.

This influential pro-Shah tribal chief had contacts with Pakistani Baluch tribal leaders. In fact, a Senator from Baluchistan, who had rushed to Karachi after hearing the news of his murder, had not allowed the police to take the body for autopsy.

Reports further said that a large number of Iranian exiles and others from Iranian Baluchistan used to visit Mir Moola Dad's house frequently as he was one of the most important Iranian exiled leaders in Pakistan. He also used to visit friends and relatives in Turbat, Dasht and Mand in Pakistani Baluchistan. According to police record, this was the first murder of an important Iranian exile in Pakistan.

In Tuesday's encounter, Amanullah and Rasool Bukhsh, two of the five who had escaped from Machh Jail, were killed. The remaining three viz Naseer, Subhan Margi and Kamal Khan, are still at large. Even if they have been arrested, the police have not announced it yet.

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## TALKS BEGIN ON LOAN FOR KARACHI DEVELOPMENT PROJECT

Karachi DAWN in English 5 Nov 85 p 8

## [Text]

KARACHI, Nov 4: Mayor Abdus Sattar Afghani, leaves here on Tuesday for Washington morning to take part in the final negotiations for Rs. two billion World Bank loan for Karachi Special Development Programme, beginning from Nov 6.

The Director General KDA, Mr. Z.A. Nizami, who is also a member of four-member delegation which will hold final round of talks with the World Bank authorities, left for Washington on Monday.

Other members of the delegation, the Provincial Finance Minister Mr. Jawed Sultana Japanwala and Additional Secretary, Planning, Mr A.B. Soomro, will join later. The talks would follow signing of an agreement with the World Bank.

According to informed sources here, the external financing of Karachi Special Development Programme to the tune of Rs 1,800 million will be met by the World Bank, while the Pakistan Government will contribute Rs. 490 million.

The loan will be utilised for strengthening of Keenjhar-Gujjo Canal banks, laying of an alternate syphon, sewerage system, flood protection, transport, drainage, traffic engineering, roads network, study of mass transit system, up-grading of kutchi abadis, treatment plants, solid waste management etc.—APP.

PPI adds:

The Mayor, talking to newsmen said the loan will consist of two components: the World Bank and the ADB. While the agreement with the former will be signed in Washington on Nov. 8 or 9 that with

the latter will be signed soon there after in Manila, the ADB Headquarters.

However, the representative of ADB will be present at Washington meeting, the Mayor said.

He said, the projects under KSDP will be executed by various agencies namely, KMC, Karachi Water and Sewerage Board (KWSB), Karachi Development Authority KDA and the Sind Government.

While the KMC will execute kutchi abadis uplift, solid waste management and accounting assistance to KMC, the KWSB will be responsible for five projects, namely Kinjhar-Gujjo Canal, construction of stand-by syphons, Hub Water Supply Scheme (state two), renovation and expansion of sewerage treatment plants one and two, and sewerage and wastewater disposal study.

He said, the loan will carry an interest of 11 per cent per annum. However, KMC will pay five per cent interest and the rest will be paid by the Federal Government in the form of grant-in-aid like that in Faisalabad and Hyderabad.

The mayor said after laying of the alternate syphons, the problem of disruption in water supply in Karachi due to bursting of pipelines frequently, would be solved on a permanent basis.

He said it would be KMC's good luck to have the loan, which will be the biggest amount ever received by the civic body and would be a "positive step" towards solving the problems of Karachi, particularly the kutchi abadis for the upgradation of which a sum of Rs. 510 million has been allocated.—PPI.

## REOPENING OF PAKISTAN-IRAN TRADE ROUTE URGED

Karachi DAWN in English 6 Nov 85 Business Supplement p I

[Text]

KARACHI, Nov 5: The President of the Quetta Chamber of Commerce and Industry (QCCI) has demanded reopening of the Katcha Post trade route between Pakistan and Iran, closed since early 1981.

The QCCI President, Mr. Ammuddin Achakzai, told 'Dawn' the closure of the Katcha Post had created problems for the business community and substantial losses were being suffered.

"We have informed the Chairman of the Central Board of Revenue and he has promised to examine the matter in depth," Mr. Achakzai said.

But informed sources told 'Dawn' the decision had been taken by the Government of Pakistan on a request by the Iranian Government since the border post was providing "an easy access to smugglers".

These sources said no real loss of trade had taken place since the Katcha Post was used only by those exporters who could not use the

other channels because of close scrutiny and checks on both sides of the border.

"The Katcha Post is just 15 to 20 miles from the Tofan border from where all surface trade between the two countries takes place," one exporter said. "There was no point in having one check post so close to another."

KIBATTIS: Moreover, sources said there was no customs check post on the Iranian side of Katcha Post which provided an excellent opportunity to send anything to take addresses in Iran to claim rebates and export concessions.

The QCCI President also demanded that headquarters of banks and other financial institutions should be shifted to provincial capitals, to boost investment opportunities for the people in their province.

In Baluchistan's Hub area, he said, not one industrial unit is owned by a Baluch.

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## SPECIAL TRADE AGREEMENT TO BE SIGNED WITH BANGLADESH

Karachi DAWN in English 6 Nov 85 Business Supplement p I

[Article by Hasan Saeed]

## [Text]

DHAKA, Nov 5: Bangladesh and Pakistan have agreed to increase the volume of their annual bilateral trade by at least 80 million US dollars to make the total two-way trading to nearly 200 million dollars a year.

Officials here said the additional 80 million dollar trading will be carried out under a Special Trading Arrangement (STA) by the State Trading Corporations of the two countries.

The two sides agreed to sign the Special Trade Arrangement by January next at the end of four days of trade talks here on Tuesday.

Bangladesh Commerce Secretary, A.B.M. Golam Mostafa led his country's delegation to the talks while the Pakistani team was led by Commerce Secretary Mubtahir Masood.

**Annual trade:** Officials said the average annual trade turnover between Dhaka and Islamabad was currently at over 110 million dollars. Trading between the two countries are done both through government and private channels but the additional trading will be

restricted exclusively to the state-owned trading corporations.

During the talks the two sides also identified new items for exchange besides the traditional commodities. Dhaka, in addition to its traditional exports of Jute and Tea, will try to sell to Pakistan commodities like newsprint paper and paper products, hand and particle board, spices, C.I. pipe and telecommunication equipment.

**Exports to ED:** Pakistan which has long been exporting only chemicals, machinery and cotton, would explore the possibilities of boosting its exports to Bangladesh with new items like light engineering products, pharmaceuticals, pig iron, sports goods, surgical instruments and railway coaches.

**Specializing at:** the conclusion of talks Mr. Mubtahir Masood said the agreement to raise trade volume would add a new dimension to the economic cooperation between the two countries.

Bangladesh Commerce Secretary Golam Mostafa hoped that trading with friendly country Pakistan would grow to the satisfaction of the two countries.

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## OFFICIAL TALKS ABOUT RICE EXPORT FIGURES

Karachi DAWN in English 13 Nov 85 Business Supplement p I

[Text]

KARACHI, Nov 12: Out of a total production of 2.8 million tonnes of rice in the country 1.25 million tonnes will be exported — 750,000 tonnes from Sindh and 500,000 tonnes from the Punjab.

This was stated at a meeting held at the NLC Headquarters (South Zone), presided over by Brig. Hadayat Ali, Commander, and attended by representatives of Pakistan Railways, Rice Export Corporation, and the President of Rice Millers and Traders of Sindh, Mr Gada Hussain Mahasar.

Brig Hadayat Ali told the meeting that out of 750,000 tonnes to be exported from Sindh, 97 per cent of it will be transported from all parts of Sindh to Karachi by rail which is the cheapest means of transportation.

The exportable rice will be lifted from Larkana (290,000 tonnes), Jacobabad (265,000), Sukkur (10,000), Shikarpur (80,000), Dadu (65,000), Hyderabad (5,000), Badin (20,000) and Thatta (15,000).

Mr M. Ziaullah, representing the Pakistan Railways, said during the current month and in December, 100 wagons per day will be made available for the movement of rice and he assured that this will be the minimum number and it could go upto 130 wagons a day.

**PILFERAGE:** The President of the Millers and Traders of Sindh expressed his fear that pilferage was possible if the rice was not loaded in wagons in time at the designated

ten railway stations. That would be a loss of upto 1½ kgs of rice per bag to the growers.

If there is no loading at any one particular station, the wagons will move on to other stations.

Brig Hadayat Ali pointed out that the growers prefer that their crops be lifted either by the Railways or the NLC because in these cases the growers receive the payment on the spot which is not so when they hire mechanised trucks. The payment is made at Pipri when the consignments are offloaded.

Where the Railways is not being able to provide wagons at smaller places, NLC will quickly intervene and lift the cargo. Where the Railways and the NLC are lifting the cargoes, the payment is made to the growers through the Food Department.

The bulk of the rice movement will take place by the end of November and harvesting is already taking place.

The NLC officer, Maj. G.M. Khat-tak, will coordinate the movement of rice from the interior to the Karachi Port.

**CENTRES:** The Commander of the NLC agreed with the millers' group that Larkana, Jacobabad and Dadu will be made centres of collection for the convenience of all.

The NLC Commander said that to make sure that 100 wagons are made available daily, the Railways should make arrangements for 120

wagons. Past experience has shown that the promise of 60 wagons was not fulfilled and the average supply was 12 wagons per day. Since the situation has improved this year there is every likelihood of fulfilling the promises, he added.

In Punjab, only Government transport is made available while in Sindh both Government and private transport is issued. The private transport will be inducted only in case of emergencies when both the NLC and the Railways cannot provide the required facilities.

The entire transport system will be busy during the period because movement of cotton and sugarcane will also start at the same time when rice is procured and transported to Karachi.

**LARKANA LEADING:** According to figures made available for both Punjab and Sindh for the procurement of rice for export, Larkana tops the list of 28 districts with a projected movement of 307,000 tonnes, followed by 217,000 tonnes from Jacobabad 176,000 tonnes from Gujranwala and 110,000 tonnes from Sheikhupura.

Sindh produces 1.6 million tonnes and Punjab 1.2 million, out of which 1.25 million will be exported.

RECP was represented at the coordination meeting by Mr Ali Hussain Soomro and Mr S.K. Malik while Lt. Col. Wazir Mohammad, Maj. M. Hanif, Maj. G.M. Khattak and Maj. Ajaz Ahmed Siddiqui represented the NLC.

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CSO: 4600/111

## SUGGESTIONS FOR BOOSTING REMITTANCES PRESENTED

Karachi DAWN in English 7 Nov 85 Business Supplement PP I, IV

## [Text]

KARACHI, Nov 6: The Karachi Chamber of Commerce and Industry has expressed concern over the declining trend of home remittances since 1983/84 and repatriation of large numbers of overseas workers from the Gulf states.

The Chamber on Wednesday, released the recommendations to the Press adopted at a seminar on "Export of Manpower, Invisible Earnings and Home Remittances of Pakistan" organised by the Chamber in September last.

The recommendations are:

1. The Government should adopt measures by which Pakistani engineering, construction organisations and consultants in foreign countries obtaining the contracts be bound to employ workers from Pakistan in such industrial construction projects, of course observing the employment rules of those countries.

2. The Government of Pakistan should also enter into package deals with foreign countries employing outside manpower as has been done by Turkey and North Korean Governments.

3. The Government of Pakistan should ensure with the respective foreign governments that the contracts entered into by the Pakistani workers with their employers abroad are strictly adhered to. Numerous instances have come to the notice that the Overseas Employers force the Pakistani Workers to work on reduced wages contrary to the contracts.

4. In order to prevent reduction of Pakistan's share in the international labour market, the Government should organise and evolve a proper screening procedure so that

the unwanted element is prevented from entering the market abroad and the good reputation of the Pakistani workers is upheld. The Government, it suggested, should also diversify the export of manpower to other countries experiencing shortage of labour so as to protect ourselves from adverse events in individual countries.

5. Highly qualified, experienced and talented Pakistanis find their way to the market abroad. It is suggested that the Government should evolve policies to increase the opportunities for such professionals at home and also provide better terms & conditions of service so that a balance is maintained in the employment opportunity of such professionals within and outside the country.

6. A score of formalities, lengthy and time consuming procedure as well as "Red Tapes" involved in the manpower export and home remittances, indeed, frustrate the efforts. The procedure in this regard be simplified, formalities be curtailed and red tapism be avoided.

7. The seminar expressed concern over the stagnant earning through traditional sources of invisible earnings. Foreign exchange earnings from the tourism industry, shipping, banking, as well as insurances and services have been in the vicinity of around Rs 10,000 to 11,000 million for the past few years. The principal items of invisible earnings from traditional sources are transportation, travel, insurance income from miscellaneous services. These sources have an ample potential of foreign exchange earnings. The Government, should properly develop these

traditional sources through appropriate incentives.

8. The slump in home remittances reflects the slump in export of manpower and increased influx of the returnees from the Middle East. Therefore, the Government should evolve policies to actively promote employment generation at home. Pursuit of labour intensive technology has to be encouraged through deliberate policy measures.

**HUNDI SYSTEM:** 9. The most important factor for the decline of home remittances is said to be the flow of remittances through "Hundi" system which provide facilities for prompt payment to the addressees as compared to the time taken by bank for payment to the recipient. Moreover, the *Hundi Wala* also gives a premium over the official exchange rates.

In order to curb temptation for remittances by overseas Pakistani workers through *Hundi* some percent extra bent in on the prevalent exchange rates of rupees be allowed to them, so that they may be encouraged to remit their earnings through legal banking channels.

10. In order to help resolve unemployment problem of the returnees Pakistani workers, as well as to promote industrialisation, it was suggested that the Government should enhance the existing investment ceiling of Rs 1 Lac for establishing cottage industry with certain tax benefits, to Rs 5 Lac. Because due to depreciating value in Pakistani rupee from US dollar, world wide inflation and the high cost of machineries have made it practically impossible to establish cottage industry within the existing ceiling of Rs 1 Lac.

11. Regarding promotion of tourism the seminar recommended to provide added incentives and facilities for the promotion of tourism in the country. The transport and communication system deserves special attention in this regard. Our embassies abroad should be advised to take appropriate measures to publicize and promote Pakistan tourist resorts.

12. There is still ample scope in the field of construction in the Middle East. Although Pakistan has entered into this field, yet growing opportunities in this area still require to be fully explored and utilized. It is suggested that the Government should, therefore, provide more facilities and incentives so that our construction companies can operate there in a big way. Besides, Pakistan has an added advantage of entrepreneurial talent and skilled and unskilled manpower for undertaking a number of industrial turnkey projects abroad. Participation in the turnkey projects abroad, especially in Middle East and African countries, would generate many-sided benefits to Pakistan in the areas such as banking, consultancy, insurance, as well as export of machinery and equipment needed by industries which would be set there.

13. In order to increase the flow of Home Remittances, following steps were suggested:

Pakistan Bank's existing procedures should be revised streamlining that the remittances sent by overseas Pakistani workers are paid to beneficiaries well in time and without any inconvenience.

14. The seminar suggested that the fixation of salary for unskilled workers by the Bureau of Emigration should be revised. Because it is observed that in places of Pakistan labourers sent back from Libya, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and other Middle East countries, labourers from Bangladesh, India and Korea and other third world countries are being recruited on monthly salary of 300/400 riyals. Whereas the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment has fixed minimum salary scale of 610/- riyals for these countries. It recommended that the ceiling of the

minimum wage rates fixed for unskilled workers be removed in order to compete with the labourers going on cheaper salaries from other countries.

15. The seminar suggested that a liberal policy should be adopted so that export of manpower can be enhanced.

#### PROTECTORATES OFFICE:

16. The seminar suggested to abolish the office of the Protector of Emigrants. Because this office, in fact, create problems for the workers going abroad.

17. The seminar suggested that the Head of the Bureau of Emigration and Overseas Employment, should be headed by a person taken from the private sector like the Export Promotion Bureau.

18. It also recommended that the status of Overseas Employment Promoters who export manpower abroad should be made equal to all exporters of Pakistan in every respect. The provision of inheritance, sale and transfer of business concerns be made available to the exporters of manpower also. Manpower exporters should be treated at par with all other exporters and facilities for travelling abroad, like all other exporters, be given to them also. Manpower exporters should also be included on the list of Annual Export Awards of Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry and other award giving organisations.

19. It suggested that the overseas Pakistani workers should be allowed to bring and/or send industrial machineries out of their foreign exchange earnings, and for that necessary change in the Import Policy be made.

20. Government should form a commission including Chamber's representative to study the ways and means to solve the problems of Overseas Pakistani Workers in home and abroad and to submit its findings to the Government to resolve their problems. It recommended.

**OPF ACTIVITIES:** 21. The seminar noted with concern the activities of Overseas Pakistani Foundation. And suggested that the OPF should bring out periodical (at least monthly) informative publication in the shape of News Letters, as other's various organisations including Chambers of Commerce

and Industry do. The OPF should mobilise its efforts to provide the Overseas Pakistani Workers abroad and their dependents in home the technical trainings and other formalities for which the OPF was established. The OPF should prepare plan and housing schemes for overseas Pakistani workers with complete civil amenities in Hyderabad, Sukkur, Karachi, Quetta, Multan, Gujrat, Jhelum, Abbottabad and Peshawar and obtain land from the respective authorities of these areas and sell land and/or constructed houses to the overseas Pakistani workers.

22. Under the Emigration Ordinance 1979, the name of recruiting agencies were changed to that of Overseas Employment Promoters, who were required to pay Rs one lac to the Government under this Ordinance before licence is granted to them. This licence is not transferable and is cancelled in the event of death of the licence holder. It is suggested that this licence be made inheritable in case of death of the licence holder and transferable to other party as is done in case of transfer and/or sale of other business concerns.

23. Income Tax rebate: The exporters of manufactured goods are provided incentive to boost the export of commodities by way of income tax rebate at the rate of 55 per cent. The Overseas Employment Promoters have been denied this facility. Even the commission earned in foreign exchange by such promoters from their principal abroad is also not eligible for tax rebate. Overseas Employment promoters may also be allowed tax rebate.

24. In order to give incentives to overseas Pakistani to send their remittances through official banking channel, it is suggested that Foreign Exchange Act applicable on overseas Pakistani workers in respect of their remittance and/or bringing in foreign exchange may be withdrawn so that they may avoid to transfer their money through "Hundi" system, and thus flow of invisible earnings and home remittances through banking channels be maintained.

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## BRIEFS

CAUSES OF KARACHI UNREST--Karachi, 5 Nov--Mahajir Ittehad Tehrik has said that unrest among people of Karachi is not so much on account of lack of civic amenities but owing to the sense of deprivation among the population. The main problems are lack of job opportunities, extension of quota system for another 10 years; non-repatriation of Pakistanis stranded in Bangladesh etc. The Sind Government should have constituted a committee of MPAs to look into problems other than supply of water, power, gas, and public transport, it said. The meeting at Malir was addressed, among others, by Dr Salim Hyder, Dr Tajuddin Malik and Mr Israr Ahmed. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 6 Nov 85 p 6] /9274

MUHAJIR DEMANDS DEFENDED--Karachi, 5 Nov--Mr Altaf Husain, chief of the banned Mohajir Qaumi Movement, has said it is unjust to dub Mohajirs narrow-minded when they talk of their rights as a "fifth nationality." Talking to various unit office-bearers and workers here on Tuesday, he regretted that the Mohajirs were living as "second class citizens" even after 38 years of independence. When others were demanding their rights, the Mohajirs should also raise their voice for their rights, he added. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 6 Nov 85 p 6] /9274

MILITARY COURT CONVICTS 23--Lahore, 6 Nov--A Summary Military Court here has, under MLR-31 and MLO-6, sentenced 23 persons to 14 years rigorous imprisonment, a fine of Rs 20,000 each and confiscation of all movable and immovable property. They were summoned twice by the Summary Military Court No 25. As they failed to acknowledge the summons, they were tried in absentia. They are: Islamullah Tipu s/o Salam Ullah, r/o 2/A, Nazimabad, Gul Bahar, Karachi. Agha Walid s/o Hashmat Ullah, r/o 14 Andar Nagar Street, Nizam Road, Police Station, Samanabad, Lahore. Kausar Ali Shah, s/o Afzal Ali Shah, r/o 7/D, Gulberg III, Lahore. Muhammad Ashraf alias Shera Barafwala, s/o Muhammad Botta, caste Kashmiri, pan cigarette shop, Chowk Dar ul Islam, Mohallah Islampura, Gurjranwala. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 7 Nov 85 p 1] /9274

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**15 January 1986**